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Despite recent progress, abject poverty remains pervasive in many countries around 
the world. Achieving further sustained reductions in poverty will require more 
effective poverty eradication policies. The effectiveness of these policies, in turn, 
depends on how well we understand the structural dynamics of households moving in 
and out of poverty. 
 
The four papers in this dissertation explore several issues in the modeling and 
measurement of structural household welfare dynamics that to date have received little 
attention in the academic literature but that are directly relevant for the design of 
poverty reduction policies. 
 
The first paper examines quantitative methods for modeling household welfare 
dynamics and identifying long-run welfare equilibria and poverty traps. It proposes a 
new semiparametric panel data estimator that has several advantages over methods 
used in the extant literature. The empirical application to data from three Indian 
villages shows deep structural immobility. Structural poverty traps loom large, as rural 
Indian households who start out asset-poor are likely to remain poor. 
 
The second paper proposes and applies a statistical test to examine whether high 
estimates of economic mobility and transitory poverty in the existing literature are 
 partially driven by stochastic one-off income flows. It finds that these estimates are 
inversely correlated to the length of the interval between panel observations 
suggesting that estimates based on short panel spells represent (high) upper bounds of 
underlying structural economic mobility and (low) lower bounds of chronic poverty. 
 
The third paper introduces several new classes of intertemporal poverty measures that 
can incorporate the variability of household welfare and the distribution of poverty 
across households over time. Accounting for these intertemporal factors in rural 
Pakistan leads to greater estimates of poverty than using existing, static poverty 
indicators.  
 
The fourth paper uses a regression-based technique to explore the household 
characteristics that determine income inequality in rural Pakistan. The level of 
inequality is determined primarily by land ownership and location. These structural 
variables are difficult to change by policy, in contrast to the factors that reduced 
inequality over time, such as access to secondary education and lower dependency 
ratios. 
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Chapter 1:  
Introduction 
 
Context and Research Questions 
In the Millennium Development Goals the world community committed itself to 
substantial improvements in human well-being with the central goal of halving 
poverty rates by 2015. While there has been substantial progress towards this goal in 
some regions of the world, abject poverty remains all too common. In 2004 around 1 
billion of the world’s population continues to live on less than one dollar a day, and 
more than 2.5 billion subsist on less than two dollars (World Bank 2007). The 
magnitude of this human misery remains enormous and presents formidable 
challenges, particularly in rural areas of many developing countries. 
 
Quicker and more sustained progress towards reducing poverty requires more 
effective public policies. Enhancing the effectiveness of these poverty reduction 
policies, in turn, depends heavily on improving our understanding of household 
welfare dynamics. Only if we know more about the processes and dynamics of how 
households escape and fall into poverty over time can we better target assistance. 
Given the importance and the magnitude of the challenge to reduce poverty, it is 
surprising and unfortunate how little we know to date about these dynamics. 
 
This dissertation is motivated by this twin challenge: tackling interesting academic 
research questions on household welfare dynamics which, at the same time, have 
direct practical relevance and the potential to inform the design of more effective 
poverty reduction policies. These four papers on household welfare dynamics explore 
  2 
different aspects of this challenge. They, respectively, address the following key 
research questions: 
 
1. What quantitative methods are most appropriate to model household welfare 
dynamics and to uncover potential poverty traps? 
2. To what extent are estimates of welfare dynamics and economic mobility 
affected by the length of time over which surveys observe households? 
3. How can households’ experiences of poverty over time be measured to take 
account of welfare variability for individual households and of the 
intertemporal distribution of poverty across households? 
4. What household level factors determine the level of economic inequality, and 
what factors explain changes to inequality over time? 
 
The new methods developed in the four papers are tested in empirical applications to 
two panel datasets covering rural households in South Asia where poverty is 
structurally deeply entrenched. The ICRISAT Village Level Studies (VLS) panel 
follows households in three villages in semi-arid India from 1975/76 to 2003/04, 
making it the longest running panel dataset in any developing country and, thus, 
ideally suited to exploring household welfare dynamics. The IFPRI Pakistan Rural 
Household Survey (PRHS) describes rural households in four districts over the period 
1986/87 to 1990/91.  
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An Introduction to the Four Papers 
Modeling Household Asset Dynamics 
The first paper Modeling Household Asset Dynamics: New Methods with an 
Application to Rural India quantitatively explores the dynamics of household welfare 
changes. It lays out the deficiencies of the methodological toolkit used in the existing 
empirical literature on household welfare dynamics (Jalan and Ravallion 2004; 
Lokshin and Ravallion 2004; Barrett et al. 2006). It then introduces a more robust 
semiparametric panel data estimation technique that is more suitable for modeling 
household asset dynamics and precisely locating dynamic asset equilibria. Also, its 
empirical application contributes to the small emerging empirical literature on non-
linear household welfare dynamics by providing the first study for rural India, a 
country which is home to almost 40% of the world’s population living on less than 
one dollar per day (World Bank 2007). 
 
Identifying the shape of household welfare dynamics and the equilibrium level of long 
term household welfare poses a difficult academic challenge, both in terms of methods 
and data requirements. Yet, it is also highly relevant for designing effective anti-
poverty policies. If there is a single welfare equilibrium to which all households 
gravitate in the long run, we need to know its level. If it is sufficiently high to escape 
poverty, then policy can focus on helping households move along the dynamic welfare 
path more quickly. In contrast, an equilibrium below the poverty line would constitute 
a poverty trap and require structural changes that provide new economic opportunities 
for households. 
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Alternatively, household welfare dynamics may exhibit multiple dynamic welfare 
equilibria with threshold points above which households will move towards a higher 
level of welfare, and below which households converge towards another, low-level 
equilibrium. If this lower level of welfare lies below the poverty line then the 
threshold point would constitute the entrance to a dynamic poverty trap. Households 
can be chronically poor simply by starting out poor. Clearly, the policy response in 
such a world would differ markedly from the single equilibrium case, requiring 
policies to lift households above the threshold point and social protection measures to 
ensure that households don’t fall below the thresholds in the aftermath of adverse 
shocks.  
 
This paper uses a definition of household welfare based on assets stocks rather than 
income or expenditure flows. This is particularly appropriate in a dynamic context and 
helps to identify structural poverty. Ultimately, it is asset holdings that, conditional on 
production technologies and market prices, determine a household’s level of material 
well-being. Thus, relative to income or expenditure flows, observing asset stocks 
generates more information about which households are likely to be poor in the future, 
which can improve the targeting of public policies (Carter and Barrett 2006). 
 
The empirical application to data from three Indian villages portrays a society 
characterized by pervasive structural immobility and economic stagnation. Despite a 
very slow upward trend over the last 30 years, a large proportion of village households 
simply remain at their initial welfare level. This suggests a strong type of poverty trap: 
absent any structural changes, (in expectation) the currently poor remain poor. The 
most precise estimates from the new semiparametric estimation technique suggests 
that the median household in the villages already attained the equilibrium level of 
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welfare in 2001, suggesting that the concurrent consumption poverty rate of 22%  is 
likely to persist in the absence of structural change that increases villagers’ 
productivity. 
 
Finally, disaggregating the results by subgroup shows a predictable pattern. Higher 
castes, larger landholders and more educated households enjoy monotonically greater 
welfare equilibria than their lower caste, smaller landholder and less educated peers. 
 
Economic Mobility the Length of Observation  
The second paper, entitled Do Short-Term Observed Income Changes Overstate 
Structural Economic Mobility?, is motivated by the recent empirical literature on 
household income dynamics in developing countries which has tended to find a high 
degree of economic mobility and, consequently, concluded that a large proportion of 
poverty is transitory (Baulch and Hoddinott 2000; McCulloch and Baulch 2000). This 
paper investigates what we can infer from these results in terms of the underlying 
structural economic mobility that is the focus of long-term poverty reduction efforts. 
 
We can think of total economic mobility as comprised of structural and stochastic 
economic mobility. Structural economic mobility results from changes in non-
stochastic income resulting both from changes in household assets and changes in 
expected returns to these assets. Stochastic mobility in contrast is due to changes in 
stochastic transitory income as well as changes in measurement error. 
 
This definition frames the central argument in this paper: If we don’t control for 
stochastic factors and, thus, implicitly assume that total economic mobility measures 
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structural mobility, then the length of the interval between panel rounds influences the 
estimate of economic mobility. If the random components of the income changes 
observed in the panel survey, i.e., one-off stochastic transitory income and 
measurement error, are independently distributed then we should expect shorter 
intervals to lead to larger estimates of economic mobility and transitory poverty. A 
statistical test to verify this hypothesis is proposed and applied to the PRHS data from 
rural Pakistan. 
 
Previous work using the same data (Baulch and McCulloch 1998) concluded that only 
3 percent of households are poor in all five years of the panel. This suggests a very 
high degree of transitory poverty and economic mobility (around the poverty line) and 
makes the PRHS data well-suited to testing whether the observation spell length 
influences the estimates. 
 
By controlling for measurement error the paper partially filters out this second random 
component of observed household income. This allows the test to concentrate on the 
effect of stochastic transitory income. The results based on the PRHS data confirm 
that economic mobility and the transitory share of poverty are, indeed, inversely 
correlated to the interval between panel observations. 
 
This indicates that estimates of total economic mobility capture structural economic 
mobility better when observed spells are longer. An obvious corollary is that total 
economic mobility estimates based on short panel data spells need to be interpreted 
with caution, suggesting that the high estimates of economic mobility and transitory 
poverty found in the existing literature represent (high) upper bounds of underlying 
structural economic mobility and (low) lower bounds of chronic poverty. 
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Measuring Poverty over Time 
The third paper in this dissertation is entitled Measuring Poverty over Time: 
Accounting for Income Variability and the Intertemporal Distribution of Poverty. 
Poverty is not a static, one-off experience that can be characterized by a single poverty 
measure at one point in time. Periods spent in poverty can have a range of negative 
dynamic repercussions for individual and households, e.g., caused by stigma costs, 
dynamic poverty traps, and preferences for stable welfare levels. 
 
The dynamic aspects of poverty have long been part of qualitative research but 
quantitative poverty analysis tends to focus on static, single-period, snapshot views. 
With a growing availability of panel data it is now possible to incorporate poverty 
dynamics in quantitative analysis, too. However, to date there have been few attempts 
in the development economics literature to expand static poverty measures to an 
intertemporal setting. 
 
This paper examines two intertemporal extensions to the standard Foster-Greer-
Thorbecke (Foster et al. 1984) (FGT) poverty indices and, for each, proposes a variety 
of suitable classes of measures. The first extension incorporates welfare variability 
into a measure of intertemporal household poverty. Two classes of measures are 
proposed based on the assumption that welfare variability reduces intertemporal 
household well-being. One, based on constant equivalent income, calculates the 
unique average household income over time that would result in the same amount of 
household poverty as the household’s actual income history. As a result, periods spent 
in poverty are never ‘forgotten’. This measure is appropriate if the goal is to minimize 
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the number of ever-poor households, for example, if households cannot fully recover 
from periods spent in poverty due to physical irreversibility or stigma. It is also 
relevant when escaping poverty is difficult due to thresholds effects in household 
welfare dynamics.  
 
The second, based on stability equivalent, penalizes household welfare variability at 
all parts of the distribution. It is particularly appropriate to account for welfare 
variability when there are no thresholds effects associated with becoming poor.  
 
The second intertemporal extension to static FGT measures accounts for the 
intertemporal distribution of poverty across households, i.e., the degree to which 
experiences of poverty are shared across households over time. To capture this, two 
new classes of measures are proposed and a third is derived based on Borooah’s 
(2002) measure of unemployment. These measures are compared to the one other 
indicator proposed in the literature to date (Basu and Nolen 2006). 
 
All of these intertemporal measures of poverty increase with greater levels of 
structural immobility and chronic poverty. The applications to the PRHS panel data 
show that accounting for income variability and the intertemporal distribution of 
poverty across households makes a substantial practical difference to how we assess 
poverty over time. 
Compared to standard static poverty measures, all the proposed new methods increase 
estimates of poverty. The size of the increase depends on the distribution of income in 
each district. As a consequence, accounting for welfare variability and the distribution 
of poverty across households can change the poverty rankings between districts.  
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Applying any of the proposed intertemporal extensions involves making some explicit 
value judgments, for example in choosing one technique over another or in choosing 
value of parameters. The commonly applied static poverty measures that are the 
workhorse of (policy) analysis, however, are not free of these value judgments; they 
simply make them implicitly. 
 
Determinants of Inequality and its Changes 
The fourth paper, on Microeconomic Determinants of Income Inequality in Rural 
Pakistan, explores the causes of the level of income inequality and its changes. It is 
motivated by two observations. On the one hand, a consensus has emerged that 
income inequality matters for poverty reduction, directly through its effects on the 
distribution of gains from economic growth as well as indirectly by raising the rate of 
future growth. On the other, there is surprisingly little quantitative evidence about the 
types of determinants of static and dynamic inequality that are relevant for policy 
planning purposes. 
 
Traditional income inequality decompositions are limited to decomposing outcomes 
either in terms of income sources (Shorrocks 1982), for instance, identifying the 
proportion of total inequality due to, say, labor and non-labor household income, or by 
subgroup (Shorrocks 1984), that is, examining the proportion of total inequality that is 
due to difference within and between subpopulations. In contrast, this paper 
decomposes income inequality in terms of the underlying drivers of income itself. By 
adapting Fields’ (2003) regression-based inequality decomposition technique it can 
explain income inequality by any factor for which data is available in a household 
survey. Thus, it can examine the impact on income inequality of specific household 
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characteristics, such as education, asset holdings or location; that is, in terms of 
variables that offer more direct insights for policy purposes. Furthermore, the paper 
extends the regression-based decomposition technique to panel data. This represents a 
convenient method to explore the determinants of inequality changes over time, and 
differentiate whether these changes occurred due to changes in the distribution of 
underlying factors or due to changes in the returns to these factors. 
 
The results from the PRHS data show that the factors that explain the level of income 
inequality differ from those that explain changes in income inequality in rural 
Pakistan. The level of income inequality is driven by land ownership and geographical 
location with owners of small non-irrigated plots in remote areas being worst off. 
These two variables change slowly over time, if at all. This is consistent with overall 
structural asset immobility. The small overall net increase in income inequality results 
from two opposite forces: Inequality increasing factors, which are similar to those 
explaining the level of inequality such as physical asset holdings and household 
location; and inequality reducing factors including greater secondary education and a 
lower dependency ratio. Clearly, changing the distribution of land and location is 
either impractical or impossible. Thus, if reducing income inequality in rural Pakistan 
is considered desirable, whether for its own sake or to increase future levels of 
economic growth and poverty reduction, then policy efforts should focus on 
improving access to secondary education and market access for remote households, 
and avoid any new measures that may further skew the distribution of land. 
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Summary 
Despite recent progress, abject poverty remains pervasive in many countries around 
the world. Achieving further sustained reductions in poverty will require more 
effective poverty eradication policies. The effectiveness of these policies, in turn, 
depends on how well we understand the structural dynamics of households moving in 
and out of poverty. 
 
The four essays in this dissertation explore several issues in the modeling and 
measurement of structural household welfare dynamics that to date have received little 
attention in the academic literature but that are directly relevant for informing the 
design of poverty reduction policies: modeling households’ asset accumulation 
dynamics and identifying long-run welfare equilibria and poverty traps, examining the 
robustness of economic mobility and transitory income estimates to changes in the 
observation period, measuring poverty over time when welfare is variable and poverty 
is unequally distribution across households, and identifying the drivers of income 
inequality and its changes over time. 
 
The applications to two panel datasets from south Asia show rural societies that are 
characterized by a large degree of economic stasis and structural welfare immobility. 
Structural poverty traps – albeit not multiple equilibrium poverty traps – appear a 
serious concern, as rural Indian households accumulate assets slowly, if at all. Thus, 
households who start out asset-poor are likely to remain poor absent any structural 
changes in the rural economy. 
 
Similarly, in rural Pakistan the level of income inequality is explained primarily by 
structural factors, such as land ownership and location. These are some of the same 
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factors that determine future productivity and income. However, since these are also 
factors which change little over time, they suggest a low level of structural economic 
mobility, mirroring the situation in the Indian villages. 
 
The findings in this dissertation also highlight that due to the short intervals between 
panel observations, common estimates of total economic mobility overstate the degree 
of underlying structural mobility. The estimates in the existing literature should, 
therefore, be interpreted as high upper bounds for structural economic mobility and as 
low lower bounds for chronic poverty. 
 
Finally, this dissertation proposes several new classes of intertemporal poverty 
measures. These expand existing, static Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty measures to 
explicitly account for two intertemporal dimensions of poverty: variability in 
household welfare and the distribution of poverty across households over time. 
Applying these new classes of measures to rural Pakistan demonstrates that controlling 
for these intertemporal dimensions leads to greater estimates of poverty than those 
suggested by existing, static poverty indicators.  
 
The overarching motivation for this dissertation has been to produce new techniques 
and empirical insights that have a practical policy application. It is my hope that these 
papers will become a useful addition to the toolkit of household welfare analysis and 
perhaps ultimately help improve the design of long-term policies aimed at reducing 
structural poverty. 
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Chapter 2: 
Modeling Household Asset Dynamics: 
New Methods with an Application to Rural India 
 
1 Introduction 
Alleviating poverty is one of the key challenges for the new millennium. Meeting this 
challenge requires effective poverty reduction policies. Designing these policies, in 
turn, requires an understanding of the underlying welfare dynamics that determine 
how individuals and households escape or fall into poverty over time. Policy makers 
need information on two key issues: First, on the location of the dynamic household 
welfare equilibria towards which people converge over time, as this will indicate 
whether households are trapped in poverty given current economic opportunities and 
returns. Second, on the shape of household welfare dynamics, as this will reveal the 
dynamic nature of possible poverty traps. 
 
If there is but one dynamic equilibrium, the key questions then would be what this 
equilibrium level of welfare is relative to the poverty line and how quickly households 
move towards it. If it is sufficiently high for households to escape poverty, then policy 
can focus on speeding up the convergence process. In contrast, a dynamic equilibrium 
below the poverty line would suggest that eventually all households are expected to be 
trapped in poverty. Overcoming such a structural poverty trap would require structural 
changes that provide new economic opportunities for households that raise their 
equilibrium level of welfare. 
 
  16 
If, instead, there are multiple dynamic welfare equilibria, a household’s long-term 
welfare depends on its initial condition. If it starts above a dynamic threshold, in 
expectation it will move towards a higher level of welfare. A starting position below 
the threshold would put it onto a path towards another, low-level equilibrium. If this 
lower level of welfare lies below the poverty line then the threshold point would 
constitute the entrance to a second type of poverty trap. Clearly, the policy response in 
such a world would differ markedly from the single equilibrium case. It would require 
social policies to lift households above the threshold point and social protection 
measures to ensure that households don’t fall below the thresholds in the aftermath of 
adverse shocks. A short term public investment in these social policies could harness 
the dynamic welfare process and yield large long term welfare benefits. Again, for the 
policies to be efficient, we would need to identify the precise location of the threshold 
point.  
 
Improving methods for identifying the shape of welfare dynamics and precisely 
locating dynamic welfare equilibria is, therefore, not just an interesting academic 
challenge that has not been explored in much detail in the empirical development 
literature. It is also of great practical importance.  
 
This paper contributes to our knowledge on household welfare dynamics in three 
ways. First, it compares existing empirical techniques for modeling household welfare 
dynamics by applying them to the same dataset. This helps to determine whether, and 
how, the modeling of household welfare dynamics is affected by choosing parametric 
versus nonparametric techniques and, by extension, provides some indication about 
whether the different shapes of the welfare dynamics and the different number of 
dynamic equilibria identified in the existing literature are likely due to differences in 
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estimation methods or to real differences in the datasets used. Second, it introduces 
and expands a semiparametric panel data estimation technique from the statistics 
literature that has several features that make it more suitable for modeling household 
asset dynamics and precisely locating asset equilibria than the techniques used in 
existing studies. Third, it contributes to the small emerging empirical literature on 
non-linear household welfare dynamics by providing the first case study for India. It 
uses the newly expanded ICRISAT Village Level Studies panel dataset which now 
spans 27 years with 13 observations per household. The long time span and the 
frequent observations make it ideally suited to exploring the shape of long-term 
household welfare dynamics and their associated equilibria. 
 
The empirical results suggest that these village economies are characterized by 
economic stasis. Household asset holdings are effectively at a static equilibrium. Over 
time asset levels follow a random walk where a household can expect to remain at its 
current level of asset welfare. Given this lack of dynamism it is not surprising that 
using more flexible econometric techniques to model asset holdings does not alter the 
results. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes three 
competing theories of household welfare dynamics and provides a stylized theoretical 
framework that guides the analysis in this paper. Section 3 reviews the small empirical 
literature on modeling non-linear household welfare dynamics. Sections 4 and 5 
introduce the data and construct the asset index that is needed for the subsequent asset 
dynamics analysis. Sections 6 reviews econometric methods used in the existing 
microeconomic welfare dynamics literature and introduces a new semiparametric 
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panel data technique. Results for all these different estimation techniques are 
presented in section 7. Section 8 concludes.  
 
2 Theories of Welfare Dynamics 
Three main hypotheses from the macroeconomic literature on growth dynamics can 
inform the analysis of micro-level dynamic poverty traps: unconditional convergence, 
conditional convergence and multiple dynamic equilibria (Carter and Barrett 2006).  
 
The concept of unconditional convergence originates from the Solow growth model. 
In the context of household level dynamics it suggests that all households eventually 
gravitate to the same long term equilibrium, based on the assumption that asset 
dynamics for all households follow a common, concave, monotone Markov process. 
The dynamics underlying the conditional convergence hypothesis are the same. It 
expands the unconditional convergence concept simply by allowing exogenous 
subgroups to have a different dynamic path and equilibrium. 
 
A priori, there is no clear reason why asset dynamics should follow an autoregressive 
process of this form. On the contrary, at least four theoretical models suggest that 
different types of nonconvexities can result in multiple dynamic equilibria and in 
poverty traps if the lower stable equilibrium is below the poverty line. 
 
First, the efficiency wage hypothesis (Mirrlees 1975; Stiglitz 1976; Dasgupta and Ray 
1986; Dasgupta 1997) links worker productivity and earnings. Only if a worker can 
afford to consume more than a minimum level will he be productive and, hence, 
employed. Others who are unable to afford the minimum level of consumption remain 
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poor. Second, limited access to credit or formal and informal insurance can limit a 
household’s ability to invest in human capital (Loury 1981; Galor and Zeira 1993) or 
in an income-generating opportunity (Banerjee and Newman 1993). As a result any 
household dynasty starting below a certain level of wealth, or suffering a shock large 
enough to let it fall below this threshold, will be trapped in poverty. Third, if 
participating in society and finding employment require minimum levels of 
expenditure (Bradshaw 1993; Parker 1998), then poor households can be permanently 
‘socially excluded’. Fourth, child labor models (Basu 1999; Emerson and Souza 2003) 
suggest that poor households that have to send their children to work instead of school 
are trapped in intergenerational poverty since as adults these children do not possess 
the qualifications to access opportunities to escape poverty.  
 
All these theoretical models have similar policy implications: if there are multiple 
dynamic equilibria with one stable equilibrium below the poverty line then the 
misfortune to start with low asset holdings or the realization of downside risk are 
structural causes of chronic poverty. Conversely, poverty traps and long term poverty 
could be eliminated if every household can be lifted above the unstable equilibrium 
threshold and if safety nets ensured that they remained there. Hence, one-off social 
expenditures would not only benefit households in the current period, but also result in 
higher welfare in all future periods. Current social expenditure would yield high long 
run returns. 
 
The above theoretical models can be stylized by recursion diagrams in household asset 
space as shown in Figure 1. The recursion functions denote expected household asset 
accumulation paths. The horizontal and the vertical axes display household asset 
holdings in the previous and in the current time period, respectively At+1and At. Any 
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point on the 45-degree line represents a dynamic asset equilibrium. Function f1(At) 
illustrates the case of multiple dynamic equilibria where the dynamic asset 
accumulation path crosses the 45-degree line several times. A precondition for the 
existence of multiple equilibria are non-convexities over at least a part of the asset 
domain. If the poverty line lies above A* then the unstable equilibrium point A’ 
indicates a dynamic asset poverty threshold. Above this threshold point and absent any 
negative asset shocks households can be expected to accumulate further until they 
reach the high level long-run equilibrium point A**. Below A’ households are on a 
trajectory which, in expectation, makes them poorer over time, moving towards the 
low-level poverty equilibrium at A*. 
 
 
Figure 1 Stylized Asset Recursion Diagram for Different Shapes of the Asset 
Accumulation Path 
 
Since these threshold points represent unstable equilibria a priori we might expect 
them to lie in a low density region of the distribution (Barrett and McPeak 2005), 
because in equilibrium households would be at either of the two stable equilibrium 
Lagged Assets 
Assets 
At= At+1 
f1(At) 
A’ A** A*           A’        B*  A * B** 
f2(At) 
f3(At) 
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points. If this is the case we need estimation techniques that can identify these unstable 
equilibria using relatively few data points around A’. Fully parametric techniques 
would be at a clear disadvantage as the estimated polynomial function would be driven 
by the mass of observations around A* and A**, likely leading to imprecise 
estimation of threshold points such as A’. 
 
The first alternative hypothesis of unconditional convergence can be represented by 
expected the asset recursion function f2(At). This would be consistent with a structural 
poverty trap if B** lies below the poverty line. The second alternative hypothesis, 
conditional asset convergence, would imply one such function for each exogenously 
determined subgroup. In the analysis below subgroup membership is defined by caste, 
landowning class, location of the household or its education level. Figure 1 illustrates 
the case of two subgroups. One follows f2(At) while the other is on trajectory f3(At) 
with each function having its own distinct dynamic accumulation path and asset 
equilibrium. As a result, in the conditional convergence case poverty traps could be 
subgroup specific. 
 
Even in the absence of multiple equilibria and poverty traps, there may be a case for 
helping the poor escape poverty through redistributive policies that i) benefit them in 
the form of immediate transfers and ii) raise mean asset levels in subsequent periods. 
We can express future mean asset holdings as a function of households’ current assets. 
If this function is strictly concave, as indicated by f2(At) and f3(At) in Figure 1, then 
future mean assets are a strictly quasi-concave function of households’ current assets. 
Therefore, reducing current asset inequality would increase mean future asset levels 
(Aghion et al. 1999; Banerjee and Duflo 2003).  
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Again, this would imply that redistribution can support poverty reduction if the gains 
for the poor from redistribution are larger than any potential negative effects on 
economic growth. Testing for concavity of the recursion diagram using household data 
is therefore a micro-level test analogous to the test for the effects of inequality on 
economic growth in the cross-sectional macro literature (for a summary see Banerjee 
and Duflo (2003)). 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that none of the above theories consider the speed of 
adjustment back to equilibrium as that is ultimately an empirical question. The models 
can only assume that households are ‘temporarily’ away from their respective stable 
dynamic equilibria (A* and A** in the case of multiple dynamic equilibria, B* and/or 
B** for unconditional and club convergence). This temporary deviation would be due 
to shocks causing asset losses or gains. Of course, in reality, depending on the speed 
of adjustment, this temporary state could be unacceptably long and justify policy 
intervention. 
 
3 The Empirical Literature on Modeling Welfare 
Dynamics 
Compared to the well-developed theoretical literature on welfare dynamics there is a 
relative dearth of empirical studies. The paucity of this literature is primarily due to 
the lack of suitable household panel data, but also to the empirical difficulties involved 
in modeling household welfare dynamics.  
 
In terms of estimation methods the few existing studies have modeled household 
welfare dynamics either fully parametrically or nonparametrically. Parametrically, the 
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level of household welfare in one period can be approximated by a Pth order 
polynomial function of welfare in the previous period: 
0 1
1
( 2,..., )
P
p
it p it it it
p
W W X t Tα α β ε−
=
= + + + =∑  
where Wit represents household i‘s welfare at time t, and Xit are other household 
characteristics. Existing studies have limited themselves to a first order autoregression 
model. While longer lags could affect the dynamic welfare path, they also reduce the 
number of usable observations and use up degrees of freedom in the estimation. 
 
Three published studies have used a model of this form. Two use the flow variables 
income and consumption to measure household welfare, the third is based on the stock 
variable of household asset holdings. Each measure has advantages and drawbacks for 
analyzing welfare dynamics. The beginning of section 5 explains why I chose 
household assets as the welfare measure in this paper. 
 
For Hungary and Russia, Lokshin and Ravallion (2004) estimate a third degree 
polynomial in income levels. They correct for serially dependent error terms and for 
sample attrition by running T-1 simultaneous autoregressive income equations for the 
T panel years, instrumenting for initial period income, and simultaneously estimating a 
Probit attrition model. Jalan and Ravallion (2004) use a fixed effect model in 
differences for rural China. Using income rather than asset data, neither of these two 
studies finds evidence for multiple dynamic equilibria. Both papers conclude that 
current income is a slightly concave function of lagged income. Therefore, poorer 
households would take longer to adjust to an income shock and are expected to move 
towards the single equilibrium more slowly than richer households. In contrast, Barrett 
et al. (2006) use asset data from Northern Kenya to estimate changes in assets as a 
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fourth degree polynomial function of past assets, controlling for household and time 
specific effects. They detect nonlinear asset dynamics with one unstable threshold 
point and two stable equilibria suggesting the existence of dynamic poverty traps. 
 
One key problem with such parametric specifications is that if the unstable threshold 
points lie in an area with few observations, which the theories reviewed in the last 
section suggest, we need a large enough sample size that the fitted polynomial 
function can accurately reflect the few observations around the thresholds. If the 
sample size is too small the observations near the threshold point may not be picked 
up by the polynomial, but instead enter as heteroskedastic and positively 
autocorrelated error (Barrett 2005). Also, while high order polynomial functions 
present a way to adjust the coefficients so that in the centre of the domain the function 
exhibits the desired nonlinearities, they can make the function move around wildly 
towards in the tails of the distribution. This is to be expected from statistical theory 
(Hastie et al. 2001) and indeed is what Barrett et al. (2006) find in practice.  
 
Three studies have tried to address these problems by using nonparametric estimation 
techniques. For Northern Kenya Barrett et al. (2006) run locally linear nonparametric 
LOWESS regressions of current herd size on its three month lagged value. Lybbert et 
al. (2004)  run the same type of nonparametric regressions but on one and ten year 
lagged herd size in Southern Ethiopia. Adato et al. (2006) analyze household asset 
dynamics in South Africa using local regression methods.1 
 
The advantage of nonparametric estimation is that it allows a fully flexible functional 
form, which is more responsive to potential non-linearities in the asset dynamics. The 
                                                 
1 Their exact regression method is not specified. 
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main drawback is that nonparametric techniques suffer from the ‘curse of 
dimensionality’. That is, the required sample size for estimation grows exponentially 
with the number of regressors. With common survey sample sizes this means that it is 
generally only possible to use one explanatory variable in nonparametric regressions. 
The Barrett et al. and Lybbert et al. papers are able circumvent this limitation as 
livestock accounts for almost all household assets in their settings. Hence, it is 
legitimate to use livestock as the single asset variable. Different types of livestock 
were aggregated by converting them into Tropical Livestock Units based on metabolic 
weight.  
 
In settings with more complicated household asset holdings, alternative techniques 
have to be used. One option is to reduce the number of asset variables by creating an 
asset index. For some of their survey sites Barrett et al. (2006) have done this using a 
methodology based on factor analysis methods used in Sahn and Stifel (2000). Adato 
et al. (2006) construct an asset index based on asset weights from an estimated 
livelihood function, which is estimated using a polynomial expansion of basic assets 
as regressors. Regardless of how assets were aggregated, all three studies using 
nonparametric techniques have found evidence for asset poverty traps. 
 
Clearly, both estimation techniques used in the existing literature have limitations. 
Polynomial parametric techniques don’t perform well with few observations around 
potential inflexion points. Nonparametric estimation is constrained in practice by how 
much it can control for other variables. Statistically, these two techniques mark the 
two extremes of the trade-off between the flexibility of the functional form and the 
ability to control for other covariates. Semiparametric techniques combine the 
advantages of parametric and nonparametric estimation and seem more suitable for 
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modeling household welfare dynamics. This paper introduces such a technique in 
section 6. 
 
4 The Data 
The data are taken from the International Crop Research Institute for the Semi-arid 
Tropics’ (ICRISAT) Village Level Studies (VLS). The original first generation data 
(VLS1) was collected for the ten cropping years from 1975/76 to 1984/85. The 
cropping year runs from July to June. Here, I will refer to each year by the starting 
year only, that is, 1975 stands for the cropping year 1975/76. Collection of the second 
generation data (VLS2) started in July 2001 and is ongoing. The data released to date 
and used for analysis in this paper includes the year 2003. 
 
The VLS1 data collection covered up to 10 villages in three states and a total of 400 
households; the VLS2 spans 6 of those villages in two states containing some 265 
households. The analysis in this paper is based on a subsample of these data selected 
on two main criteria. First, a household had to be included in both VLS1 and VLS2. 
This allows the construction of the longest possible panel spanning a period of 27 
years. Second, income information had to be available for all years. This limits 
analysis to three villages: Aurepalle in the Mahbubnagar district of Andhra Pradesh, 
Shirapur in the Sholapur district of Maharashtra, and Kanzara in the Akola district of 
Maharashtra. This subsample contains 886 observations for 72 households with either 
12 or 13 observations per household.2  
 
                                                 
2 Some households are not included in all VLS2 rounds. 
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Between VLS1 and VLS2 there has been some attrition as some households dissolved, 
while some others left the villages. Out of the 104 continuously surveyed household in 
VLS1, 72 could be included in the VLS2 sample. Ideally, we should try to control for 
the probability of attrition econometrically. This is only defensible if there is a 
variable in the survey that influences whether or not a household was resurveyed in 
VLS2 but which does not impact household income. However, the VLS was 
conceived primarily as an agricultural production survey. Hence, its module on 
household composition and characteristics is relatively small and does not contain any 
variables that can credibly identify the attrition probability (such as the place of birth, 
or the place of residence of relatives). The downside of not being able to control for 
attrition is that the results may not be representative for the villages. The attrition bias 
is likely to come from either end of the distribution: better-off and more educated 
households are more likely to migrate, while poorer households are more likely to 
disband, die off entirely, or merge with other households. A common factor in 
explaining attrition in other panels is the age of the household head. However, there is 
no reason to believe that the age factor affects household attrition differently for 
different wealth levels. Moreover, as Alderman et al. (2001) and Falaris (2003) show, 
even high levels of attrition in developing country panel surveys often do not affect 
the consistency of estimation. The upside of using only the continuously observed 
households is that the subsample containing these 72 households is a balanced panel. 
Thus, there is no further attrition bias during the period of analysis. 
 
The VLS survey contains detailed information on key assets such as land, and 
agricultural and financial assets. Information on household composition and education 
is less detailed, but available at the basic level. The key feature that makes the 
ICRISAT VLS data suitable for exploring is the length of the panel. This is useful in 
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two ways. First, the long time-span covered by the panels makes it suitable to track 
changes in assets which, absent any short term shocks, tend to be slow and may not be 
detectable in shorter panels. Second, unlike the few other panel datasets which cover 
similarly long periods3 the VLS data have up to 13 observations per household. With 
that number it begins to be possible to estimate household specific asset dynamic 
curves using fixed effects. 
 
There is a 17-year gap between the last year of data VLS1 (1984) and the start of 
VLS2 (2001). There are different ways this can be handled. I annualized the change 
over this 17-year period to create a quasi-one-year period and use this in the asset 
dynamics analysis below.4 
 
As a measure of material well-being I use household income rather than consumption. 
Although the permanent income hypothesis suggests that in theory consumption is a 
preferable measure of the economic standard of living, two key factors favor the use of 
income in the case of the VLS data. First, unlike consumption, income data are 
available for all years and all households. And second, there are reliability concerns 
regarding consumption data in the early years of data collection (Walker and Ryan 
1990). 
 
The VLS data collection was originally stratified into four equal sized landholding 
classes: landless laborer households and small, medium and large landowning 
households. The exact cut off points in acres between the landholding classes differ 
slightly between villages but is around 2.5 acres for small and 5.5 acres for medium 
                                                 
3 For example, the Chilean data set by Scott with one observation in 1968 and another in 1986 
4 As a robustness check for this crude annualization I repeated the analysis dropping the 1984-2001 
period altogether. The results did not change significantly. Thus, everything reported below uses the 
annualized data for 1984-2001. 
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landowners.5 This information on landholding classes is used both in the regression 
analysis as well as to analyze asset dynamics by subgroup. 
 
Caste membership is an important determinant both for the initial level of household 
well-being as well as for opportunities for economic advancement. For information on 
household caste membership I use Ryan’s caste rank index (Walker and Ryan 1990) 
which classifies all castes into one of four groups with caste rank 1 containing the 
highest castes. Having four caste ranks reduces the number of necessary dummies in 
the subsequent regressions and makes the analysis of asset dynamics by subgroups 
more tractable.  
 
Other variables are more standard and include household size, age of and years of 
education completed by the household head, and the number of working age adults 
and the number of children in the household. Variables are adjusted for household size 
and expressed in per adult equivalent terms6 whenever appropriate. The construction 
of the asset index and the choice of variables used to construct this index are described 
in the next section. 
 
5 Constructing the Asset Index 
In this paper I use a definition of household welfare and poverty based on the stock 
variable asset holdings rather than a flow variable such as income or consumption. I 
focus on assets for three reasons. First, the economic well-being of a household is 
                                                 
5 For more information on variable definition and on sampling procedures see Singh et al. (1985) and 
Walker and Ryan (1990) 
6 The adult equivalence scale was taken from (Ryan et al. 1984) who count men as 1 adult equivalent, 
women as 0.9 and children under 12 as 0.39 adult equivalents. In this paper I follow the VLS data 
standard and define children as anyone below 14. As a result the adult equivalent conversions using the 
Ryan et al. is incorrect for anyone aged 12 and 13. 
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dependent on its stock of assets. From a dynamic perspective it is the accumulation of 
assets which over time enables households to earn enough income to move out of 
poverty.7 This makes an asset-based measure of household welfare more suitable for 
forward-looking policy design. Second, asset levels fluctuate less from day to day than 
income and, thus, are closer to the measure of structural well-being that is ultimately 
of interest to forward looking policy design. Assets can be interpreted as measuring 
the underlying structural well-being of a household whereas income, and to a lesser 
extent consumption, contains a much larger amount of stochastic variation (Carter and 
May 2001). Third, surveys tend to measure asset holdings more accurately than 
income or consumption. It is easier for a household to recall, and for enumerators to 
verify, how much X it has than how much it spent on Y or received in payment over 
the last fourteen days.  
 
Unlike income or consumption, assets are multidimensional. Thus, before we can 
analyze asset dynamics we first need to summarize assets into an asset index. For 
parametric analysis such a summary index is convenient as it avoids having to specify 
a system of simultaneous interrelated autoregressions. For nonparametric and 
semiparametric analysis reducing assets into a single unidimensional asset index 
circumvents the curse of dimensionality and, thus, makes estimation possible with the 
smaller sample sizes commonly found in household survey data. 
 
The asset index is constructed through a livelihood regression (Adato et al. 2006) 
which expresses household well-being as a function of household characteristics and 
asset holdings. The fitted values of this regression can be interpreted as a asset index 
                                                 
7 Productivity and technologies and relative terms of trade are equally critical for a household’s escape 
from poverty, but technologies and terms of trade are not state variables of the same sort as assets. 
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in which assets are weighted according to their marginal contribution to household i’s 
well-being.  
 
The asset index was constructed as follows. Let household i’s subsistence need be the 
product of household size in adult equivalent units and the poverty line, and denote it 
by Si. Further, let itℓ be a measure of i’s livelihood at time t, expressed as the ratio of 
its real income yit to its subsistence need: /it it ity S=ℓ . Hence, itℓ measures a 
household’s well-being in poverty line units (PLUs). This provides an intuitive 
normalization for itℓ and, hence, the asset index: A measure of 1 means that a 
household survives on an adult equivalent income right at the poverty line; while 
1it <ℓ  and 1it >ℓ  indicate poor and non-poor households, respectively. Household i’s 
livelihood in PLUs can be expressed as 
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where ( )20,i iid uU N σ∼ . Aitj and Cits are the jth of J assets and the sth of S household 
characteristics that contribute to i’s livelihood at t. Ait and Cit are control vectors 
representing household assets and characteristics, and Tt  are T-1 year dummy 
variables. Coefficients ( ),j it itβ A C represent asset j’s marginal contribution to the 
livelihood. The parentheses indicate that the coefficients depend on all of household 
i’s assets and characteristics at time t. 
 
The fitted values yield the estimated household asset indices and are given by 
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To estimate equation 1 we need to construct itℓ , which in turn requires setting a 
poverty line. The 1993 Expert Group of the Government of India suggested 49 Rupees 
per month in 1973/74 prices, which is around Rs630 per year per capita in 1975/76 
prices. However, this would classify close to 90 percent of villagers as poor, including 
many households that would not be regarded as poor in the villages. Instead, I follow 
recent work by Badiani et al. (2007) and use a lower cut off point of 500 Rupees in 
1975/76 prices as the poverty line. 
 
Equation 1 was estimated using a random effects panel model using a second-order 
polynomial expansion of all assets and household characteristics. A random effects 
model is preferred for two reasons: First, a Hausman test against the fixed effects 
model did not reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are the same. The 
probability that the critical χ2 value with 74 degrees of freedom is greater than the 
observed χ2 of 23.41 is equal to one. Second, the fixed effects specification explained 
only 65% of the variation in itℓ , compared to 74% for the random effects model; and 
the primary objective for the livelihood regression is to project the household asset 
index as precisely as possible. 
 
The flexible second-order expansion for equation 2 allows the marginal returns to vary 
both with their own levels as well as with the levels of the other included asset and 
control variables. The estimation of equation 1 is based on the subsample of 72 
continuous households. The subsequent asset dynamics analysis is, therefore, not 
affected by attrition though it may suffer from some selection bias.8 
                                                 
8 The subsequent analysis and results are based on the asset index constructed by random effects using 
the subsample of 72 continuous households. I also estimated equation 1 by OLS and using the whole 
sample of 102 continuous and non-continuous households. This yielded a total four different household 
asset index estimates. The asset dynamics analysis using the three other asset indices (OLS all 
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The choice of explanatory variables was informed by the categories of assets 
identified in the livelihoods literature (see, e.g., Moser and Felton (2007)) and spans 
physical, productive, financial, natural and human capital.9 Specifically, the asset 
vector Ai includes net financial assets, the value of houses, residential plots, productive 
equipment and consumer durables, acreage of dry and irrigated land owned, the 
number of bullocks and other bovine livestock owned. The household characteristics 
vector Ci contains the age and education of the household head, the household size in 
adult equivalent units10 and the number of working age adults to proxy the labor 
endowment of the household. With the exception of the age and education of the 
household head, all variables were expressed per adult equivalent. To center the 
curvature of the polynomial at the sample mean, all asset and household characteristics 
variables and their squares and interaction terms were demeaned. Further, all variables 
expressed in Rupees, including the poverty line, were converted to real 1975/76 
Rupees using the state-specific Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Laborers from 
Indiastat.  
 
The main objective of this regression is to derive a set of weights to reliably project 
expected household well-being given its assets holdings. The focus of this regression 
is, therefore, less on the actual estimated coefficients but on the overall explanatory 
power. The regression has a good fit and can explain about three quarters of the 
variation in the household well-being as shown by an R-squared of 0.74. These results 
provide a solid justification for using the fitted values from equation 2 as the 
                                                                                                                                            
households, OLS continuous households and RE all households) produced substantively similar asset 
indices and asset dynamics results. The estimation results for all four specifications of equation 1 are 
given in the Appendix. 
9 The VLS does not provide sufficient detail on social capital. 
10 Strictly speaking I used the subsistence need which is equal to household size multiplied by the 
poverty line. 
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household asset index. Full results for the estimates of equation 1 are provided in the 
Appendix. 
 
Figure 2 plots the asset index on the vertical axis against its one-year lagged value on 
the horizontal axis. The asset index ranges from 0 to 23 PLU, with only 12 
observations above 12 PLU. The data points are scattered fairly closely to the 45 
degree line. This suggests a low level of asset mobility and is a priori evidence against 
nonlinear asset dynamics and multiple dynamic equilibria. This simple plot is 
consistent with overall economic stasis in these three rural villages.  
 
The constant from equation 1 is around 2, suggesting that the average level of 
household well-being for a household without assets is around twice the poverty line. 
The median household PLU for VLS1 (1975/6-1984/5) is around 1.5 and for VLS2 
(2001/02-2003/4) is around 3.2. The relatively high average level of well-being is 
partially a result of four factors: First and foremost, household incomes far exceed 
consumption levels in the VLS. While there is no conclusive explanation for this, it is 
likely due to an underestimation of consumption levels (Townsend 1994; Morduch 
2004). As a consequence, the magnitude of the regression constant of household PLU 
estimates is consistent with widespread consumption poverty headcounts of 76 percent 
for VLS1 and 22 percent for VLS2 (Badiani et al. 2007). Second, the period over 
which households have been observed is long. Thus, while average annual growth in 
assets is low at 0.8%, and consistent with economic stagnation, over almost thirty 
years this does represent significant compounded growth and has resulted in much 
higher income and asset holdings in VLS2. Third, due to the regression-to-the-mean 
effect, the fitted values of the asset index span a smaller range than the observed itℓ . 
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This results in fewer projected poor households. Fourth, the Rs 500 poverty line is 
lower than in some existing papers. 
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Figure 2 Scatterplot of Asset index against Lagged Asset Index (One year lag) 
 
6 Econometric Methods 
Nonparametric Methods 
Simple univariate nonparametric regression is equivalent to fitting a smooth function 
through a scatterplot without any assumptions on the functional form. Its two key 
assumptions are that the function to be estimated, f, is “smooth” and that the covariates 
are uncorrelated with the error, which is normally and identically distributed with an 
expected value of zero. Let Ait represent household i’s asset index at time t then 
dynamic autoregression of household assets can be written as 
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1( )it it itA f A ε−= +  
2(0, )it iid N εε σ∼  
(3) 
 
Equation 3 can be estimated using a number of different nonparametric techniques. 
The analysis below applies locally weighted scatterplot smoothers (LOWESS), local  
polynomial regressions, and median and natural splines and penalized splines. 
 
LOWESS estimation (Cleveland et al. 1988) is a type of local regression and is used 
to identify dynamic asset equilibria in Lybbert et al. (2004) and Barrett et al. (2006). It 
estimates n weighted local regressions11 at each data point Ait-1 based on only the 
points in the neighborhood of Ait-1. The neighborhoods are defined as a proportion of 
the total number of observations. The regression weights for each local regression are 
based on a kernel function and vary inversely with distance from Ait-1. A wider 
bandwidth results in a smoother function and lower variance, but a larger bias. A 
narrower bandwidth improves bias and tracks the data more closely, but increases 
variance. The conditional expectation E[Ait] is then given by the prediction of the local 
weighted regression at each value of Ait-1. 
 
Kernel weighted polynomial regressions are a related form of local regressions. They 
differ from LOWESS in that the local regression neighborhood is not defined as a 
proportion of the total number of observations, but as the set of observations that lie 
within a specified range of Ait-1. In principle both types of local regression support the 
use of local polynomials, although in practice studies have used locally linear 
LOWESS only. Polynomial specifications are preferable, however, as the locally 
                                                 
11 Most commonly these local regressions are linear. 
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linear estimations tend to be biased in the regions of the distribution where the 
function has curvature, as it is ‘trimming the hills and filling the valleys’ (Hastie et al. 
2001). This bias can affect the estimates of the dynamic asset equilibria since these are 
likely to lie in areas of curvature. Locally linear estimation tends to be preferable for 
extrapolation outside the sample, as it has reduced bias at the boundaries. Higher order 
polynomials, in contrast, tend to reduce bias in the interior of the distribution (Hastie 
et al. 2001) though at the cost of increased variance. A priori local polynomials should 
perform better at fitting the recursive asset relationship. 
 
Another way of estimating equation 3 is through splines. Compared to global 
polynomial regressions, splines are better at fitting highly curved data (Schumaker 
1981; de Boor 2002). The cubic spline is the most popular spline in applications as it 
offers the best trade-off between goodness of fit and too much local variation. The 
main drawback is that it is difficult to implement if we have more than one 
explanatory variable (Pagan and Ullah 1999). In the nonparametric autoregression in 
equation 3 this is not a problem. 
  
A modification to regular cubic splines are natural cubic splines. These add the 
additional constraint that the function is linear beyond the lowest and the highest 
knot12, freeing up two degrees of freedom at each end of the domain (Hastie et al. 
2001). These can be used instead to specify more knots in the interior, thus enabling 
better fit in the interior of the dynamic asset function.  Hence, if the asset equilibria lie 
some way from the boundaries, then statistical theory suggests that natural cubic 
splines should be preferable to cubic splines. Due to the additional linearity constraints 
                                                 
12 A spline regression estimates different slopes for different ranges of the independent variable. The 
endpoints of each subsection of the range is called a knot. More specifically, a knot is the value of 
κ corresponding to the function ( )x κ +−  (see, e.g., equation 5). 
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the natural cubic splines have more bias, but less variance near the boundaries. The 
tradeoff between regular and natural splines, and hence between bias and variance in 
the tails of the distribution, echoes the problems of the global polynomial estimations, 
which also tend to oscillate wildly in the tails of the distribution.  
 
Another method for estimating the univariate nonparametric model is the penalized 
spline. This method is borrowed from the statistics literature (Ruppert et al. 2003; 
Wand et al. 2005) and has not yet been used in economic applications. It is laid out 
here in some detail as it forms the basis of the new semiparametric panel data 
estimator introduced in section 6.3. Equation 3 can be expressed as a penalized spline 
as follows: 13 
 
( )1 1
1
A A A
K
it it k it k it
k
uα β κ ε− − +
=
= + + − +∑
 
1 ,2i N t T≤ ≤ ≤ ≤  
(4) 
 
where 2(0, )it N εε σ∼ , κ represents a knot, K is the total number of knots, T is the total 
number of time periods in the panel data, and the plus subscript + indicates that the 
term 1Ait kκ− − only enters the regression if 1Ait kκ− > . Define  
 
                                                 
13 The representation of the penalized spline in equation 4  uses a truncated polynomial basis function. 
The truncation is included via the ‘+’ terms, i.e., ( )1it κ− +Α −  is only included if 1it κ−Α > . These 
basis functions are more intuitive as they resemble regular least squares regression except for the added 
truncation terms. Actual estimations were carried out using radial cubic thin plate functions, 
3
0 1 1 1
1
A A A
K
it it k it k i
k
uβ β κ ε− −
=
= + + − +∑ , as these tend to be more computationally stable and 
give very similar results (Ruppert et al. 2003). 
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If we treat u as a random effect with 2Cov( ) uσ=u I  then the penalized spline from 
equation 4 can be estimated as the best linear unbiased estimator of the mixed model 
in equation 6. 
 
= + +y Xβ Zu ε  
2
2
Cov u
ε
σ
σ
  
=   
   
u I 0
ε 0 I
 
(6) 
 
Let [ ]=C X Z , then the fitted value vector for equation 6 is 
  
2ˆ ( ′ ′= -1y C C C+ λ D) C y  (7) 
 
where, ( )10,...,0, Kxdiag=D 1  and ( )2 2 2/ uελ σ σ= . 
 
The smoothing parameter λ smoothes the estimated function by penalizing the knot 
coefficients uk and can be estimated by restricted maximum likelihood (REML). 
Define 2 2u εσ σ′= +V ZZ I . Then the residual likelihood is 
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The estimator for λ is then the ratio of the estimated fixed and random variance 
components:  
 
( )2 2 2, ,ˆ ˆ ˆ/REML REML u REMLελ σ σ=  (9) 
 
yˆ  in equation 6 is then an estimated best linear unbiased predictor (Ruppert et al. 
2003). The degrees of freedom used in fitting equation 7 measure the degree of non-
linearity in the estimated function with larger degrees of freedom indicating a more 
non-linear function. 
 
In actual applications penalized splines also have a distinct advantage compared to 
regular splines estimators. Their estimation results are very insensitive to the choice of 
knots (French et al. 2001; Ruppert 2002). Penalized splines also have at least four 
advantages over non-spline smoothers. First, they represent a model-based approach to 
smoothing based on statistical principles of maximum likelihood and prediction. 
Second, they can be implemented using mixed model software. Third, the mixed 
model representation means that the smoothing parameter λ can be chosen 
automatically from the data through REML. And fourth, the mixed model framework 
allows inference via standard likelihood ratio tests. 
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Parametric Methods 
Following existing parametric studies (Jalan and Ravallion 2004; Barrett et al. 2006), 
the parametric global polynomial regressions estimate the change in the asset index as 
a function of the Pth-order polynomial of the lagged asset index. A cubic function is 
the lowest order polynomial that can detect multiple stable dynamic equilibria as it 
allows the curvature of the function to switch. Since Jalan and Ravallion (2004) use 
this specification I have included it in the estimations below for comparison purposes. 
In the presence of multiple dynamic equilibria, however, a cubic function has a 
tendency to force the stable equilibria into the tails of the distribution. The analysis 
below, therefore, also includes a fourth degree polynomial which provides additional 
flexibility [although it, too, can suffer from oversmoothing (Barrett et al. 2006)]. 
 
The change in the asset index is estimated as 
 
1
1 3
A A
P T
p
it p it it t t i it
p t
T Uα β γ ε−
= =
∆ = + + + +∑ ∑X
 
21 , 2 , (0, )iti N t T N εε σ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ∼  
(10) 
 
where itA∆ is the change in household i’s asset index between years t and t-1, Xit is a 
Cx1 vector of control variables, where C is the number of control variables, the Tt’s 
are time dummies, and Ui controls for either household fixed effects or, if we can 
assume ( )2N 0,i iid uU σ∼ , a random household intercept.14 Using the changes in 
household assets as the dependent variable explicitly estimates growth rates and also 
controls for time invariant household unobservables. 
 
                                                 
14 Section 7 shows that the random effects specification of equation 10 is appropriate. 
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In the analysis below vector Xit contains the following time-varying control variables: 
The age of the household head and its square control for life-cycle effects. Similarly, 
household size and its square control for economies of scale; and years of education of 
the household head and its square account for returns to human capital. The number of 
adults and its square and the number of children and its square control for available 
household labor and dependents, respectively. Also included in Xit are the two time-
invariant household characteristics caste and landholding class. Continuous variables, 
their squares and interaction terms are demeaned to generate an exact second-order 
local approximation at the sample mean. Where appropriate variables are used in per 
adult equivalent terms.  
 
Semiparametric Methods 
Semiparametric methods contain a combination of nonparametric and parametric 
components. They combine an unknown functional form for some variables with 
unknown finite-dimensional parameters. A simple semiparametric model is the 
partially linear model (PLM). It imposes no parametric conditions on the asset 
autoregression function, but allows linear control for other covariates. We can estimate 
asset dynamics as 
 
1
3
A ( )
T
it it t t it it
t
T f Aα β γ ε−
=
= + + + +∑X  
21 , 2 , (0, )iti N t T N εε σ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ∼  
(11) 
 
where Xit and all Tt enter the model linearly, and the relationship between assets and 
lagged assets is estimated nonparametrically. Xit contains the same control variables as 
in the parametric model in equation 10. 
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As long as the lag structure in our asset autoregression is shorter than the total length 
of the panel then each household enters the estimation more than once. The rural 
Indian data have 13 observations per household. Thus, using one year lags in the 
autoregression each household is represented 12 times. 
 
The non- and semiparametric estimators in equations 6 and 11 do not use the panel 
information. Penalized splines, unlike other scatterplot smoothers, are easily 
extendable to panel data models and can exploit the additional information we have 
from longitudinal data. Analogously to the global parametric model in equation 10 we 
can extend the semiparametric model from equation 11 by a random household 
intercept (Ruppert et al. 2003). 
 
Consider the extended partially linear mixed model 
 
( )1
3
A A
T
it i it it t t it
t
U f Tα β γ ε−
=
= + + + + +∑X  
( )2 21 , 2 , N 0, , (0, )i iid u iti N t T U N εσ ε σ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ∼ ∼  
(12) 
 
where Tt is a time dummy equal to one at time t and zero otherwise that accounts for 
time specific effects.15 Again we assume that f is smooth. If Ui is a random household 
intercept we can estimate equation 12 using a mixed model representation of the 
penalized spline. Let 
                                                 
15 The first time dummy is T3 for the following reason. Since we are estimating a first order 
autoregression, the first observation for each household is at t=2. If we then omit the time dummy 
associated with this observation, i.e., T2, to represent the base period, the first included time dummy is 
T3. Similarly, the first included time dummy for the three year lag estimations is T5.  
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and [ ]1 1,..., , ,...,K KU U u u ′=u  
(13) 
 
Then we can estimate 12 using the following mixed model 
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(14) 
 
2
Uσ I  measures the variation between households, 
2
εσ I  measures the within household 
variation, and 2uσ I  controls the amount of smoothing used to estimate f. The partially 
linear model estimated by a mixed model representation of penalized splines combines 
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the advantages of the global parametric model with the flexible functional form of a 
fully nonparametric model. 
 
The random effects semiparametric penalized splines model in equation 12 was 
estimated using the R package SemiPar (Wand et al. 2005) which estimates the 
smoothing parameter λ through restricted maximum likelihood (REML), and cross 
checked using the model-selection-based algorithm in Ruppert et al. (2003: Appendix 
B). 
 
Alternatively, we can use the mixed model representation of the penalized spline to 
estimate a fixed effects model. To control for unobserved household heterogeneity in 
the estimation of household asset dynamics we can let Ui from equation 12 be non-
random and instead represent a household fixed effect, yielding 
 
( )1
3
A A
T
it i it it t t it
t
U f Tα β γ ε−
=
= + + + + +∑X  
21 , 2 , (0, )iti N t T N εε σ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ∼  
(15) 
 
Equation 15 can be estimated similar to equation 12. We only need to redefine the 
fixed and random components of the mixes model by moving the zero-one submatrix 
of household intercepts from the random component matrix Z to the fixed component 
matrix X. Let 
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and [ ] 21,..., (0, )K uu u N σ′≡u ∼  
(16) 
 
Then we can estimate 15 using the following mixed model 
 
FE= + +y X β Zu ε  
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(17) 
 
2
εσ I  measures the within household variation, and 
2
uσ I  controls the amount of 
smoothing used to estimate f.  The estimator of the fixed effects mixed model 
representation of the penalized splines is also implemented in R and builds on the 
model-selection based algorithm in Ruppert et al. (2003: Appendix B). 
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7 Results 
Table 1 reports the estimated dynamics pattern and location of stable dynamic 
equilibria  for each of the estimation techniques introduced in section 6. The point 
estimates for all techniques and lag structures find only a single dynamic asset 
equilibrium for the rural Indian households and identify a very similar shape for the 
asset dynamics. However, there are significant differences across techniques in the 
estimated asset equilibrium levels and in the size of the confidence intervals. Thus, 
even in the context of economic stasis in the three rural Indian village the estimation 
technique matters with the semiparametric random effects model providing the most 
precise estimates. 
 
Overall, asset accumulation for the VLS households is very slow, if it happens at all. 
As illustrated by the scatter plot in Figure 2 and as borne out by the recursion 
diagrams below, the VLS villages represent a stagnant economy. Households have a 
strong to tendency remain at their level of asset holdings and well-being. 
 
The ranges reported in Table 1 indicate the estimated dynamic asset accumulation path 
follows the 45 degree line very closely. In the first two columns the low and high 
values in brackets, respectively, show where the lower and upper 95 percent 
confidence bands cross the diagonal. The bracketed numbers, therefore, provide the 95 
percent confidence interval for the asset equilibrium. For the fully parametric 
techniques, in particular, the confidence intervals span most of the asset index range, 
e.g., between 0.5 and 9.5 for the fourth degree polynomial on the one year lagged data. 
In other words, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that, in expectation, no 
household’s wealth changes from one year to the next. This represents a random walk 
along the 45 degree line and suggests a very strong case of economic stagnation. The 
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third and fourth columns in Table 1 reinforce this by presenting the share of household 
observations that fall within the confidence interval of the dynamic asset equilibrium. 
 
The confidence intervals for the nonparametric penalized splines are smaller, but still 
very large at between 3 and 9 poverty line units. By controlling for covariates as well 
as allowing for flexible asset dynamics, the semiparametric penalized splines allow 
greater precision in the estimates. The confidence intervals for the dynamic asset 
equilibrium shrink to between 2.4 and 4.1 PLUs. However, this greater statistical 
significance does not detract from the economically significant result of very slow 
asset accumulation and overall economic stagnation for the VLS households, as even 
for the semiparametric techniques the asset estimated dynamic accumulation path still 
follows the 45 degree line very closely (see Figure 5). 
 
Since household asset holdings in the VLS villages are fairly stagnant and the 
resulting asset accumulation path are close to linear, the choice of estimation 
technique matters little in identifying the shape of asset dynamics. However, the 
precision of the point estimates seems to benefit from simultaneously allowing for 
flexible modeling of the asset autoregression and controlling for household 
characteristics, location, and time. 
 
The asset recursion diagrams for the various nonparametric estimation techniques look 
substantively similar in that they all follow the 45 degree line closely. Representative 
for the various techniques, Figure 3 shows the estimated recursion diagram for 
equation 4 using penalized splines. The central red line displays the estimated asset 
accumulation path and the grey areas above and below the curve show the 95 percent 
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confidence bands. The rug plot at the bottom of the graph depicts the density of the 
observations. 
 
Table 1 Summary of Asset Equilibria Estimates by Estimation Technique and Lag 
Structure 
  Approximate Location 
of  Stable Equilibrium 
(in PLUs)  
% of observations in 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the Stable 
Equilibrium 
  1 year lags 3 year lags 1 year lags 3 year lags 
Nonparametric Regression    
 LOWESS (bandwidth = 0.4) 1.8-4.2 1.5-5.2 35% 48% 
 Kernel weighted local cubic 
regression (bandwidth = 2) 
2-9 2-6.5 39% 36% 
 Median Cubic Spline 1.8-3.5 1.9-3.8 31% 30% 
 Natural Cubic Spline 1.8-6.7 1.8-4.1 42% 34% 
 
Penalized Spline (Equation 6) 
7.1 
[3,9] 
5.7 
[4.4,6.3] 
21% 6% 
 
Penalized Spline RE 
7 
[3.6,9] 
5.8 
[5.4,6.2] 
13% 2% 
Global Parametric Regression    
 4th order Polynomial RE 
(Equation 10) 
5 
[0.5,9.5] 
5 
[1.2, 13] 
94% 70% 
 3rd order Polynomial RE 
(Equation 10) 
6.2 
[1,12] 
4.4 
[0,11] 
78% 98% 
Semiparametric Regression    
 PLM Penalized Spline 
(Equation 11) 
2.8 
[2.5,3.6] 
3.1 
[2.4,4.1] 
16% 21% 
 PLMM Penalized Spline RE 
(Equation 14) 
2.8 
[2.7,3.3] 
3.2 
[2.7,4.1] 
9% 15% 
 PLMM Penalized Spline FE 
(Equation 17) 
1.7, 6.3 
[0,8] 
5.8 
[0,12] 
96% 98% 
• Asset Index estimated by Equation 1 using random effects. 
• In each cell the line above the brackets indicates a single crossing point or its range. 
• Ranges in brackets indicate where confidence bands overlap 45 degree line 
 
The relative linearity of the estimated asset recursion function is also reflected in the 
approximately 3.25 degrees of freedom used by the penalized spline in fitting the 
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nonparametric function f(Ait-1). This implies that households’ dynamic asset 
accumulation paths are close to linear. 
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Figure 3 Assets vs. Lagged Assets (Nonparametric Penalized Splines) One year lag 
 
The nonparametric penalized spline estimations are robust to changes in the 
specification. Using a different spline basis, for example using truncated polynomial 
spline bases linearly or quadratically instead of cubic thin plate spline bases, causes 
very small changes in the estimated dynamic asset path. The asset recursion diagrams 
are similarly unaffected for relatively large changes in the smoothing parameter λ. For 
example, specifying 20 degrees of freedom, instead of the 3.25 degrees of freedom 
estimated by REML, lets the penalized spline estimator follow the data more closely. 
However, the estimated recursion diagram hardly changes, again likely due to the 
relatively linear nature of the true dynamic asset path we are trying to estimate. 
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This robust result is confirmed through the LOWESS and kernel weighted local 
polynomial regression estimates. They, too, are unaffected over a large range of 
bandwidths. Again, this is unsurprising given the almost linear shape of the asset 
recursion function. In practice, the asset dynamic path almost coinciding with the 45 
degree line means that on average households do not move much from their initial 
asset position signifying an extremely low level of year-on-year asset mobility in the 
three villages. 
 
For the global polynomial parametric regression we first need to identify the 
appropriate specification for equation 10. We can reject the hypothesis that equation 
10 has a single intercept through the Breusch Pagan LM test. The probability that the 
chi-square test statistic is larger than the 95 percent critical value for one degree of 
freedom is 0.004. Hence, we should use a panel data model. 
 
Next, we can test the random effects assumption of no correlation between unobserved 
household heterogeneity, ui, and the other right hand side variables through a 
Hausman test of the consistent fixed effects model against the potentially inconsistent 
random effects model. The probability that the test’s chi-squared statistic is greater 
than the 95 percent critical value is 0.17. Thus, we can use the more efficient random 
effects estimator which allows us to keep the time invariant regressors caste, 
landholding class and education in the model. 
 
Table 2 summarizes the global parametric regression results for the third and fourth 
order polynomial specifications for one-year and three-year asset lag structure. Within 
each lag structure the results differ between the fourth and the third order polynomial 
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specification, i.e., comparing column (1) with (2) and column (3) with (4). Similarly, 
the lag structure leads to different coefficient estimates, i.e., comparing column (1) 
with (3) and column (2) with (4). However, few of the coefficients are statistically 
significant and all regressions explain less than 30 percent of the variation. 
 
Table 2 Global Polynomial Asset Dynamics Regressions (Random Effects) 
Dependent Variable: Change in Asset Index     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 One year lags Three year lags 
 4th order 
polynomial 
3rd order 
polynomial 
4th order 
polynomial 
3rd order 
polynomial 
lagged asset index 0.101 -0.561 -1.339 -0.199 
 (0.562) (0.006)** (0.002)** (0.057) 
lagged asset index 
squared 
-0.111 0.072 0.328 -0.048 
 (0.005)** (0.046)* (0.036)* (0.087) 
lagged asset index 
cubed 
0.013 -0.004 -0.039 0.004 
 (0.001)** (0.008)** (0.065) (0.000)** 
lagged asset index 
to the fourth power 
-0.000  0.002  
 (0.000)**  (0.062)  
household size (in 
adult equivalents) 
-0.964 -0.981 -0.511 -0.562 
 (0.007)** (0.020)* (0.178) (0.245) 
squared Household 
size (in adult 
equivalents) 
-1.137 -1.391 -2.740 -2.609 
 (0.443) (0.311) (0.109) (0.174) 
age of HH head -0.023 0.093 0.212 0.024 
 (0.964) (0.879) (0.789) (0.972) 
squared age of HH 
head 
-1.175 -1.820 -6.351 -5.458 
 (0.513) (0.142) (0.070) (0.075) 
years of education 
HH head 
0.279 0.336 0.534 0.469 
 (0.112) (0.067) (0.007)** (0.026)* 
squared years of 
education HH head 
-0.354 -0.433 -0.109 -0.048 
 (0.585) (0.529) (0.779) (0.924) 
# of working age 
adults per AE 
1.374 1.176 0.776 0.470 
 (0.234) (0.366) (0.259) (0.531) 
squared # of working 
age adults per AE 
0.357 0.542 0.860 0.967 
 (0.632) (0.527) (0.021)* (0.040)* 
# of children per AE 0.404 0.283 0.027 -0.064 
 (0.422) (0.616) (0.932) (0.859) 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
 
squared # of 
children per AE 
0.062 0.041 0.522 0.458 
 (0.552) (0.650) (0.056) (0.004)** 
Constant 0.389 0.943 1.691 0.825 
 (0.123) (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
R-Squared 0.2875 0.2764 0.2938 0.2631 
Observations 741 741 597 597 
Number of unique HH 
id 
72 72 72 72 
Robust p values in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Landownership class, caste, time and village dummies are included in 
the regression, but not reported here for brevity. 
 
To examine the economic significance of the regression results we need to plot the 
asset recursion diagrams. To translate these regression coefficients of the lagged asset 
variables into the asset recursion diagram I predict the dependent variable ‘change in 
asset index’ and then add the lagged asset index. This gives the predicted asset index, 
which is plotted against the lagged index as the inner red line in Figure 4 for the one 
year lag structure from column (1). The outer green lines show the 95% confidence 
bands. The asset recursion diagrams for the third order polynomial estimates and for 
both polynomials for the three year lags have an almost identical shape and are 
therefore omitted for brevity. In all four recursion diagrams the 95 percent confidence 
bands include the 45 degree line for most of the range. The point estimates for the 
single stable dynamic equilibria all lie between 4.4. and 6, as shown in Table 1, but the 
given the wide confidence bands these point estimates are at best indicative. 
 
The semiparametric penalized splines models produce asset recursions diagrams with 
the lowest dynamic equilibria of all the estimation techniques: between 2.8 PLUs for 
the one year lags and 3.1 PLUs for the three year lags. To put these levels into 
perspective, the median household PLU level for 2001 was 3.1, suggesting that the 
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median household had already reached its dynamic equilibrium at around three times 
the poverty line income, which translates into around Rs1500 per adult equivalent. For 
the reasons outlined at the end of section 5, this estimate is likely on the high side. For 
comparison, in 2001 22 percent of households still lived below the low consumption 
poverty line of Rs500 (Badiani et al. 2007). 
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Figure 4 Assets vs. Lagged Assets (4th order Global Parametric Estimation) One year 
lag 
 
The simple semiparametric partial linear model from equation 11 and the 
semiparametric partially linear mixed model with the added random intercept from 
equation 12 yield very similar results and produce the tightest confidence bands of all 
the estimation techniques. Adding the random effects shrinks the confidence bands a 
little bit more resulting in the asset recursion diagram in Figure 5. This suggests that 
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the partially linear model random effects model specification is the preferred 
specification for modeling asset poverty dynamics in the three villages. 
 
The non-linear components use up only slightly over 1 degree of freedom as the 
estimated asset dynamics path is almost perfectly linear. The slopes from the 
semiparametric models are slightly smaller than for the other techniques, suggesting a 
somewhat faster, though still slow, process of asset accumulation. 
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Figure 5 Semiparametric Estimation of Assets vs. Asset Lagged (Penalized Splines 
Random Effects) One year lag 
 
In addition to the above analysis of the asset dynamics for the whole sample of 
households we can estimate asset dynamics and equilibria by subpopulation. Table 3 
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summarizes the results by village, caste rank, landholding class and education based 
on the semiparametric penalized splines estimation with random effects. All subgroups 
share a similar pattern for their estimated dynamic asset accumulation path. The shape 
of this pattern resembles that of the full sample discussed above and is characterized 
by a single dynamic asset equilibrium and a dynamic path that is relatively linear and 
close to the 45 degree line. The subgroups differ primarily in the location of their 
equilibria. 
 
Among the three villages, Aurepalle has the highest dynamic asset equilibrium point 
estimate followed by Kanzara and Shirapur. The difference between Aurepalle and 
Shirapur is also statistically significant as their 95 percent confidence intervals do not 
overlap. This is consistent with the finding that income growth in the Andhra Pradesh 
village Aurepalle has outperformed the Maharahstra villages (Badiani et al. 2007) and 
suggests that economic growth in Aurepalle has managed to sustainably raise the level 
of structural well-being as indicated by a higher asset equilibrium. 
 
The analysis by caste confirms the expectation that higher castes enjoy higher asset 
equilibria. The relationship between caste rank and the level of the stable equilibrium 
is monotone. However, the differences in dynamic equilibria are not statistically 
significant across caste ranks as evidenced by the overlapping confidence intervals in 
Table 3. This is due to a combination of heterogeneity within caste ranks and 
relatively small sample sizes for each caste rank.  
 
Similarly, among landowning households, greater acreage systematically increases the 
level of the asset equilibrium. Large landowners enjoy statistically significantly higher 
asset holdings. The differences between the other groups are not statistically 
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Table 3 Stable Dynamic Asset Equilibria by Subgroups 
 Number of 
observation
s 
Approximate Location of  
Stable Equilibrium 
 (in poverty line units) 
  Semiparametric 
Penalized Splines 
 (Random Effects) 
By Village   
 
Aurepalle 286 
4.4 
[3,7] 
 
Shirapur 338 
2.5 
[2.2,2.8] 
 
Kanzara 312 
3.5 
[3,4.5] 
By Caste Rank   
 
1 (highest) 260 
4.2 
[2.7,5.9] 
 
2 195 
3 
[2.4,6.3] 
 
3 247 
2.5 
[2.2,2.9] 
 
4 (lowest) 234 
2.1 
[2,12] 
By Landholding   
 
Landless 246 
2.8 
[2.5,3.5] 
 
Small Landholders 265 
2.5 
[2.2,3.2] 
 
Medium Landholders 206 
3.3 
[2.9,3.7] 
 
Large Landholders 219 
4.5 
[4,7] 
By Education   
 
No Education 544 
2.2 
[2,2.8] 
 
Up to 4 years 204 
4 
[3,6] 
 
More than 4 years 188 
3 
[2.5,5.5] and [7,15]* 
• Asset Index estimated by equation 1 using random effects. 
• * indicates that the equilibrium is driven by very few observations 
• In each cell the line above the brackets indicates a single crossing point or its range. 
• Ranges in brackets indicate where confidence bands overlap 45 degree line 
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significant, again probably due to heterogeneity within landholding classes and due to 
small subsamples. Landless households have a slightly higher equilibrium than 
smallholders, but this is likely caused by shopkeepers and civil servants being 
included in the landless category. 
 
Splitting the sample by education level of the household head we see that education 
raises the expected asset equilibrium level. The difference in dynamic equilibria 
betweenhouseholds with uneducated heads and those with up to 4 years of education is 
statistically significant. The highest education category has two equilibria. The one at 
around 3 PLU is likely driven by the larger number of household heads that have 5 or 
6 years of education, thus, hardly more than the ‘up to 4 years’ group. The other, very 
high equilibrium is probably driven by the few household heads that have tertiary 
education.  
 
I also tested the robustness of the above results against two alternative explanations of 
why we only see one dynamic asset equilibrium. First, social sharing rules may mean 
that any gains in assets by one household are at least partly distributed via its social 
networks. Alternatively, household composition may be endogenous. If a household 
manages to accumulate assets it also attracts people currently living outside of it to 
join the household. Both of these mechanisms would result in a household that is 
above the dynamic equilibrium to move back to it over time. We can test for these 
alternative explanations by re-estimating the livelihoods function in equation 1 but 
using total household income rather than household income adjusted by household 
subsistence needs as the dependent variable. This asset index then reflects any 
additional assets gained by the household, whether or not their returns were consumed 
by the (original) household members. Redoing the analysis with this asset index did 
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not substantively change the asset recursion diagrams. This suggests that social 
sharing rules and endogenous household composition do not affect the asset 
accumulation path. This mirrors the results of similar analysis for rural Pakistan and 
Ethiopia (Naschold 2006).  
 
A second reason why we might not see multiple equilibria is that the time period 
between observations is only one year. If total asset holdings change slowly, this may 
be too short an interval to pick up the long run asset dynamics. Indeed, the existing 
studies which have found multiple asset equilibria have either used longer spells [five 
year in South Africa (Adato et al. 2006) and thirteen years in Western Kenya (Barrett 
et al. 2006)], or are based only on pastoralists’ livestock holdings, which are much 
more volatile than other asset holdings [see (Barrett et al. 2006) on Northern Kenya] 
or both [see (Lybbert et al. 2004) on Southern Ethiopia]. 
 
Rerunning the above analysis with a longer, three-year asset index lag did not 
substantively change the results. The asset recursions diagrams continue to show a 
single dynamic equilibrium at a level very similar to the one year lags. Again, this 
confirms the results for Pakistan and Ethiopia in Naschold (2006). 
 
Finally there are two other possible, but untestable, explanations as to why the data do 
not show bifurcating welfare dynamics. First, evidence from Ethiopia (Santos and 
Barrett 2006) has shown that bifurcating equilibrium paths may depend on the quality 
of the growing season. When years are good all farmers expect to be on concave 
accumulation path. In contrast, in mediocre years only some farmers, including 
probably the experienced, expect to grow, whereas others expect to fall behind. In the 
VLS data we can partially control for good and bad growing years using information 
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on the rainfall pattern. However, it appears that asset dynamics in the VLS data are not 
substantively different for good and bad harvest years, though this may be a result of 
rainfall being a crude measure for the quality of the growing season. 
 
Second, the VLS covers poor rural populations. Close to 90 percent would fall under 
the poverty line recommended by the 1993 Expert Group of the Government of India. 
It is, therefore, possible that in the country as a whole there are additional higher asset 
equilibria, which are absent from the VLS data, as the VLS villages contain very few 
richer households. The only way to test for this would be to use a data set that is more 
representative of India as a whole. If indeed there were higher equilibria in other rural 
or urban parts of the country, then the findings in this paper could be interpreted as 
geographic poverty traps in the sense that there may be unique low level equilibria for 
the rural villages of the VLS.  
 
8 Conclusions 
This paper has modeled household asset dynamics and asset thresholds in three 
villages in rural semi-arid India. It used nonparametric and parametric estimation 
techniques from the existing literature and adapted a new (to economics) 
semiparametric panel data method adapted from the statistics literature. This method 
can flexibly model the asset accumulation process while controlling for household 
characteristics and location and time. It can accommodate random intercepts and was 
extended to handle household fixed effects. The empirical results for all methods paint 
a picture of economic stasis in these villages. 
 
The theoretical literature on household welfare dynamics and most of the empirical 
case studies have focused on modeling the shape of the dynamic welfare path, in 
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particular the existence of multiple dynamic equilibria and welfare thresholds. This is 
an important area of research as it can contribute to the design of more effective anti-
poverty policies and, indeed, is what motivated the improved semiparametric 
estimation technique in this paper. However, the empirical investigation of rural India 
showed clearly that in practice welfare dynamics can look very different from those 
hypothesized in the models. The three rural Indian villages are characterized by a lack 
of welfare dynamics. Households asset accumulation is a very slow, almost static 
process approximating a random walk along the 45 degree line where next period 
welfare equals this period’s. 
 
In this context of economic stasis it is not surprising that the different econometric 
methods come to qualitatively similar conclusions, as the main advantage of more 
complex nonlinear modeling techniques is in the context of highly nonlinear 
dynamics. The process of asset accumulation for these rural households is close to 
linear in its central tendency. There is no evidence for non-convexities either for the 
whole sample or any of the subgroups. This suggests that households in the VLS 
villages do not face an asset poverty trap in the form of multiple dynamic asset 
equilibria. This does not mean, however, that village households are not trapped in 
poverty. On the contrary, since in expectation households remain at their initial asset 
positions, all households with an asset position below the poverty line of 1 PLU are 
effectively trapped in poverty. 
 
The estimated mean asset accumulation path also shows very little concavity. This has 
two implications. First, there is no significant difference in the speed of asset 
accumulation between asset-poor and asset-rich households. And second, reducing 
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asset inequality would only provide direct benefits to the recipients, but would not 
enhance the overall rate of subsequent asset growth.  
 
Where the results from the different estimation techniques differ is in the precision of 
their estimates. The parametric techniques resulted in the largest confidence bands 
encompassing most of the range of the asset data. The semiparametric penalized 
splines with random effects had the smallest confidence bands and is the preferred 
model specification. It also displays the lowest asset equilibria at around three times 
the lowest rural poverty line, or Rs1500 per adult equivalent per year in 1975/76 
prices, or close to $2 per day when converted to 1995 PPP $. While this level is well 
above the poverty line and, therefore, may appear not too low, it is likely to understate 
the extent of poverty in the villages. Perhaps a better way of interpreting it is in a 
relative context. The median household in the villages has already achieved the 
equilibrium level of well-being in 2001 suggesting that absent any changes in the 
welfare distribution, the concurrent level of consumption poverty of around 22 percent 
is the long term equilibrium. 
 
In any event, the estimation results, particularly the relatively large parts of the asset 
range that are spanned by the confidence bands, present a picture of economic stasis. 
This image is confirmed by the low average annual growth rate in per capita asset 
holdings over the period 1975 to 2003 of 0.8%. Since the estimated asset accumulation 
path does not suggest a dynamic way for households to move towards a higher 
equilibrium, future improvements in welfare will have to come from structural 
changes that raise the asset equilibrium itself. In terms of social policy, the estimated 
linear asset dynamics also indicate that the key function for social safety nets is their 
traditional most basic role of ensuring survival. Since there are no bifurcation points in 
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the form of unstable dynamic equilibria they cannot help to leverage dynamic gains or, 
conversely, prevent dynamic losses. 
 
When we relax the assumption that households share a common underlying dynamic 
asset accumulation path and examine asset dynamics by subgroup we find predictable 
patterns of club convergence with a single equilibrium per subgroup. Higher castes, 
large landholders and more educated households have monotonically greater asset 
equilibria than their lower caste, smaller landholder and less educated peers. In 
addition, recent improvements in economic conditions in Andhra Pradesh village of 
Aurepalle have resulted in a higher equilibrium level of asset holdings that in the 
Maharashtra villages. 
 
To put the methods and results into a broader perspective it is worth concluding with 
some caveats about using an asset index and a single equation model to estimate 
household welfare dynamics. For policy purposes a key practical issue is how he 
estimated equilibrium asset index relates back to actual asset holdings. We can of 
course work back mechanically and use the coefficients from the asset index 
regressions and do some calibration against commonly held bundles of assets to 
‘recover’ typical asset levels associated with the one asset equilibrium. That would 
give the average value of all the assets in the index that a household would have in 
equilibrium, thus creating a ‘representative household’. This concept, however, has 
limited value, as any number of linear combination of assets can yield that same asset 
index, not just the combination of ‘average’ assets. 
 
Moreover, there may be economies of scale and of scope in reaching the equilibrium 
level of assets. That is, there is likely to be limited substitutability, and a considerable 
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degree of complementarity between assets. This makes it difficult to identify which 
particular assets households below the equilibrium need assistance with; let alone 
identifying which particular combination of assets is required. There is a need to 
disentangle the effects of different assets. This can be done in two different ways. 
Either by supplementing quantitative surveys with qualitative data, where particular 
types of households identified from the quantitative data are revisited and asked 
further questions about their gains and losses of assets (Adato et al. 2006) or, in 
theory, by extending the statistical analysis beyond a single asset index. Techniques 
exist to flexibly model multiple assets and interactions of assets on the right hand side 
of the equation through, for example, additive models and single index models or 
penalized splines. The practical constraint for such modeling is the availability of data. 
However, there is another layer of complication. Asset dynamics are an autoregressive 
process. Thus, if multiple assets and interaction of assets are included on the right 
hand side, they will need to also appear as the next period’s left hand side. And the 
statistical literature has not yet developed suitable estimation techniques to solve 
systems of simultaneous non- or semi-parametric equations. 
 
The bottom line is that estimation of household welfare dynamics is currently limited 
to using a single welfare variable in a single equation autoregression model. In 
choosing the welfare variable, an asset index has clear advantages over more 
commonly used income or consumption, notwithstanding the issues identified above. 
If the aim is to be forward looking and to help inform poverty reduction policies then 
an asset index is the most appropriate measure of well-being as it captures future 
expected well-being rather than the particular stochastic income draw observed for a 
household at the time of the survey. 
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The most appropriate single equation autoregressive model to identify household 
welfare dynamics should satisfy three minimum conditions. First, it needs to be able to 
flexibly model the functional form of the autoregression to allow for possibly non-
convexities in any part of the asset range. Second, it must be able to control for other 
household characteristics, subgroups and time and location specific effects. Third, it 
obviously needs to be able to handle panel data. The semiparametric mixed model 
representation of penalized splines including random or fixed effects satisfies these 
requirements and can be implemented without specialist software. It, therefore, 
represents one of the most suitable currently available techniques to model household 
asset poverty dynamics. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Asset Index Regressions - Dependent Variable: Poverty Line Units 
    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 VLS1&2 all 
obs –  
OLS 
Regression 
VLS1&2 All 
obs - 
Random 
Effects 
VLS1&2 
Cont HHs - 
OLS 
Regression 
VLS1&2 
Cont HH - 
Random 
Effects 
subsistence need per 
HH in AE at PL 
income 
-0.028 -0.921 0.745 0.615 
 (0.981) (0.385) (0.610) (0.648) 
squared subsistence 
need per HH in AE at 
PL income 
0.224 0.806 -1.179 -2.394 
 (0.933) (0.788) (0.717) (0.521) 
age of HH head -0.192 0.625 0.267 0.751 
 (0.645) (0.011)* (0.536) (0.009)** 
squared age of HH 
head 
-6.269 -7.716 -7.729 -7.612 
 (0.031)* (0.000)** (0.076) (0.000)** 
years of education 
HH head 
0.718 0.619 0.713 0.830 
 (0.305) (0.014)* (0.055) (0.000)** 
squared years of 
education HH head 
-0.699 0.116 0.473 -0.000 
 (0.556) (0.726) (0.495) (0.999) 
real net financial 
assets per AE 
2.017 1.140 1.085 1.108 
 (0.296) (0.000)** (0.226) (0.063) 
squared real net 
financial assets per 
AE 
1.284 2.486 2.375 2.375 
 (0.339) (0.000)** (0.001)** (0.000)** 
real house value per 
AE 
2.391 1.177 1.508 1.509 
 (0.130) (0.306) (0.201) (0.083) 
squared real house 
value per AE 
-0.461 2.220 1.105 1.660 
 (0.720) (0.034)* (0.002)** (0.000)** 
real equipment value 
per AE 
3.302 4.693 6.139 6.473 
 (0.227) (0.210) (0.243) (0.065) 
squared real 
equipment value per 
AE 
-1.679 -7.683 -8.977 -7.315 
 (0.103) (0.214) (0.401) (0.430) 
real consumer 
durables value per 
AE 
2.903 1.602 6.556 5.862 
 (0.452) (0.562) (0.059) (0.000)** 
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squared real 
consumer durables 
value per AE 
6.115 -1.955 -18.333 -17.779 
 (0.042)* (0.798) (0.047)* (0.000)** 
dry land owned in 
acres per AE 
0.183 0.353 0.208 0.318 
 (0.154) (0.000)** (0.240) (0.048)* 
squared dry land 
owned in acres per 
AE 
-0.074 -0.048 0.004 0.001 
 (0.283) (0.028)* (0.932) (0.987) 
irrigated land owned 
in acres per AE 
1.083 0.869 0.732 0.611 
 (0.043)* (0.001)** (0.233) (0.126) 
squared irrigated 
land owned in acres 
per AE 
0.012 -0.027 0.159 0.120 
 (0.844) (0.812) (0.369) (0.335) 
# bullocks owned per 
AE 
0.193 1.187 1.104 1.210 
 (0.780) (0.000)** (0.228) (0.014)* 
squared # bullocks 
owned per AE 
1.536 -0.275 0.143 -0.274 
 (0.133) (0.768) (0.903) (0.723) 
# of other bovine 
livestock owned per 
AE 
0.242 0.137 0.196 0.171 
 (0.208) (0.258) (0.564) (0.550) 
squared # of other 
bovine livestock 
owned per AE 
0.410 0.060 -0.133 -0.083 
 (0.002)** (0.575) (0.563) (0.604) 
# of working age 
adults per AE 
0.452 0.542 0.801 0.677 
 (0.145) (0.000)** (0.149) (0.059) 
squared # of working 
age adults per AE 
-0.965 -0.129 0.611 1.466 
 (0.072) (0.847) (0.641) (0.329) 
edufinassets 0.084 -2.472 -2.135 -2.238 
 (0.878) (0.010)* (0.270) (0.144) 
eduhouse 2.644 -0.468 3.791 3.029 
 (0.374) (0.815) (0.002)** (0.000)** 
eduequip 5.068 7.400 2.241 1.574 
 (0.103) (0.000)** (0.756) (0.717) 
edudurab -1.793 0.195 5.305 5.725 
 (0.753) (0.836) (0.258) (0.035)* 
edudryland 1.069 -0.570 -0.666 -0.654 
 (0.132) (0.000)** (0.039)* (0.000)** 
eduirrland -0.211 -0.176 -1.222 -0.763 
 (0.546) (0.838) (0.223) (0.328) 
edubullocks 0.533 -0.168 0.600 -0.072 
 (0.590) (0.850) (0.483) (0.928) 
edulivestocks -0.966 -0.323 -0.286 -0.364 
 (0.082) (0.595) (0.736) (0.586) 
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eduadult 0.984 0.677 0.953 0.424 
 (0.415) (0.002)** (0.697) (0.823) 
finassethouse -3.768 -9.948 -8.234 -9.084 
 (0.165) (0.000)** (0.189) (0.036)* 
finassetequip -2.354 -3.114 -4.707 -1.030 
 (0.092) (0.643) (0.734) (0.931) 
finassetdurab -2.267 14.742 18.253 17.590 
 (0.785) (0.000)** (0.378) (0.264) 
finassetdryland -1.594 0.803 1.242 1.345 
 (0.451) (0.168) (0.325) (0.075) 
finassetirrland -1.533 -1.703 -2.390 -2.634 
 (0.173) (0.196) (0.314) (0.107) 
finassetbullocks 6.253 2.431 2.391 1.866 
 (0.366) (0.540) (0.616) (0.590) 
finassetlivestock -0.925 -1.235 -2.290 -2.273 
 (0.381) (0.000)** (0.136) (0.015)* 
finassetadult -15.482 -0.801 -2.469 -2.382 
 (0.092) (0.741) (0.782) (0.720) 
houseequip 2.467 1.341 -3.862 -6.163 
 (0.319) (0.232) (0.743) (0.430) 
housedurab 0.000  0.000  
 (.)  (.)  
housedryland 2.011 0.179 0.297 0.022 
 (0.426) (0.816) (0.682) (0.967) 
houseirrland -0.808 -2.454 -3.638 -3.327 
 (0.245) (0.000)** (0.002)** (0.000)** 
housebullocks -4.496 5.547 7.722 7.890 
 (0.427) (0.010)* (0.021)* (0.000)** 
houselivestock 0.239 -2.222 -0.837 -0.639 
 (0.829) (0.020)* (0.665) (0.705) 
houseadult -0.862 -0.983 0.824 -1.374 
 (0.658) (0.508) (0.757) (0.586) 
equipdurab -6.865 16.334 19.638 16.408 
 (0.150) (0.166) (0.134) (0.049)* 
equipdryland -2.554 2.039 0.000 -0.371 
 (0.055) (0.189) (.) (0.883) 
equipirrland 1.643 5.551 0.000 9.023 
 (0.047)* (0.005)** (.) (0.000)** 
equipbullocks 14.589 -1.726 0.000  
 (0.061) (0.558) (.)  
equiplivestock -3.949 -4.177 -7.107 -6.026 
 (0.101) (0.141) (0.033)* (0.000)** 
equipadult -15.027 9.994 24.107 19.339 
 (0.163) (0.261) (0.310) (0.306) 
durabdryland 0.000  -1.723  
 (.)  (0.692)  
durabirrland 0.000  9.471  
 (.)  (0.021)*  
durabbullocks 0.000  -2.375 -0.967 
 (.)  (0.351) (0.585) 
durablivestock 0.000  0.000  
 (.)  (.)  
durabadult 0.000  0.000  
 (.)  (.)  
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drylandirrland 0.095 -0.037 0.198 0.205 
 (0.723) (0.820) (0.610) (0.448) 
drylandbullocks 0.249 0.606 0.885 0.843 
 (0.392) (0.239) (0.197) (0.082) 
drylandlivestock -0.286 0.176 0.375 0.301 
 (0.246) (0.219) (0.112) (0.014)* 
drylandadult 0.381 -0.034 -0.599 -0.403 
 (0.431) (0.783) (0.178) (0.250) 
irrlandbullocks -1.265 1.238 0.793 0.621 
 (0.443) (0.000)** (0.196) (0.005)** 
irrlandlivestock 1.516 0.376 -0.029 0.110 
 (0.086) (0.055) (0.941) (0.739) 
irrlandadult 1.515 0.440 0.483 1.149 
 (0.341) (0.589) (0.779) (0.337) 
bullockslivestock -1.329 -0.403 -0.229 -0.390 
 (0.151) (0.340) (0.811) (0.547) 
bullocksadult 1.745 -1.478 -2.942 -2.567 
 (0.447) (0.508) (0.192) (0.009)** 
livestockadult -2.957 -1.420 -0.262 -0.404 
 (0.007)** (0.100) (0.837) (0.687) 
year==  1976 0.103 0.080 0.091 0.120 
 (0.635) (0.667) (0.549) (0.233) 
year==  1977 0.425 0.460 0.510 0.523 
 (0.089) (0.000)** (0.031)* (0.000)** 
year==  1978 0.383 0.332 0.349 0.346 
 (0.169) (0.139) (0.065) (0.000)** 
year==  1979 0.313 0.353 0.451 0.461 
 (0.199) (0.045)* (0.058) (0.000)** 
year==  1980 0.067 0.012 0.112 0.106 
 (0.583) (0.896) (0.301) (0.051) 
year==  1981 -0.002 0.209 0.458 0.437 
 (0.979) (0.003)** (0.031)* (0.000)** 
year==  1982 0.375 0.467 0.647 0.620 
 (0.021)* (0.001)** (0.007)** (0.000)** 
year==  1983 0.406 0.516 0.541 0.542 
 (0.058) (0.000)** (0.131) (0.020)* 
year==  1984 0.159 0.288 0.280 0.279 
 (0.219) (0.000)** (0.326) (0.242) 
year==  2001 1.029 1.281 1.163 1.142 
 (0.054) (0.000)** (0.005)** (0.000)** 
year==  2002 1.448 1.318 1.336 1.281 
 (0.043)* (0.004)** (0.077) (0.000)** 
year==  2003 1.890 1.533 1.611 1.554 
 (0.011)* (0.000)** (0.020)* (0.000)** 
Constant 1.961 2.004 2.047 2.116 
 (0.015)* (0.000)** (0.003)** (0.000)** 
Observations 1836 1357 886 886 
R-squared/Overall R-
squared 
0.69 0.68 0.74 0.74 
Number of unique HH 
id 
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Robust p values in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
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Chapter 3: 
Do Short-Term Observed Income Changes Overstate 
Structural Economic Mobility?
16
 
1 Introduction 
Understanding changes in household welfare, i.e., economic mobility, is key for 
designing poverty reduction policies. In creating effective policy interventions it is 
especially important to understand to what extent observed changes in household 
welfare over time are stochastic, for instance resulting from random transitory gains 
and losses, or structural, for example due to changes in household asset holdings. 
Short-term stochastic welfare fluctuations suggest a need for stabilizing household 
incomes, whereas structural transitions reflect predictable changes in household 
welfare that can inform forward-looking, longer-term poverty reduction policies. 
 
Define total economic mobility as the directional changes in observed household 
incomes. Then total economic mobility can be decomposed into two components: 
structural economic mobility due to changes in household assets and characteristics; 
and stochastic economic mobility due to changes in stochastic transitory (or unearned) 
income and measurement error. Existing empirical studies of household income 
dynamics in developing countries use measures of total economic mobility and tend to 
find considerable changes in incomes over short periods of time. They, thus, conclude 
that a very large proportion of poor households move in and out of poverty over short 
periods of time and that only a small proportion is chronically poor. As a result most  
poverty is classified as transitory (for a good summary of evidence see Baulch and 
Hoddinott (2000)). Estimates for the transitory proportion of poverty run as high as 74 
                                                 
16 This chapter was co-authored with Christopher B. Barrett. 
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percent (Baulch and McCulloch 1998) and 80 percent in rural Pakistan (McCulloch 
and Baulch 2000) and 88 percent in rural India (Gaiha and Deolalikar 1993).17   
 
Such results seem inconsistent with widespread observations of “poverty traps” in 
rural areas of the developing world which imply limited economic mobility. However, 
since existing studies do not distinguish between structural and stochastic sources of 
economic mobility, it is likely that much apparent economic mobility is at least 
partially explained by random changes in transitory income and measurement error. 
This would, in turn, lead to an overestimate of short-term, transient poverty and an 
underestimate of long-term, chronic poverty.   
 
The objective of this paper is to explore whether estimates of (total) economic 
mobility based on observed incomes are positively correlated with the length of time 
over which households are observed. We develop a statistical test to indicate whether 
stochastic income changes matter and, thus, whether there exists a significant 
difference between total and structural economic mobility. The basic premise of the 
test is that if transitory income is random, then subsequent transitory income draws 
ultimately cancel each other out and we should see an inverse relationship between 
total economic mobility and the length of time over which income changes are 
measured (the ‘spell length’).  Estimates based on short spells of longitudinal data 
would then suggest more structural mobility than truly exists. 
 
Using household survey data from rural Pakistan as well as Monte Carlo simulations 
we show that panel data estimates of total household economic mobility and transitory 
                                                 
17
 These high estimates are partly driven by the presence of measurement error in household incomes. 
However, even partly controlling for measurement error, the transitory component of overall poverty 
remains large falling only slightly, from 80 to 68 percent, in rural Pakistan (McCulloch and Baulch 
2000). 
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poverty are inversely correlated to the length of time over which households are 
observed. Since we control for classical measurement error this result is driven 
primarily by changes in stochastic transitory income. Typical household panel data 
sets span only a few years and, hence, likely lead to overestimating structural 
economic mobility and transitory poverty. Our findings offer a partial explanation for 
the high rates of economic mobility and transitory poverty commonly reported in 
places widely considered to be economically stagnant or “trapped”; they also highlight 
the importance of constructing long-running panel data sets for analyzing structural 
welfare dynamics. 
 
2 Method 
Using the definition of total economic mobility from above, we can think of structural 
changes in household income as due to changes in non-stochastic income resulting 
from both changes in household assets and changes in returns to these assets; and 
stochastic changes in household income as resulting from changes in stochastic 
transitory income as well as changes in measurement error. Let vectors Ait and rt 
represent household i’s assets and returns to asset at t, respectively. Further define 
T
itε and 
M
itε to be unobserved transitory income and measurement error, respectively. 
Assuming measurement error and transitory income are proportional to income, total 
household income can then be expressed as: 
 
T M
it it
it it ty A re e
ε ε=         (1) 
 
Taking logarithms yields 
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 log log log T Mit it t it ity A r ε ε= + + +       (2) 
 
Let asset returns rt be stationary and stochastic with a mean return of r and mean zero 
iid error Ritε . Then, 
R
t tr r ε= + . Let τ denote the time elapsed between two income 
observations Taking first differences of equation 2 gives 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )log log log log log log T T M Mit it it it t t it it it ity y A A r rτ τ τ τ τε ε ε ε− − − − −− = − + − + − + −  (3) 
 
where the second term is just a stochastic intercept. This decomposition shows that 
total income changes based on survey data overestimate structural economic mobility 
if there are contemporaneous changes in random transitory income and in stochastic 
returns on assets. We want to isolate the effect of the change in stochastic components 
of observed income. Since survey incomes are measured with error and this 
measurement error can conflate the transitory income effect we need to control for this 
error to the extent possible. We assume that income suffers from classical 
measurement error and adjust income accordingly so as to filter out the final term in 
equation 3 (see the Appendix for details). 
  
Since we want to capture both the direction and the magnitude of household income 
changes we should measure economic mobility as a directional income change (Fields 
2001). Specifically, we choose the change in the logarithm of household income.  This 
appeals both because the difference in log incomes approximates the growth rate in 
household incomes and because a given absolute change in income is valued more for 
relatively poorer households, a desirable property when using the economic mobility 
measure to characterize poverty dynamics. Annualizing the change in logarithmic 
household income yields the following economic mobility measure. 
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( )(t, )
log log
m , it iti it it
y y
y y ττ τ τ
−
−
−
=       (4) 
 
This ensures that we can compare income changes across different spell lengths. Now 
let ty be mean adult equivalent household income at t, then we can normalize mi(t,τ) and 
define the normalized annual average change in log income per adult equivalent as 
follows 
 
( )
( )
( )
i(t, )
i,(t, )
i(t, )
m ,
M , , , 1
m ,
it it
it it t t
t t
y y
y y y y
y y
τ τ
τ τ τ
τ τ
−
− −
−
= −     (5) 
 
This normalization removes the average growth rate in the spell and defines household 
incomes changes relative to the average log income change. This scaling allows us to 
compare Mi(t,τ) measures across years with high and low average income growth 
rates.18 At the mean value of income, 
( )
( )
i(t, )
i(t, )
m ,
m ,
it it
t t
y y
y y
τ τ
τ τ
−
−
 equals one and Mi(t,τ) equals 
zero, thus the sign of Mi(t,τ) shows whether a household experienced greater or smaller 
economic mobility than the mean. 
 
Equation 5 can be used to derive a simple test for the effect of the change in transitory 
income 1
T T
it itε ε −− on Mi(t,τ). Define the normalized annual average change in log income 
per adult equivalent for the shortest and longest spells that can be created from a panel 
dataset as  
 
( )
( )
( )
i(T,T-1) 1
longest i,(T,T 1) 1 1
i(T,T 1) 1
m ,
M =M , , , 1
m ,
iT i
iT i T
T
y y
y y y y
y y
−
−
= −    (6) 
 
                                                 
18 This could be extended to control for cross-sectional differences, e.g., due to location or other 
exogenous household characteristics.  We would simply need to construct a different mean income for 
each subgroup. 
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( )
( )
( )
{ }i(t,1) 1shortest i,(t,1) 1 1
i(t,1) 1
m ,
M =M , , , 1 2,3,...,
m ,
it it
it it t t
t t
y y
y y y y t T
y y
−
− −
−
= − ∀ ∈  (7) 
 
Then let f(Mshortest) and f(Mlongest) denote the associated kernel densities. A first 
graphical check for the effect of transitory income changes on total income changes is 
simply to plot f(Mshortest) and f(Mlongest) on the same graph. If changes in transitory 
income are random, and their distribution is independent and stationary, they would 
cancel each other out over time. Then f(Mlongest) would be more peaked and more 
concentrated around its mean than f(Mshortest), suggesting that there is more variability 
in short-term income changes. As a result, estimates of total economic mobility and 
transitory poverty based on short observation spells would be systematically higher 
than estimates based on longer observation periods, with the difference between the 
two estimates determined by the size of changes in transitory income relative to 
changes in total income. Thus, we should expect an inverse monotonic relationship 
between total economic mobility estimates and the time between panel data 
observations. 
 
Statistically, we can test for the effect of transitory income on economic mobility as 
follows. For our purposes comparing the two kernel densities f(Mshortest) and f(Mlongest) 
reduces to testing whether they have the same variance.19  The distribution of the data 
determines the appropriate statistical homogeneity of variance test. First, if both kernel 
densities are normally distributed, then parametric homogeneity of variance tests such 
as the Levene or Brown-Forsythe tests are most powerful. If at least one kernel density 
is not normally distributed we need to use nonparametric tests for the homogeneity of 
                                                 
19 If the two kernel densities have the same variance we would want to test for differences in kurtosis. 
This paper does not extend the discussion to kurtosis for three reasons. First, variances are found to 
differ both in the application to data from Pakistan and in the Monte Carlo simulations. Second, with 
common sample sizes estimates of fourth order moments are likely to be unstable. Third, in the likely 
case of non-normally distributed M(t,τ) we would need non-parametric homogeneity of kurtosis tests 
which have not yet been developed in the statistical literature. 
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variance. By construction, f(Mshortest) and f(Mlongest) have the same mean. However, the 
choice of nonparametric test depends on whether the two kernel densities also have the 
same median. This can be verified by the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. If medians 
are equal, then the appropriate nonparametric homogeneity of variance tests are 
Ansari-Bradley and Fligner-Killeen; if not, then we have to resort to a less powerful, 
omnibus nonparametric test such as Kolmogorov-Smirnov. 
 
The autocorrelation structure of the data is likely to influence the results. Depending 
on the autocorrelation of transitory income, the stochastic component of total income 
change in equation 3 can be smaller or larger in the long or in the short spell. 
Let T Tit it τε ρε −= . If ρ=0, i.e., transitory income is independent and identically 
distributed, we would expect positive and negative transitory incomes to cancel out as 
the length of the observation period increases. As a result, the ratio of structural to 
stochastic economic mobility – the signal-to-noise ratio – would be larger for the 
longer spell and f(Mlongest) should be more centered around its mean than f(Mshortest). 
When transitory income is iid our homogeneity of variance test thus represents a 
conservative lower bound for the effect of transitory income on total economic 
mobility as even the longer spell will contain some stochastic component. 
 
If ( ]0,1ρ∈  then Titε  depends positively on Tit τε − . Such positively autocorrelated 
transitory income represents the case of cumulative advantage and disadvantage. The 
relative size of the stochastic component of total income changes falls for all spell 
lengths as the correlation coefficient gets larger. In other words, ( )( , )i tVar M τ  should 
fall as ρ increases.  
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When [ )1,0ρ∈ −  then Titε and Tit τε −  are negatively correlated and successive transitory 
income draws cancel each other out. From a modeling perspective this represent a 
fairly uninteresting case as the effect of transitory income on economic mobility 
depends not on the length of the observation period but on whether each of these 
periods are odd or even. Moreover, negative autocorrelation in transitory income 
seems highly unlikely in any realistic scenario. 
 
Actual survey panel data doesn’t allow us to test for the effect of different 
autocorrelation structures on total economic mobility. Instead, we explore this effect in 
the next section using Monte Carlo simulation.  
 
3 Results from rural Pakistan data and simulations 
The IFPRI Pakistan Rural Household Survey (PRHS) panel contains five years of 
income data for around 700 households collected between 1986/87 and 1990/91.20 For 
each household we constructed four one-year, three two-year, two three-year and one 
four-year income mobility spells.  
 
The kernel densities of annualized percentage changes in real per capita household log 
income, Mi(t,τ), for all spell lengths are shown in Figure 6. The relationship between 
spell length and dispersion is monotonic: The longer the observation spell the more 
income changes are concentrated around their mean and the smaller the variance. This 
confirms the hypothesis that, for a given average change in income, total economic 
mobility is inversely correlated with spell length. In turn, this implies that transitory 
                                                 
20 The data and detailed documentation is available from IFPRI at 
http://www.ifpri.org/data/pakistan01.htm. 
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income changes constitute a larger part of total income changes the shorter the time 
spanned by the panel. 
 
 
Figure 6 Kernel Densities of Mi(t,τ) for different income spell lengths 
 
Statistical analysis confirms these results. Table 4 shows that the variance falls 
monotonically as the spell length increases from 1741 for the one year spells to 85, 17, 
13 for the two, three and four year spells, respectively. Similarly, the kurtosis gets 
smaller as spells get longer, increasing the ‘peakedness’ of the distribution. 
 
All kernel densities are highly non-normal as indicated by p-values of Anderson-
Darling and Shapiro-Wilk test statistics that are very close to zero. However, the p-
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values for the Wilxocon-Mann-Whitney test between all spell lengths are high enough 
not to reject the hypothesis of equal medians for any two distributions. Hence, we can 
use the Ansari-Bradley and Fligner-Killeen tests to check for differences in variances. 
Their p-values very close to zero suggests that we can strongly reject the null 
hypothesis that any two empirical distributions of Mi(t,τ) have the same variance.
21 We 
can conclude that in rural Pakistan variability in incomes and, hence, apparent 
transitory poverty and total economic mobility, appears higher the shorter the interval 
between panel observations. 
 
Table 4 Moments of Mi(t,τ) for different income spell lengths 
  1 year spells 2 year spells 3 year spells 4 year spells 
# obs. 2864 2102 1368 665 
Mean -0.23 0.11 -0.01 0.04 
Median 0.19 0.10 0.21 0.06 
Variance 1741.84 84.76 17.47 13.37 
Kurtosis 17.12 10.66 4.64 3.80 
 
How robust are these results to changes in the error autocorrelation structure? We 
address this question through Monte Carlo simulation. The structure of the simulated 
data is modeled on the PRHS data with five periods covering 700 households. Let 
ity and 
*
ity denote household i’s observed income and non-stochastic income, 
respectively. Further, let itε be a multiplicative error so that
*
it it ity y ε= . First period 
non-stochastic household income *1iy  is drawn from a lognormal distribution with a 
range and variance calibrated on the PRHS data. The sampling distribution for the first 
                                                 
21 An appendix of statistical test results is available by request. 
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period multiplicative error 1iε  is based on the actual errors from a second-order 
polynomial regression (with a full set of interaction terms) of income on assets using 
the PRHS data. Let eit be this regression error.
22 Then 1itit
it
e
y
ε
 
= + 
 
 with 
[ )0,itε ∈ ∞ and [ ] 1itE ε = . For t>1, *ity  is based on * 1ity − plus three percent growth. For t 
>1 error terms itε  were created using the same method as for εi1 , but for three 
different autocorrelation structures. Let 1it itε ρε −= . Then the three cases ρ=1, ρ=0.5 
and ρ=0 represent perfect and moderate positive autocorrelation and iid errors, 
respectively. For each of the three cases, we constructed stochastic incomes for all 
households for five time periods. The normalized average annual percentage change in 
log incomes per capita, Mi(t,τ), and the variance of Mi(t,τ) was then calculated for all 
spell lengths following equations 6 and 7. Each simulation was replicated 1000 times 
yielding the twelve distributions of variances summarized in Table 5 and Figure 7. 
 
As expected, the mean variance of Mi(t,τ) varies depending on the autocorrelation 
structure. For a given spell length, the more errors are autocorrelated, that is, the 
greater ρ, the smaller the overall mean variance of annualized average percentage 
changes in per capita log income. This confirms our hypothesis 
( ) ( )( , ) ( , ), 0 , 0i t i tVar M Var Mτ τρ ρ= > > . It also makes intuitive sense as when ρ=0 
then observed income *it it ity y ε= has the largest variation over time. This is turn means 
that individual mobility mi(t,τ) is most dispersed, hence, ( )( , )i tVar M τ  is largest. The 
other extreme is shown in the last column in Table 5. When ρ=1 then transitory 
income is no longer stochastic, Mi(t,τ) and, therefore, ( )( , )i tVar M τ , is effectively zero 
for any τ. 
 
                                                 
22 For eit < 0 we assume it ite y≤ , i.e., we preclude negative values for yit. 
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Table 5 Mean variances of Mi(t,τ) for different autocorrelation structures based on 
1000 replications 
 Error Correlation Structure 
 Independent 
shocks 
 
ρ=0 
Some 
persistence 
of shocks 
ρ=0.5 
Cumulative 
advantage/ 
poverty trap 
ρ=1 
Mean Variance (Mi(t,1 year spells)) 
( )( , (min) 1i tVar M τ =  
299,144 
[2,906,319] 
2527 
[77,100] 
3.14-10 
[6.52e-11] 
Mean Variance (Mi(t,2 year spells)) 
( )( , 3i t TVar M τ = −  
226,418 
[5,625,523] 
24.06 
[7.53] 
6.84e-11 
[2.21e-11] 
Mean Variance (Mi(t,3 year spells)) 
( )( , 2i t TVar M τ = −  
791.81 
[8889.54] 
13.13 
[3.07] 
1.21e-11 
[8.37e-12] 
Mean Variance (Mi(t,4 year spells)) 
( )( , (max) 1i t TVar M τ = −  
103.68 
[530.07] 
8.98 
[1.73] 
9.51e-12 
[3.14e-13] 
Notes:  Standard deviations in brackets. 
 
Table 5 and Figure 7 also show that the mean variance and its standard deviation fall 
monotonically as the spell length τ increases, mirroring the results from the PRHS data 
above.23  
 
                                                 
23 The corresponding figure for ρ=0 is substantively the same as figure 2. 
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Figure 7 Kernel densities of mean variances of Mi(t,τ) from simulations (ρ=0.5) 
 
4 Conclusions and Implications 
The recent empirical literature on household income dynamics in developing countries 
has tended to conclude that a large proportion of poverty is transitory, and that 
relatively few households are chronically poor. In this note we propose and apply a 
test to detect whether such findings are at least partly driven by the length of time 
between panel observations.  
 
Our application of the test to data from rural Pakistan as well as to simulated data 
shows that using short spells from high frequency panels likely overestimates 
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structural economic mobility and, therefore, the degree of transitory poverty. Measures 
of total economic mobility capture non-stochastic economic mobility better when 
observed income spells are longer. An obvious corollary is that total economic 
mobility estimates based on short panel data spells need to be interpreted with caution 
as the ratio of stochastic to structural income changes is high. The variability in total 
incomes found in short spells can contain useful information for the design of income 
stabilization policies. However, our results indicate that estimates of total economic 
mobility based on short-term panel data are significantly greater than underlying 
structural income mobility that is the primary target of longer-term poverty reduction 
policies. Because of the truly stochastic component of transitory income this 
difference remains even when controlling for classical repeated measurement error 
and can only be reduced by collecting longer-running panel data.  
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APPENDIX 
Controlling for measurement error in income 
We can minimize the influence of measurement error on our economic mobility 
results following the approach of McCulloch and Baulch (2000). Let *ity  and 
M
itε denote true unobservable household income and measurement error, respectively. 
Then observed income is 
 
* M
it it ity y ε= + .        (A1) 
 
If we make the classic errors-in-variables assumption then measurement error is 
uncorrelated with true income. Hence, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )2* 2, 0 MM M M Mit it it it it it itCov y E y E y E εε ε ε ε σ= = + = + .  
If current income is a function of past true income and a stochastic error that is 
uncorrelated with past income, 
 
* *
1it it ity yρ ν−= +       (A2) 
 
but we use observed income ity instead of true income
*
ity , then we actually estimate 
 
  1
M
it it it ity yρ ν ρε−= + −      (A3) 
 
Since the covariance of observed income and the composite error term is 
( ) ( ) 2, , MM Mit it it it itCov y Cov y εν ρε ρ ε ρσ− = − = − the OLS estimate of ρ from equation 
A3 is not consistent. Its probability limit is 
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  ( )
( )
( )
2
2
,
ˆlim 1
M
M
it it it
OLS
it y
Cov y
p
Var y
ε
ν ρε σ
ρ ρ ρ
σ
−  
= + = −  
 
 (A4) 
 
where the last term is the bias. Since we have panel data we can use lagged income to 
instrument for income. The resulting instrumental variable estimator of equation A3 is 
unbiased as ( )ˆlim IVp ρ ρ= . Combining this with A3 we can estimate the ratio of 
noise variance to total observed variance (that is, the errors-in-variables bias) as 
 
  
2 2 2 2
* *
2 2 2
ˆ ˆ
1
ˆ
M y y yIV OLS
IV y y y
ε
σ σ σ σρ ρ
ρ σ σ σ
−−
= = = −    (A5) 
 
A5 is also equal to one minus the ‘reliability ratio’. The reliability ratio is a metric 
commonly used for expressing income measurement error in validation studies of 
economic mobility. Its estimates range from 0.67 to 0.87 (Abowd and Stinson 2005) 
encompassing our estimate of 0.75. 
 
Since the actual measurement error is of course unknown we cannot reverse it. 
However, we can use the estimated ratio in A5 to construct measurement-error-
adjusted household incomes as follows. Let iy denote household i’s average observed 
income over time. Then adjusted household income is 
 
  ( ) *yit i it i
y
y y y
σ
ψ
σ
= + −      (A6) 
 
Since we assumed that measurement error has mean zero, adjusted income ψ has the 
same mean as observed income y: Rs3866. However, its standard deviation of 4157 is 
equal to the estimated variance of true unobserved income, which is smaller than the 
standard deviation of observed income of 4377. The deviations from mean household 
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income are, therefore, scaled by the ratio of the standard deviations of true and 
observed income. Finally, note that since we cannot control perfectly for measurement 
error, estimating economic mobility using adjusted income gives an upper bound of 
true economic mobility.  
 
Results 
The IV estimation of equation A3 uses yit-2 as an instrument for yit-1. Hence, yit-2 has to 
satisfy two assumptions. First, yit-2 is not correlated with υit. Second,  yit-1 and yit-2 need 
to be reasonable well correlated, which they are with a correlation coefficient of 0.56. 
 
Dependent variable: Real HH income per adult equivalent (yit) 
 Variable OLS IV 
   
Real HH income per 
AE, 1st lag (yit-1) 
.76467241*** 1.0293571*** 
   
N 2867 2099 
R-squared .56509309 . 
Instrument  yit-2 
Note: *** indicates significance at the 1% level.  
 
Bias:   
2
2
ˆˆ ˆ
0.2581
ˆ ˆ
MIV OLS
IV y
ε
σρ ρ
ρ σ
−
= =  
 
Reliability Ratio:  1 1 0.2581 0.7419r bias= − = − =  
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Chapter 4: 
Measuring Poverty Over Time - 
Accounting for welfare variability and the 
intertemporal distribution of poverty 
1 Introduction 
Poverty measures tend to be static. Poverty rates calculated from single surveys give 
snapshot views of poverty. Even the assessment of poverty over time generally does 
not go beyond looking at poverty trends, that is, comparing snapshot cross-sectional 
poverty indices at two or more points in time. While analytically simple, snapshot 
poverty measures are unlikely to fully characterize poverty over time at the level of 
the individual household and at the aggregate level of society.  
 
At the individual household level, snapshot poverty measures are independent of a 
household’s income and poverty status in previous and subsequent periods. But of 
course these household income and poverty ‘histories’ can influence how one 
perceives and thinks about poverty. For example, for a given amount of total income24 
over time, income mobility in the form of fluctuations in incomes reduces welfare 
under the standard assumption of concave utility. For a given variance, upward trends 
in income are likely to be preferred to random fluctuations, which in turn are 
preferable to downward trends. Welfare would be lower the greater the uncertainty of 
future incomes. Similarly, standard snapshot poverties fail to capture society-wide 
effects of fluctuations in income. Imagine one society with no income mobility in 
which half the population is in chronic poverty and the other half is never poor. Now 
                                                 
24 In this paper I use the term ‘income’ as a short-hand for material well-being. However, the discussion 
applies equally to any other uni- or multi-dimensional indicator of well-being. 
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picture another society with the same amount of aggregate income over time, but in 
which there is no chronic poverty, but lots of (zero-sum) mobility so that everyone 
spends some time in poverty. Would we judge them to be equally poor? If we believe 
that any of these household and society-level fluctuations in income and poverty status 
affect social welfare then our poverty measures should attempt to reflect this. 
 
One main objective of this paper is, therefore, to develop new classes of poverty 
measures which are sensitive to households’ income variability and to the degree to 
which poverty is shared across households over time. A second objective is to 
compare these new measures with the few other existing measures proposed in the 
literature to date which have attempted to account for intertemporal variation in 
households’ welfare. These comparisons will highlight that the choice of how to 
account for income variability and the intertemporal distribution of poverty will 
depend on the particular policy or evaluation objective. For example, if the objective is 
to minimize the proportion of the population that experiences poverty over time we 
would use a different poverty measure to measure against than if the objective is to 
reduce the total poverty cost from income variability. The third objective is to apply 
the new and existing poverty measures to survey data from rural Pakistan to 
demonstrate the extent to which different methods to account for income variability 
and the intertemporal distribution of poverty affect estimated poverty measures. 
 
The next two section introduces some analytic preliminaries. Section 3 discusses two 
methods for making poverty measures sensitive to income variability and applies these 
to panel data from rural Pakistan. Section 4 outlines three ways of accounting for the 
intertemporal distribution of poverty across households and applies them to the same 
dataset. Section 5 concludes. 
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2 Measuring poverty over time: Some preliminaries 
Measuring household poverty over time requires either longitudinal or pseudo-panel 
data. A (pseudo-)panel contains a sequence of income observations for each household 
(type) { }1,2,...,i N∈ at each time period { }1,2,...,t T∈ . Let xit and yit denote i’s income 
at t for two societies’ intertemporal income profiles which we wish to compare. The 
panel information can be represented by society income matrices A and B in 1.  
 
11 12 1 11 12 1
21 22 2 21 22 2
1 2 1 2
T T
T T
N N NT N N NT
x x x y y y
x x x y y y
A B
x x x y y y
   
   
   = =
   
   
   
⋯ ⋯
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮
⋯ ⋯
 (1) 
 
In an ex post analysis the elements of A and B are known past incomes. We can then 
choose a sequence of poverty lines { }1,.., TZ z z= 25 to accompany the panel matrices, 
and calculate poverty levels for each element in A and B as in P(A) and P(B). 
 
11 1 12 2 1
21 1 22 2 2
1 1 2 2
11 1 12 2 1
21 1 22 2 2
1 1 2 2
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( )
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( )
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
T T
T T
N N NT T
T T
T T
N N NT T
p x z p x z p x z
p x z p x z p x z
P A
p x z p x z p x z
p y z p y z p y z
p y z p y z p y z
P B
p y z p y z p y z
 
 
 =
 
 
 

=

⋯
⋯
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
⋯
⋯
⋯
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
⋯

 
 
 
 

 (2) 
 
                                                 
25 Alternatively, incomes and poverty lines could be normalized so that we only need to use one z for all 
periods. 
  96 
Assume that household26 poverty over time is a function of the stream of incomes 
received over time and the variability of income. Lifetime poverty for household i is 
then a row aggregation of the society income matrix and can be defined as: 
( )1 1,..., ; ,...,i i iT TLP V x x z z= , where T=(1,…T) is time, ( )1,...,i iTx x  is household i’s 
income history, ( )1,..., Tz z is the sequence of poverty lines and : tV →ℝ ℝ  is the 
valuation function which maps the sequence of incomes and poverty lines into the real 
line. 
 
Income variability describes ex post income fluctuations and is, thus, a backward 
looking concept. As such, it is a tool for analyzing past performance, just like any 
commonly used measure of well-being. Note, however, that examining past variability 
can also be useful for planning future policies in the following way. If we are willing 
to assume that the distribution of a household’s past incomes is a probability 
distribution and that this probability distribution is stationary over time, then we can 
think of the observed ex post income variability as also representing the household’s 
ex ante risk and vulnerability.27 Indeed, much of the recent literature on vulnerability 
measurement is based on these assumptions (Pritchett et al. 2000; Ligon and Schechter 
2003). For now, however, this paper focuses on the effects of ex post income 
variability on well-being. 
 
Now consider the economy-wide level. At each point in time a society suffers from a 
certain level of poverty. Over several points in time this burden can be summed up 
into the aggregate intertemporal poverty burden. Define the intertemporal distribution 
                                                 
26 Throughout the paper I refer the ‘household’ as that is the level for which we generally have income 
survey data. However, we can think of it as the ‘individual’ for variables for which we have person-
specific data, such as education, health or nutrition. 
27 The stationarity assumption also implies that there is no change over time in the risks a household 
faces, and no change in ex ante risk coping strategies (e.g., choosing low risk low return investments). 
  97 
of poverty to be the way this aggregate intertemporal suffering from poverty is shared 
across households. Total lifetime poverty for a society can be expressed as: 
1( ,..., )AGG qTLP P LP LP= , where q is the number of households who are poor in at least 
one period. The aggregation function PAGG needs to aggregate across household 
lifetime poverties as well as take account of the intertemporal distribution of poverty 
across households. 
 
A poverty measure that is sensitive to the intertemporal distribution of poverty thus 
captures the – normative, but reasonable – claim that the extent of aggregate 
intertemporal poverty in a society depends not only on the aggregation of ‘snapshot’ 
single period cross-sectional poverty indices, but also on the distribution of poverty 
durations across households. Specifically, sharing poverty more equally across society 
is assumed to reduce the burden of intertemporal aggregate poverty. 
 
This assumption is reasonable in a variety of circumstances. First, if our evaluation of 
social welfare depends on ‘fairness’ in the sense that some of the differences in 
poverty durations across households are structural and not a result of differing levels 
of effort or risk taking. Second, if we believe that each individual household’s poverty 
experience gets worse with increasing length of poverty. For instance, at the 
household level chronic poverty can have a permanent effect on health, employability, 
and psychological well-being. Third, if there are neighborhood effects in the sense that 
the poverty experience of one household affects the well-being of other households. 
Fourth, if there are economy-wide negative consequences from chronic poverty. For 
example, overall investment and output may be depressed due to social tensions and 
civil unrest, and due to some members of society being permanently excluded from 
higher return activities. 
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The same concept - variability in household incomes – has two opposite effects  
depending on how we choose to measure income and poverty. For individual 
households it reduces welfare compared to a constant income stream, but at the 
aggregate level greater income mobility, in the form of churning, is a positive. Neither 
of these two opposite effects is right or wrong, but it does suggest that we need to pick 
income and poverty measures according to the particular issue we are interested in. 
Indeed, both the household and the aggregate methods of accounting for income 
variability can be a valuable addition to poverty analysis as they both capture aspects 
of poverty that standard poverty measures (implicitly) ignore. 
 
3 Lifetime household poverty & income variability 
This paper’s motivation for incorporating income variability into a measure of 
household poverty is depicted in Figure 8. The household income histories in case 1a 
and 1b have the same average income below the poverty line z, but does the income 
variability in 1b make it poorer than 1a? Similarly, 2a and 2b have the same average 
income, this time above z. Is 2b poorer than 2a?  The answer is ‘yes’ in a wide variety 
of circumstances.  
 
For example, if we believe any of the following are true: households are averse to 
income fluctuations; household incomes are not truly separable over time, for instance, 
due to imperfect access to financial markets; there are no irreversibilities so that 
households can physically and materially recover from periods in poverty; and there 
are no stigma costs to having experienced poverty. 
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 (Case 1a: Average poor, no variability) (Case 1b: Average poor, variability) 
  
  
 
(Case 2a: Average non-poor, no variability) (Case 2b: Average non-poor, variability) 
  
 
Figure 8 Stylized household income histories – with and without income variability 
 
This section introduces two classes of poverty and income measures to account for 
intertemporal variability in household income. They offer two distinct ways of 
summarizing the income history of each household i, ( )1,...,i iTx x  into a single lifetime 
household income number.  
 
In deriving these intertemporal poverty measures it is useful to define a household 
‘illfare from poverty’ function based on the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (1984) index 
(FGT)28 
 
( )
0
t it
it t
it t
it t
z x
if x z
W x z
if x z
α  −
− < =   

≥
 (3) 
 
                                                 
28 The choice of this particular form is motivated in the next section. 
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where α is household i’s intertemporal poverty aversion parameter. This function 
satisfies the focus axiom of static poverty measures in the sense that a household 
which is never poor has zero lifetime illfare from poverty. 
 
Two approaches for making intertemporal household poverty 
measures sensitive to income variability 
A measure of intertemporal household welfare can be made sensitive to income 
variability in two ways. The first can be termed the constant equivalent income 
approach to measuring intertemporal household poverty. Let δ be the discount factor 
and 
1
1 T t
t
t
z z
T
δ
=
= ∑ be the intertemporal poverty line. Then the constant stream of i’s 
income that results in the equivalent poverty as the actual household lifetime poverty 
LPi(α) is defined as:  
 
:
1
it t
t t it i
i
t x z t
z x z x
CEIP
T z z
α α
δ
<
 − − 
≡ ≡   
  
∑  (4) 
 
For each i we can find a constant equivalent income (CEI) ix which gives the same 
illfare from poverty as i’s actual income stream. ix depends inversely on α. For a given 
income history, as i’s aversion to income variability increases its CEI falls.  The 
constant equivalent income poverty (CEIP) definition in equation 4 distributes any 
poverty i experiences equally across all t. Hence, in addition to aversion against 
variability the CEIP implies strong poverty aversion. Periods where i is non-poor 
cannot compensate for periods spent in poverty. This is a result of the shape of the 
social ‘illfare’ function W(.) above, which gives the value of zero to all observations 
above z. For example, if all but one xit are well above their zt’s, but one is below, then 
ix is still less than zt. The CEI can be plugged into a regular FGT poverty measure to 
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yield a simple measure of the total average lifetime poverty for society: 
:
1
i
i
i x z
z x
TLP
N z
α
<
− 
=  
 
∑ . Using equation 4 to replace ix  with xit and rearranging gives 
 
: : : :
1 1 1
i it t i it t
t tt it t it
i x z t x z i x z t x zt t
z x z x
TLP
N T z NT z
α α
δ δ
< < < <
    − − = =        
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  (5) 
 
Note that this is not equivalent to the simple case of aggregating matrix A horizontally 
(over t) and then vertically (over i). That would count the ever-poor households only 
in periods where they below z. In contrast, the second summation in equation 5 sums 
across all households whose constant income ix is below z. 
 
In terms of implementing the constant equivalent income approach to measuring 
intertemporal household poverty it is worth noting that it gives unsatisfactory results 
for the headcount ratio. To illustrate rewrite equation 4  
 
:
1
( )
0
it t
i
i it tt it
i
t x z t
i it t
z x
if x z x zz x
CEIP z
T z
if x z x z t T
α
α
α
<
 −   < ⇔ ∃ <−  = =    
   ≥ ⇔ ≥ ∀ ∈
∑  (6) 
 
Then in the case of α=0, if household i has ever experienced poverty its CEIPi(0) is 
equal to one and its constant equivalent income ( )0ix could be any income below z. 
Symmetrically, if i has never been poor then its CEIPi(0) is equal to one and any 
( )0ix  above z can be its constant equivalent income. This extreme result is due to the 
discontinuous nature of the headcount index. 
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The constant income approach is less extreme and, therefore, more appealing for α 
greater than 0. For α=1 and α=2, ix  can be calculated as follows. 
 
( ) [ ](1) 1 1 (1)ii i i
z x
CEIP x z CEIP
z
α
− 
= ⇒ = = − 
 
 (7) 
 
( )
2
(2) 2 1 (2)ii i i
z x
CEIP x z CEIP
z
α
−   = ⇒ = = −    
 (8) 
 
From equations 10 and 11 we see that the CEIPi(1) and CEIPi(2) for never poor 
households are equal to zero. This means that the right hand sides of equations 10 and 
11 are also equal to zero, forcing ( )ix α  to be equal to z. Therefore, calculating the 
constant equivalent incomes for non-poor households does not provide additional 
information for any poverty analysis. The never-poor households are therefore 
excluded from the calculation of constant equivalent income. This also ensures that the 
constant equivalent income approach is in line with Sen’s (1976) focus axiom. For 
ever-poor households the constant equivalent income is a useful indicator of the cost 
of income variability if we believe that having ever experienced poverty is not - or at 
least not completely - reversible. 
 
The second, alternative way of making social welfare sensitive to income variability 
can be called the stability equivalent income approach. This approach exploits the 
mathematical analogy between ex ante expected utility and income risk on the one 
hand and ex post utility and income variability on the other. In an ex ante world we are 
dealing with expected utility, which is based on the range of possible states of the 
world denoted by the outlined dots in Figure 9 to the right of the present time 
(time=0). Since we have uncertainty over the states of the world the contingent income 
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for each state is a random variable. The expected income and, thus, utility depends not 
only on the incomes in each state but also on their distribution, i.e., the probability 
with which each income happens. Figure 9 depicts a world with two equally likely 
states, high income xHigh and low income xLow, and an expected income of E(x). If, as 
usual, we assume a concave utility function to represent risk aversion then the 
certainty equivalent income CertEI lies below E(x) by Jensen’s inequality. The Arrow-
Pratt coefficients of absolute and relative risk aversion are positive and the difference 
between CertEI and E(x) represents the risk premium. 
 
 
 
Figure 9 Analogy of ex ante income risk and ex post income variability 
 
In an ex post world we observe a sequence of past incomes denoted by the black dots 
to the left of ‘now’. While past incomes show some variation over time they are, of 
course, no longer random variables. However, the mathematics carry over from the 
stochastic ex ante world. States of the worlds are now replaced by actual realizations 
-3    -2         -1  0     1          2
  
income 
xHigh 
xLow 
xaverage 
SEI= xi(SE) 
CertEI 
E(x) 
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of past household incomes at time<0 and the utility function over certain past incomes 
replaces the expected utility over uncertain future states. 
 
The examples in Figure 9 and Figure 10 show the case of income variability aversion 
where average income, xaverage, lies above the stability equivalent income, xi(SE). When 
a household is variability averse the welfare function W(.) is concave, the coefficients 
of absolute and relative variability aversion are positive, and a household would be 
better off if it earned its average income in each period, as W(xi(SE))<W(xaverage). The 
absolute and the relative variability premia29 VA and VR can be defined as: 
 
( )A average i SEV x x= −  (9) 
 
( )( )average i SE
R
average
x x
V
x
−
=  (10) 
 
For a given level of variability aversion, the absolute and relative variability premia 
therefore show the additional amount and percentage of income, respectively, needed 
to compensate for income variability to maintain the same amount of poverty. 
Interpreted differently, the stability equivalent premium indicates the upper limit of 
welfare gains from income stabilization; or, similarly the upper limit of the welfare 
loss (in currency or in Poverty Measure units) due to fluctuations in past incomes. 
 
 
                                                 
29 As this paper has gone through revisions the concepts of stability equivalent incomes, variability 
premium, constant relative and absolute variability aversion welfare functions and coefficients of 
relative and absolute variability aversion have been proposed in another PhD thesis (Cruces 2005). 
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Figure 10 Stability Equivalent Income and Variability Premium under Variability 
Aversion 
 
To implement the stability equivalent income approach we need to choose a functional 
form to penalize past income variability. Analogously to ex ante constant relative risk 
aversion we can define a household’s lifetime SEI, xi(SE), using a constant relative 
variability aversion (CRVA) function: 
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where ρ is the constant relative variability aversion coefficient. Again, a matching 
poverty line can be written as 
1
1 T t
t
t
z z
T
δ
=
= ∑ .  
VA 
xlow xhigh xaverage 
W(x) 
W(xi(SE)) 
W(xlow) 
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W(xaverage) 
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By choosing different values of ρ we can allow for different households’ preferences 
towards income fluctuations or, equivalently, tailor our lifetime household poverty 
measures to the social planner’s preferences and the particular policy objective at 
hand. Increasing the value of  ρ would be appropriate as the policy objective moves 
from maximizing aggregate income towards the ‘safety first’ goal of minimizing 
(downward) fluctuations. Figure 11 shows the two limiting cases of ρ =0 and ρ →∞  
and the intermediate case where ρ is a finite positive number. 
 
When there is no fluctuation in income so that xi1=xi2, or when ρ is equal to zero and 
households are ‘variability neutral’ we are at point xi(SE,ρ=0) in figure 11. The stability 
equivalent income evaluation function reverts back to the straight average of 
household intertemporal income:  
 
0
( )
1
1 T t
i SE it
t
x x
T
ρ δ=
=
= ∑  (12) 
 
This gives us the upper limit of the lifetime household income range and represents 
the utilitarian version30 of equation 14. Often this is reported in studies which do not 
explicit set out to account for income variability. Note that xi(SE) may be lower than the 
snapshot poverty in each t (Grootaert and Kanbur 1995). As the level of ρ increases 
the stability equivalent income penalizes income variability more and, hence, 
increases lifetime poverty compared to simply aggregating snapshot poverty levels. 
                                                 
30 Utilitarian in the ‘intertemporal within household’ sense, where each household is only interested in 
maximizing the sum of its discounted income stream, not in the distribution of income over time. 
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Figure 11 Stability Equivalent Income (2 periods, different values of ρ) 
 
The lower limit is marked by the case when ρ →∞ . This represents the Rawlsian 
version of equation 14 where households are averse to any degree of income 
variability, indicated by the point xi(SE,ρ→∞)  in figure 1. In this case the stability 
equivalent income reduces to the lowest single period income for a household: 
 
( ) min( )i SE itx x
ρ→∞ =  (13) 
 
On the basis of these SEI’s we can then calculate total variability adjusted lifetime 
poverty in society. First construct the N-vector ( )( ) 1( ) 2( ) ( ), ,...,SE SE SE N SEx x x x=  such that 
the xi(SE)‘s are ordered from lowest to highest. Then applying the FGT yields the 
stability equivalent income poverty aggregate: 
 
xi1 
xi2 
 
Stability Equivalent Income Line, xi1=xi2 
Extreme Variability 
aversion, ρ→∞ 
No variability aversion, ρ=0 
Intermediate variability aversion, ρ>0 
xi(SE,ρ=0) xi(SE,ρ→∞) 
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Why and when should one choose the constant equivalent income method or the 
stability equivalent income method of adjusting lifetime household poverty for income 
variability? Neither method is better than the other per se. Instead, the choice of how 
to adjust incomes and poverty rates for variability depends on how the properties of 
each of the two methods suit the particular evaluation question at hand and/or on one’s 
assumptions about how households’ lifetime welfare are affected by spending any 
time in poverty. 
 
 
Figure 12 Different levels of poverty under CEI and SEI for the same lifetime 
household income 
 
xi1 
xi2 
Stability Equivalent Income Line, xi1=xi2 
xLow 
 
xi(SE) 
xHigh 
z 
z 
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Both the stability equivalent and the constant equivalent income approach imply 
aversion to income variability, but only the latter implies poverty aversion. To see this 
consider the lifetime poverty of an ‘ever-poor’ household based on the stability 
equivalent approach in Figure 12. The income in period 1 is xLow, which is below the 
poverty line z, while period 2 income xhigh is above z. Then the household’s lifetime 
poverty is zero as long as the stability equivalent lifetime income, xi(SE), is above z. 
Time spent in poverty can be made up by being ‘sufficiently’ non-poor in other 
periods. In contrast, under the constant equivalent income approach the household 
would be poor as xLow < z and a household cannot fully recover from having ever been 
poor. 
 
Table 6 summarizes the conceptual and technical differences between the constant 
equivalent and the stability equivalent approach to measuring income and poverty that 
were discussed in this section. 
 
Table 6 Differences between Constant Equivalent Income and Stability Equivalent 
Income 
 
Constant Equivalent 
Income Poverty, CEIP 
Stability Equivalent 
Income Poverty, SEIP 
Policy Objective 
Minimize number of HHs 
ever in poverty 
(‘thresholds’) 
Minimize cost of any 
income variability 
(↑ρ→ “safety first”) 
Preserves HH poverty 
histories ( )1,...,i iTx x  
Yes 
(remembers any xit<zt) 
No 
(aggregated into the 
LPi(α)) 
Poverty Aversion/ 
Irreversibility 
Yes 
(by discontinuity in W) 
No 
Variability aversion 
Only if poor in 1 to T-1 
periods 
Trivial variability aversion 
due to α and δ. 
Yes 
(due to ρ) 
Trivial variability aversion 
due to δ. 
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Table 6 (Continued) 
 
Choice parameters δ,α(in income calculation) δ,α(in poverty calculation),ρ 
Can express social welfare 
loss in income terms 
Yes 
(as difference between CEI 
and average income) 
Yes 
(as variability premium) 
Can express social welfare 
loss in poverty terms 
No Yes 
Implies concavity of 
evaluation function 
No Yes 
Continuous across z No Yes 
Poverty index applied NxT times (to each xit) N times (to each LPi(α)) 
Interpretation 1 
For a given amount of 
poverty what is the loss of 
income from variability? 
What is the income loss 
you are willing to take if 
income was stabilized? 
For a given amount of 
income what is the 
poverty increase and 
income loss from 
variability? 
 
Interpretation 2 
The richest poor ‘lose’ the 
most. (‘threshold’ 
motivation) 
Everyone loses 
proportionately from 
variability. 
 
The Data 
To test empirically to what extent accounting for income variability and the 
intertemporal distribution of poverty makes a difference, the poverty measures 
discussed in this paper are applied to data from the Pakistan Rural Household Survey 
(PRHS). This survey was conducted by the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI) and spans 14 rounds between July 1986 and October 1991. It 
contains data for around 900 rural households in 46 villages located in four districts in 
three provinces: Badin in Sindh, Dir in the North Western Frontier Province, and 
Attock and Faisalabad in Punjab. As often with rural panel surveys, the selection of 
districts was not random; the first three were selected specifically because they are 
among the poorest in their province. The richer district of Faisalabad was included as a 
contrast. The survey is therefore not representative for Pakistan as a whole. It should, 
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however, reflect conditions in poor rural areas. Villages within districts and household 
within villages were selected by stratified random sampling. Due to the irregular 
spacing of rounds across the five years the data display varying degrees of seasonality. 
To overcome this I follow previous studies that have used these data, for example 
Baulch and McCulloch (1998), and combine rounds by year to construct annual data.  
 
The data include 773 households for which we have income data for any of the five 
years. To illustrate the full effect of intertemporal income variability I only kept 
household for which we have income data for all five years (this throws out 97 
households) and for which income is positive in all time periods (this eliminates 
another 9 households), yielding a balanced panel of 667 households. 
 
Following previous studies that have used the IFPRI panel (Alderman and Garcia 
1993; Adams and He 1995; McCulloch and Baulch 2000) I use a relative poverty line 
set to equal the 20th percentile of the distribution of adult equivalent income in 
1986/87, the first year of the panel. This works out to be RS 2000 per adult equivalent 
and is also roughly equal to the level of expenditure needed to purchase 2100 calories 
per adult per day. Using this relative poverty line also circumvents the problem of not 
having a reference basket of goods for the survey villages that could be used to 
calculate the cost of basic needs. 
 
Estimating the effect of variability on incomes and poverty 
Some summary measures of income mobility are useful to get a sense of the 
magnitude of income variability in the sample from rural Pakistan. Symmetric income 
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movements per household as measured by the Fields-Ok (1996) measure31 range 
between Rs380 and Rs408 for the five years covered by the survey. These movements 
represent between 9.7 and 11.3% of average incomes. Expressed in terms of relative 
movements in the income distribution, the variations in household incomes mean that 
on average households moved approximately one income quintile from each year to 
the next. In short, there is a lot of income movement among households in rural 
Pakistan which makes this dataset suitable for exploring the effect of income 
variability on lifetime household poverty and income. 
 
The analysis below reports results for whole sample of the PRHS and individually for 
each district. The prime reason to include the districts separately is because the 
poverty and income measures proposed in this paper are novel and, therefore, lack 
benchmarks. Thus, only a comparative analysis enables one to gauge whether, and in 
what way, the proposed extensions yields different poverty rates than standard poverty 
measures. Comparing districts also shows whether different methods of accounting for 
income variability leads to different poverty rankings. 
 
To put the effects of income variability on income and poverty measures into 
perspective, consider two poverty baselines as reference points. Baseline A represents 
poverty rates in the pooled cross section. By treating the panel data as NxT ‘cross-
sectional’ observations it loses the household specific income histories ( )1,...,i iTx x . 
This has two consequences: First, it is immaterial whether the cross-sectional 
aggregate poverty is made up of some households that are chronically poor, or if it 
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results from all households being poor some of the time. Second, any time spent in 
poverty by any household cannot be compensated. 
 
Baseline B represents the extreme case of no variability aversion. It is related to 
Ravallion’s (1988) measure of chronic poverty as it treats households as poor only if 
their average (or expected) income is below z. Thus, Baseline B does not register any 
negative welfare cost from income variability. The effects of variability are eliminated 
by first summing incomes for each household over time so that incomes below the 
poverty line are compensated Rupee for Rupee by other periods’ incomes above z. 
This total intertemporal household income combined with the total period poverty line 
(i.e., 
5
1
t
t
t
zδ
=
∑ since we have five years of income data) gives us the Baseline B poverty 
indices. When households are neutral towards variability in income so that ρ=0, then 
stability equivalent income poverty SEIP  is identical to baseline B. This baseline is, 
therefore, the lower limit for poverty rates under the stability equivalent income 
approach. As variability aversion ρ rises SEIP goes up. 
 
Table 7 shows that, as expected, baseline B is substantially lower than Baseline A for 
the whole sample as well as for the individual districts. For example, the headcount for 
all districts is eight percentage points lower. This gives an indication of the effect on 
poverty rates of using average incomes and thus ignoring variability of incomes. Much 
as the baselines differ, neither is ‘wrong’. However, the magnitude of the difference 
means that it is important to be clear about why we want to use one baseline over 
another. The choice of baseline and of the method for accounting for income 
variability should depend on the aspect of poverty (and the policy evaluation question) 
we are interested in.  
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Table 7 Baseline Poverty Measures 
    FGT index 
    α=0 α=1 α=2 
Baseline A  
Pooled Cross Section All districts 0.296 0.096 0.046 
 Faisalabad 0.234 0.061 0.025 
 Attock 0.413 0.151 0.081 
 Badin 0.305 0.091 0.041 
 Dir 0.264 0.086 0.040 
Baseline B 
Average long single HH poverties All districts 0.214 0.044 0.014 
 Faisalabad 0.152 0.021 0.004 
 Attock 0.365 0.098 0.038 
 Badin 0.219 0.048 0.016 
 Dir 0.167 0.027 0.006 
 
Next let us examine how accounting for income variability affects these baselines. 
Under the constant income approach we need to find the level of constant income that 
would result in the same amount of poverty as the average of the individual period 
household poverties. From equation 4 we see that by definition the total poverty over 
time under the constant equivalent income approach is the same as the average poverty 
actually experienced. One way to look at the welfare cost of variability is to examine 
the differences between the average actual income and the corresponding constant 
equivalent income ix from equation 4. 
 
In these data, 421 households have an LPi(α)>0. This defines the sample for the 
constant equivalent income approach as it means that these households were poor in at 
least one period. The average mean income of these ever-poor households in all 
districts is Rs2606.  This is much higher than the mean constant equivalent incomes 
from equations 4 and 5 reported in the first column in table 8. ix  based on α=1 and 
α=2 are only Rs1704 and Rs1553, respectively. This means that the effect of income 
variability for the average household is equivalent to losing between 902 and 1053 
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Rupees (or 27 and 34% of household income) based on the poverty gap and the 
squared poverty gap. Since the estimated percentage shortfalls from average income in 
table 8 compare actual variable household incomes with stabilized mean incomes, they 
can be viewed as an upper bound of welfare improvements that would have been 
possible had past incomes been stable at their mean. The percentage shortfall from 
average income rises as the Constant Equivalent Income measures get more 
distributionally sensitive. This is to be expected as income variability causes more 
lower income draws, and as higher values of α put more weight onto lower incomes. 
 
Table 8 Constant Equivalent Incomes and Percentage Shortfalls from Average 
Incomes 
  
# of 
obs Mean Percentile 
     10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
All Districts 421       
Average Intertemporal Income  2606 1462 1838 2393 3069 4078 
Constant Equivalent Income, ( )1ix α =   1704 1364 1573 1775 1905 1959 
% Shortfall from average income, α=1  27% 2% 11% 25% 40% 54% 
Constant Equivalent Income, ( )2ix α =   1553 1144 1344 1590 1801 1912 
% Shortfall from average income, α=2  34% 11% 20% 32% 45% 59% 
Faisalabad District 82       
Average Intertemporal Income  2772 1688 2061 2656 3334 4175 
Constant Equivalent Income, ( )1ix α =   1791 1474 1675 1844 1951 1979 
% Shortfall from average income, α=1  28% 8% 18% 30% 42% 53% 
Constant Equivalent Income, ( )2ix α =   1668 1312 1490 1687 1891 1954 
% Shortfall from average income, α=2  35% 17% 22% 35% 46% 57% 
Attock District 107       
Average Intertemporal Income  2411 1262 1545 2172 2878 4052 
Constant Equivalent Income, ( )1ix α =   1607 1177 1454 1653 1851 1928 
% Shortfall from average income, α=1  24% 0% 3% 21% 38% 55% 
Constant Equivalent Income, ( )2ix α =   1436 1047 1165 1435 1719 1859 
% Shortfall from average income, α=2  32% 8% 16% 31% 44% 61% 
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Table 8 (Continued) 
 
Badin District 130       
Average Intertemporal Income  2630 1461 1925 2439 3025 3833 
Constant Equivalent Income, ( )1ix α =   1716 1358 1584 1785 1912 1953 
% Shortfall from average income, α=1  27% 2% 13% 25% 39% 53% 
Constant Equivalent Income, ( )2ix α =   1576 1184 1398 1609 1823 1903 
% Shortfall from average income, α=2  33% 11% 22% 30% 44% 56% 
Dir District 102       
Average Intertemporal Income  2646 1571 1959 2247 3055 4130 
Constant Equivalent Income, ( )1ix α =   1720 1435 1600 1791 1875 1936 
% Shortfall from average income, α=1  28% 6% 13% 25% 42% 56% 
Constant Equivalent Income, ( )2ix α =   1557 1195 1389 1576 1776 1856  
% Shortfall from average income, α=2  35% 13% 22% 33% 46% 61% 
 
 
Looking at the percentile distribution of the shortfall between constant equivalent 
income ix  and average income we see that the incomes of the richest, ever-poor 
households in the right-most column are most affected when we control for variability, 
dropping by between 54-59%. The shortfall for the top 25% in the second column 
from the right is 40-45%. The variability penalty drops monotonically as we move 
down the income distribution to near zero for the bottom 10 and 25% of the 
distribution. This is to be expected because in calculating the ix ’s we excluded all 
incomes above the poverty line and the bottom percentiles are less likely to have ever 
had an income above z. 
 
The general pattern of shortfalls at the district level is similar to the whole sample. The 
percentage shortfall of constant equivalent income is between 24 and 28% for α=1 and 
between 32 and 35% for α=2. Note, however, that the poverty ranking across districts 
can change if constant equivalent income is used instead of average intertemporal 
income. For example, Dir’s average intertemporal household income of Rs2646  is 
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higher than Badin’s at Rs2630. However, when using constant equivalent income at 
α=2 then the ranking is reversed. This example illustrates that using a welfare measure 
that accounts for income variability can alter interregional poverty profiles. 
 
Under the stability equivalent income approach there are two ways of measuring the 
social welfare cost of variability. First, we can compare the standard average income 
with the stability equivalent income. The percentage difference between the two 
shows the relative variability premium. Second, we can use the stability equivalent 
income to calculate FGT measures.32 Unlike for the constant equivalent approach 
these poverty measures differ from the standard pooled cross section FGTs. Thus, we 
can compare them to get the cost of variability in terms of additional poverty. 
 
For the applications below I use the Constant Relative Variability Aversion (CRVA) 
as shown in equation 14. This is the ex post analogue to the ex ante Constant Relative 
Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility functions in the risk literature. Initially, I set the 
coefficient of relative variability aversion ρ equal to 2. This baseline follows two 
previous studies which have tried to model vulnerability or variability (Ligon and 
Schechter (2003) and Cruces and Wodon (2003)) and is a common rule of thumb for 
CRRA functions. Under CRVA, as under CRRA, higher values of ρ imply greater 
reduction in welfare due to income variability. As an illustration of the magnitude of 
this effect on stability equivalent incomes and poverty measures I also present results 
for ρ =3 as well as for the two possible extremes when ρ=0 and when ρ →∞ . For the 
initial applications reported below I assume δ=1, i.e., that there is no discounting of 
incomes.  
                                                 
32 Note that FGT measures can be substituted by alternative poverty measures without loss of 
generality. 
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Table 9 compares average intertemporal income with stability equivalent income from 
equation 14 and reports the relative variability premium from equation 10. Note that 
these income estimates are not directly comparable with those in table 8 as here we 
can include all 667 households, not just the 421 who were ever poor. 
 
For all districts together, the average relative variability premium is 18 and 24% for ρ 
equal to two and three, respectively. The welfare loss due to variability in table 9 tends 
to be more equally distributed across the income quantiles than is the case for constant 
equivalent income in table 8. But the richer households still tend to ‘lose’ a larger 
amount of income due to variability. However, unlike in the constant equivalent 
income approach, this is not a result of the evaluation function, but a reflection of the 
data; richer households experienced larger variations in incomes. 
 
Table 9 Stability Equivalent Incomes and Percentage Shortfalls from Average 
Incomes 
  Mean Percentile 
    10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
All Districts       
Average Intertemporal Income, 
0
( )i SEx
ρ=
 
3834 1342 1933 2950 4477 7149 
Stability Equivalent Income, 
2
( )i SEx
ρ=
 
3111 1251 1721 2555 3664 5516 
Relative Variability Premium VR, ρ=2 18% 4% 7% 13% 24% 39% 
Stability Equivalent Income, 
3
( )i SEx
ρ=
 
2875 1082 1571 2376 3433 4975 
Relative Variability Premium VR, ρ=3 24% 6% 10% 19% 33% 51% 
Stability Equivalent Income, ( )i SEx
ρ→∞
 
2002 655 1041 1648 2418 3590 
Relative Variability Premium VR, ρ→∞ 47% 24% 32% 45% 58% 73% 
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Table 9 (Continued) 
 
Faisalabad District       
Average Intertemporal Income, 
0
( )i SEx
ρ=
 
4562 1804 2546 3437 4679 7374 
Stability Equivalent Income, 
2
( )i SEx
ρ=
 
3877 1536 2184 2981 3916 6072 
Relative Variability Premium VR, ρ=2 16% 4% 8% 13% 21% 30% 
Stability Equivalent Income, 
3
( )i SEx
ρ=
 
3627 1372 1879 2782 3755 5697 
Relative Variability Premium VR, ρ=3 21% 7% 11% 18% 29% 39% 
Stability Equivalent Income, ( )i SEx
ρ→∞
 
2563 881 1264 1896 2625 4102 
Relative Variability Premium VR, ρ→∞ 44% 25% 32% 44% 54% 65% 
Attock District       
Average Intertemporal Income, 
0
( )i SEx
ρ=
 
3334 1319 1721 2582 3896 5996 
Stability Equivalent Income, 
2
( )i SEx
ρ=
 
2513 762 1312 2125 3211 4497 
Relative Variability Premium VR, ρ=2 22% 5% 7% 15% 28% 51% 
Stability Equivalent Income, 
3
( )i SEx
ρ=
 
2289 607 1180 1914 2849 4158 
Relative Variability Premium VR, ρ=3 29% 7% 11% 22% 41% 62% 
Stability Equivalent Income, ( )i SEx
ρ→∞
 
1551 337 707 1332 2006 3023 
Relative Variability Premium VR, ρ→∞ 52% 25% 36% 50% 66% 80% 
Badin District       
Average Intertemporal Income, 
0
( )i SEx
ρ=
 
3688 1683 2270 3042 4415 6242 
Stability Equivalent Income, 
2
( )i SEx
ρ=
 
3061 1324 1837 2535 3819 5656 
Relative Variability Premium VR, ρ=2 17% 3% 7% 11% 22% 35% 
Stability Equivalent Income, 
3
( )i SEx
ρ=
 
2838 1154 1625 2402 3521 5337 
Relative Variability Premium VR, ρ=3 22% 5% 9% 17% 30% 50% 
Stability Equivalent Income, ( )i SEx
ρ→∞
 
1999 664 1102 1691 2473 3799 
Relative Variability Premium VR, ρ→∞ 45% 23% 31% 43% 56% 75% 
Dir District       
Average Intertemporal Income, 
0
( )i SEx
ρ=
 
3823 1729 2189 2944 4550 7137 
Stability Equivalent Income, 
2
( )i SEx
ρ=
 
3027 1411 1733 2542 3424 5516 
Relative Variability Premium VR, ρ=2 18% 4% 7% 13% 25% 43% 
Stability Equivalent Income, 
3
( )i SEx
ρ=
 
2776 1283 1585 2300 3258 4945 
Relative Variability Premium VR, ρ=3 25% 6% 11% 19% 33% 53% 
Stability Equivalent Income, ( )i SEx
ρ→∞
 
1909 728 1040 1554 2403 3425 
Relative Variability Premium VR, ρ→∞ 48% 25% 33% 48% 59% 73% 
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To illustrate the bounds of the effect of variability on income, consider the two 
extreme cases. In table 9, ρ=0 represents the baseline B case, hence, the relative 
variability premium is 0% and there is no loss of welfare compared to using average 
intertemporal income. Under the Rawlsian case when ρ →∞ , the relevant measure is 
the minimum income for each household. As expected, the cost of variability is much 
higher, with a shortfall from average income of 47%. 
 
Comparing districts, the income rankings of Badin and Dir again change depending on 
whether we penalize income variability. Of these two districts Dir has the higher 
average intertemporal income, but the lower stability equivalent income for any 
positive level of ρ.  
 
In addition to presenting the welfare effect of income variability in terms of stability 
equivalent income we can also examine the effect of this variability on poverty 
measures directly. Table 10 shows rates of stability equivalent income poverty from 
equation 14 for the whole sample and the districts for three levels of α and for the 
same values of ρ as in table 9.  
 
Again accounting for income variability has a large impact. As the coefficient of 
relative variability aversion ρ goes from zero to three the headcount index (α=0) 
increases by almost 17 percentage points - nearly doubling - for the entire sample. 
Since the poverty gap and squared poverty gap ratio are increasingly sensitive to the 
distribution of poverty the relative effect of income variability on these two poverty 
measure is even larger. Poverty for α=1 and α=2 increases three and four-fold as ρ 
goes from zero to three. Disaggregating by district, Badin and Dir again switch ranks. 
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Table 10 Poverty under Stability Equivalent Income for selected levels of ρ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 The intertemporal distribution of poverty across 
households 
This section proposes two new classes of poverty measures that account for the 
intertemporal distribution of poverty across households, derives a third one drawing 
on the unemployment literature, and compares these three with a fourth measure 
proposed by Basu and Nolen (2006) by applying them to the same data set from rural 
Pakistan. 
 
Imagine two societies with the same amount of aggregate poverty over time, that is, 
they show the same amount of poverty in each time period. However, in the first 
society some households are permanently poor while the rest are never poor, while in 
 All Districts Faisalabad Attock 
  α=0 α=1 α=2 α=0 α=1 α=2 α=0 α=1 Α=2 
ρ=0 0.214 0.044 0.014 0.151 0.021 0.004 0.365 0.098 0.037 
ρ=2 0.326 0.099 0.043 0.238 0.055 0.018 0.462 0.185 0.097 
ρ=3 0.382 0.127 0.061 0.274 0.074 0.028 0.517 0.222 0.126 
ρ→∞ 0.642 0.265 0.147 0.573 0.186 0.090 0.768 0.385 0.241 
 Badin Dir 
  α=0 α=1 α=2 α=0 α=1 α=2 
ρ=0 0.219 0.048 0.016 0.167 0.027 0.006 
ρ=2 0.311 0.959 0.041 0.324 0.083 0.032 
ρ=3 0.367 0.122 0.059 0.394 0.114 0.050 
ρ→∞ 0.630 0.255 0.140 0.632 0.260 0.139 
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the second society time spent in poverty is distributed equally across all households. 
The intertemporal income profiles for these two societies are depicted in figure 13. 
The arrows represent households i and j, z is the poverty line, xHigh and xLow are two 
income levels and t1 and t2 denote two time periods. (A) and (B) can be thought of as 
representing populations with only chronic and only transitory poverty, respectively. 
 
 (A)      (B) 
  
Figure 13 Two stylized intertemporal income distributions 
 
How should the unequal intertemporal distribution of poverty be incorporated into a 
poverty measure and which society should it classify as being poorer? The answer 
and, thus, our choice of poverty measure, depends on our perspective and on the 
purpose for measuring poverty. From an individual’s perspective, variability is bad, as 
in the previous section’s discussion of the effect of income variability on household 
level poverty. However, from a societal perspective the intertemporal variability in 
households’ incomes and, hence, the distribution of poverty across households and 
time can be good or bad. Sharing the burden of poverty over time across household 
and minimizing the level of chronic poverty is ‘good’ if we value social equity. This is 
the underlying motivation for all of the intertemporal poverty measures discussed in 
this section. In contrast, if the impact of experiencing poverty once is irreversible or if 
it is so severe that subsequent episodes of poverty have no further traumatic effect 
xHigh 
xLow 
z 
t1 t2 
xHigh 
xLow 
z 
t1 t2 
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then the objective is to minimize the number of chronically poor households even at 
the expense of making already poor households even poorer. Only one of the four 
intertemporal poverty measures below can accommodate this objective. 
 
Standard poverty measures, such as single-period FGTs aggregated over time, are 
insensitive towards the distribution of poverty across households over time and, hence, 
towards society’s preference for such a distribution. As a result, these measures can 
give the same rate of poverty for quite different underlying distributions of poverty 
over time across households. For example, the FGTs for (A) and (B) are the same for 
t1 and t2 as well as for the aggregate of the two time periods. 
 
Standard poverty measures can be made sensitive to the intertemporal distribution of 
poverty across households by choosing an appropriate method to aggregate lifetime 
household poverties (e.g., SEIPi) or incomes (e.g., xi(SE)) across households. There are 
two general approaches: i) discounting incomes33 over time and ii) introducing an 
inequality dimension into the aggregate intertemporal poverty measure. The choice of 
method determines what types of distributional changes in the poverty burden are 
picked up, and the choice of parameters affects the degree to which aggregate 
intertemporal poverty in (B) differs from (A).  
 
By discounting incomes over time we can construct a poverty measure which shows 
greater lower intertemporal poverty in society (B) than in (A). Let δ be the discount 
factor.34 Then in (A) the two households i and j have lifetime incomes LIi and LIj of 
y1(1+δ) and y2(1+δ), respectively. In (B) they get y1+δy2 and y2+δy1. Hence, for y1≠ y2 
                                                 
33 Or poverty measures. 
34 Whether we take an ex ante perspective and look forward and discount future incomes, or evaluate ex 
post by looking back and discounting past incomes does not affect the following argument. 
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and δ>0 lifetime incomes are more equal in (B) than in (A), as both y1+δy2 and y2+δy1 
lie strictly between y1(1+δ) and y2(1+δ). Hence, aggregate lifetime inequality of 
poverty35 is greater in (A) than in (B). In matrix form this can be summarized as: 
1
2
(1 )
( )
(1 )
A A
y
y M y y I M
y
δ
δ δ
δ
+ 
+ = + =  + ɶ ɶ ɶ
, where 
1
2
1 0
0 1
A
y
y and M
y
   
= =   
  ɶ
 for (A)  
and 
1 2
2 1
( )B B
y y
y M y y I M
y y
δ
δ δ
δ
+ 
+ = + =  + ɶ ɶ ɶ
, where 
1
2
0 1
1 0
B
y
y and M
y
   
= =   
  ɶ
 for (B). 
As δ increases, the difference in lifetime inequality of poverty between (A) and (B) 
gets larger. This can be seen intuitively by comparing the ratios of lifetime incomes in 
both situations. 1 2(1 ) /(1 )y yδ δ+ +  is independent of δ, whereas 
1 2 2 1/y y y yδ δ+ + decreases in δ. More rigorously, (A) has a more unequal 
intertemporal distribution of poverty than (B) if MB is more equal than MA. That is true 
if and only if ( ) ( )B Ay I M My I Mδ δ+ = +
ɶ ɶ
such that M is bistochastic36 (Conlisk 1989). 
As this needs to hold for all y
ɶ
 we need ( )B AI M M I Mδ δ+ = + . Since MA=I this 
implies ( )1BI M Mδ δ+ = + . Hence we need to show that there exists a bistochastic 
matrix M such that ( )1
1
BM I Mδδ
= +
+
. Substituting MB into this equation we get 
1
1 0 0 11 1 1
0 1 1 0 11
1 1
M
δ
δ δδ
δδ
δ δ
 
      + += + =      +       
 + + 
, which is clearly bistochastic.37 
 
In assessing the intertemporal distribution of poverty it is important that our measure 
maintains household poverty histories for at least two reasons. First, in a normative 
sense, people may feel that being (very) poor in one period may be impossible to make 
                                                 
35 In this simple example income inequality and poverty inequality are synonymous as we only have 
two income levels, one above and one below the poverty line. 
36 A bistochastic matrix is a square matrix whose elements are positive and whose rows and columns 
sum to one. 
37 And is a permutation matrix if δ=0. 
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up even through great riches in other periods. Second, even from a positive 
perspective poverty at one point can have irreversible effects on lifetime poverty. For 
example, low consumption in one period can lead to permanent disabilities. Poverty 
measures which capture such irreversible events are either discontinuous, e.g., 
Rawlsian in nature so that { }min ,
i i
tP P t T
αα
= ∈ , or less extremely, put disproportionate 
weight on the worst periods, e.g., through a high value of α. 
 
The need to preserve the poverty histories of households means that the anonymity 
axiom from poverty measurement applies only to entire poverty histories. For 
example, in situation (B) above the intertemporal poverty measure shouldn’t be 
affected by which of the two households starts rich and which starts poor. The 
standard anonymity assumption holds in that sense. However, it is important that their 
respective lifetime poverty histories are maintained, as this is the only way we know 
that households have traded places. We could call this ‘poverty history preserving 
anonymity’. 
 
The discounting approach to measuring the effect of the intertemporal distribution of 
household poverties can be implemented as follows. First, introduce a discount factor 
to the lifetime income measure LIi. We saw above that the resulting LIi(δ) is greater 
than LPi for any δ<1. The three FGT aggregate lifetime poverty measures TLP(α=0,δ), 
TLP(α=1,δ) and TLP(α=2,δ) can then be estimated using the suitably discounted 
poverty line 
1
T
T t
t
t
z zδ −
=
=∑ . The social welfare ‘benefit’ of more equally distributed 
lifetime household poverties is then the difference between the pooled cross section 
FGTs, and the TLP(α,δ)’s. The choice of δ represents society’s preferences for the 
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equality of lifetime household poverties. Higher levels of δ represent greater aversion 
to unequally distributed poverty, and more generally, to chronic poverty. 
 
The second general way of incorporating the intertemporal distribution of poverty 
across households in an aggregate intertemporal poverty measures is by including an 
inequality dimension directly into the poverty measure. The two existing methods 
from the unemployment literature are discussed in the next section. Another method is 
proposed here and can be termed the ‘poverty inequality aversion method’. It relies on 
using a convex function to aggregate individual households’ lifetime poverty 
measures. Let ρ represent the degree of aversion to inequality of poverty across 
households. Then under constant relative poverty inequality aversion the aggregate 
intertemporal poverty measure can be expressed as: 
 
( )
( )
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
( )
1
N
i
i
N
N
i
i
LP if
N
P
LP if
ρ
ρα ρ
ρ
α ρ
−
−
=
=
 
≠ 
 = 

=

∑
∏
 (15) 
 
Equation 15 has two sources of curvature through parameters ρ and α. ρ accounts for 
the inequality of lifetime poverties across households. Setting ρ>1 makes P(ρ) convex 
in individual household lifetime poverties LPi(α). Hence, for a given level of 
aggregate intertemporal income, the policy response for reducing overall intertemporal 
poverty would be to equalize lifetime poverties. The level of α determines the extent 
to which we penalize the unequal distribution of poverty over time for a single 
household. 
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P(ρ) in equation 15 becomes concave when the exponents are switched. A concave 
aggregation function is appropriate when instead of penalizing the inequality of 
poverty across households we want to reward it. Among the four measures that 
account for the intertemporal distribution of poverty across households the poverty 
inequality aversion measure is the only measure that can either penalize or reward 
inequality of poverty. 
 
Existing studies on the intertemporal distribution of ‘bads’ 
across households 
Two other methods of accounting for the inequality of poverty or other societal bads 
have been proposed in the existing literature: Basu and Nolen’s (2006) measure for 
unemployment and poverty, and Borooah’s (2002) measure for unemployment. In 
contrast to the poverty inequality aversion method proposed above these two methods 
can only treat inequality of ‘bads’ as a negative. 
 
Basu and Nolen (2006) is the only paper to date which includes something akin to a 
‘churning axiom’ which rewards zero-sum symmetric income mobility. Their 
proposed poverty measure treats intertemporal mobility as a ‘good’ via a Rawlsian-
style multiplicative aggregation function:  
 
1
1 2
1
1 1
( , ..., )
n n
n i
i
P p p p pβ
β β=
 
≡ − − 
 
∏  (16) 
 
where pi is household i’s intertemporal poverty measure, 1 2( , ..., )nP p p p is the poverty 
profile of the society, and (0,1)β ∈  is a poverty aversion parameter. When using the 
headcount index, pi represents the proportion of time household i is poor. If poverty is 
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shared equally among all people then ,i j i jp p p p P= ∀ ∈ , and the effective poverty 
rate is the regular FGT measure for any value of β. In the (excluded) limiting cases we 
have the regular FGT (i.e., a utilitarian poverty measure) when β=0, and a Rawlsian 
poverty measure (where poverty is at its maximum as soon as one person is poor) if 
β=1. Thus by choosing β we can decide how much to value a more intertemporally 
equal distribution of poverty.  
 
The Basu-Nolen measure cannot be separated into its poverty and mobility 
dimensions. Mobility, and hence the equality of poverty durations, is included through 
the multiplicative method of aggregation. Basu and Nolen also explicitly reject 
separability of the measure into the poverty levels of individuals for two reasons. First, 
it allows the sensitivity of the aggregate poverty measure to a change in any 
individual’s poverty to vary inversely with the aggregate level of poverty in the 
society. This of course is desirable only if we accept that the marginal effect of a 
household getting poorer is greater in a richer society than in a poorer one.  Second, 
they argue that poverty cannot be equated to pure welfarism. Basu and Nolen (2004) 
defend their ‘non-welfarist’ approach arguing that it is possible that people near the 
poverty line are not risk averse. While this may be true under certain circumstances, 
particularly when there are non-linearities and threshold effects in welfare dynamics, it 
seems contrary to the findings in much of the literature on poverty and risk. The Basu-
Nolen poverty measure can include depth and severity of poverty by choosing pi to be 
i’s Pα=1 or Pα=2 history.
  
 
Borooah (2002) introduces a different approach for including inequality into an 
unemployment measure. Here I draw on his ‘duration sensitive’ unemployment 
measure to define a measure of poverty which is responsive to how much aggregate 
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intertemporal poverty is shared within a population. Let di be the number of periods 
household i is poor. [0, ]id T∈ , where T is the number of periods observed. Let pi be 
the proportion of periods in which i is poor so that pi=di/T, and the average duration of 
poverty is d T p= , where 
1
1 N
i
i
d d
N =
= ∑ . Poverty is equally shared in society if di=dj for 
all ,i j N∈ . If the same number of households (not necessarily the same households) 
are poor in each period, the headcount index H0 is the same for all t in T. And the 
average duration of poverty is 0d TH= . 
 
Then define an additively separable social loss function 
1
( )
N
i
i
L F d
=
=∑ , where F(di) is 
the social loss due to i’s duration of poverty. Then the change in L from a change in di 
is: 
1
( ) /
N
i i i
i
L F d d d
=
∆ = ∂ ∂ ∆∑ . If F(.) is strictly convex, then the social marginal loss, 
( ) /i iF d d∂ ∂ , is increasing in di. Thus, the loss to society gets larger as any individual’s 
spell in poverty di increases. Hence, for an average duration of poverty d , L is 
minimized if di=dj for all ,i j N∈ . If F(.) is defined as a constant elasticity function, 
then its elasticity ε represents society’s aversion against unequal distribution of 
poverty duration and can be chosen as desired. 
 
The Borooah-based method also introduces a natural way to handle the trade-off in the 
poverty measure between greater equality of the duration of poverty and higher 
poverty incidence. Let a richer household k give something to a poorer household j so 
that 0, ,k j id d and d i j k∆ = −∆ ∆ = ≠ , and average poverty duration d  remains 
constant. Let , 1j kd dλ λ= > . Then the transfer of poverty duration from k to j results 
in a change in social loss of: 
( ) / ( ) /k k k j j j k k k jL F d d d F d d d d d d d
ε ε ελ∆ = ∂ ∂ ∆ − ∂ ∂ ∆ = ∆ − ∆ . If L∆ =0, i.e., the transfer 
didn’t change social loss, then k jd d
ελ∆ = ∆ . If ε=0 then the transfer of poverty 
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duration could be done without increasing the average duration of poverty d . This is 
what standard poverty measures assume implicitly. If, however, ε>0 then society 
would be willing to increase k’s poverty duration by more than the reduction in j’s 
duration: k j jd d d
ελ∆ = ∆ > ∆ . 
 
Finally, we can define a duration-adjusted poverty rate. Recall d  is the actual average 
duration of poverty. Then, let d* be the average poverty duration when poverty 
duration is equally distributed where d* and d  have the same social loss. Then 
*d d≥ . In the terminology of the Atkinson poverty index, d* is the equally distributed 
equivalent poverty duration. Applying Atkinson’s index to the inequality in poverty 
duration gives: 
 
1/(1 )
1
1( * / ) 1 1i
d
A d d N
d
εε
ε
++
−
  = − = −  
   
∑  (17) 
 
Aε measures how far away the actual distribution of intertemporal poverty across 
households is from perfect equality, with parameter ε determining the sensitivity to 
inequality of poverty. ε=0 means that society is indifferent to the distribution of 
poverty durations across households, so that *d d= and 0 0A = . For a given d >0, d* 
and Aε increase as ε rises. Thus, the social loss from d  is * (1 )L d d Aε= = + .  
 
Now we can use the analog principle to apply this to poverty measurement. 
Let *0H and 0H denote the duration adjusted poverty headcount index and the standard 
headcount index, respectively. Then *0H  can be expressed as a function of 0H and the 
distribution of the duration of poverty At. 
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*
0 0(1 )H A Hε+ =  (18) 
 
This method can be used in a similar fashion to calculate the Atkinson measure and 
the social welfare loss function due to the unequal distribution of poverty depth and 
severity by replacing poverty duration, i.e., LPi(0), with the intertemporal averages of 
poverty depth and severity, i.e., LPi(1) and LPi(2). 
 
Estimating the effect of the intertemporal distribution of 
poverty 
Table 11 presents results for the four different methods of adjusting poverty rates for 
the intertemporal distribution of poverty across households. As before results are 
provided for the whole sample and for each district. Again, absent any benchmarks for 
these new extensions to standard poverty measures, including the districts individually 
shows to what extent different methods of accounting for the intertemporal 
distribution of poverty can affect poverty rankings. 
 
First, let us look at the results for the headcount index for all districts in the first 
column of Table 11. Poverty rates for the discounting method are shown for four 
different discount rates. The case of δ=1 is the same as the average income case from 
Baseline B. To test the sensitivity of the poverty measure to the choice of δ table 11 
also presents results for discount rates of 0.9, 0.5, and 0.1. First, note that as δ 
increases so do the poverty indices for all districts combined as well as for individual 
districts. This is as expected as we have shown that decreases in δ increase the 
inequality of poverty. Hence, any poverty index adjusted for the intertemporal 
distribution of poverty by discounting incomes should also go up. As past incomes are 
discounted more and δ falls to 0.9, 0.5 and 0.1, poverty headcounts for all districts 
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increase to by 1, 8 and 15 percentage points compared to the baseline of δ =1. Pα=1 and 
Pα=2 increase even more as δ falls as they are increasingly more sensitive to the 
distribution of poverty. 
 
For the Basu and Nolen method we have to pick a value for the poverty inequality 
aversion parameter β. β has to lie between zero, the case of the utilitarian measure 
from the pooled cross section in Baseline A, and one, the Rawlsian case. Choosing the 
mid point 0.5 seems a natural first choice. Another choice is to use the level of β that 
corresponds to the following value judgment: A society that in which half the people 
are always poor and the other half is always non-poor is deemed to have the same 
poverty as a society in which everyone is poor three quarters of the time. Basu and 
Nolen (2006) show that this level of β is 8/9.38 As shown in Table 11, these two levels 
of poverty inequality aversion increase the poverty headcount index for all districts by 
between 2 and 11 percentage points compared to baseline A represented by the case β 
=0. 
 
For the Borooah-based method we first need to choose a value of ε, where [ )0,ε ∈ ∞ . 
The lower bound indicates no aversion to inequality of poverty and infinity is the 
limiting case of total aversion to inequality, meaning that aggregate poverty rates are 
equal to those of the poorest household. I started by picking 0.5 and 2, which are 
commonly used values for the Atkinson index.39 As ε increases all Pα’s increase 
monotonically, by between 6 and 20 percentage points, which is slightly more than for 
the other two methods. Under the poverty inequality aversion method headcount 
 
                                                 
38 For justification see Basu and Nolen (2004). 
39 Note though that these are common values when measuring the inequality of income or consumption. 
There are no common values of aversion for the Atkinson index applied to the distribution of poverty as 
this paper is the first such application. 
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indices increase with the inequality aversion factor ρ by between 5 and 12 percentage 
points. 
 
The effect of accounting for the intertemporal distribution of poverty on the poverty 
gap and the squared poverty gap indices for all districts is shown in columns 2 and 3 in 
Table 11. As the level of α increases the effect of accounting for the distribution of 
poverty across households becomes stronger. This is because lifetime household 
poverties are increasingly unequally distributed as α rises, as seen in the last row of 
Table 11.  
 
The Basu and Nolen measure has never been applied to poverty measurement, the 
Borooh-based measure is adapted for poverty measurement in this paper, and the other 
two measures are new altogether. Given this newness and in the absence of clear 
benchmarks for choosing the poverty inequality aversion parameters in each measure, 
it is useful to examine how these different measures affect results across districts. 
 
Table 11 shows that poverty rates increase in all cases. However, the different 
methods of accounting for the intertemporal distribution of poverty across households 
affect districts’ poverty rates to different extents. Faisalabad and Attock provide a 
useful comparison as they represent the most and least unequal district in terms of the 
distribution of lifetime household poverties (see last row in Table 11). 
 
For example, for all levels of α increasing the inequality parameter in the discount 
method has a larger absolute and relative impact on poverty estimates for Faisalabad 
than for Attock. In contrast, percentage increases in poverty estimates resulting from 
an increase in ρ is similar for both districts under the poverty inequality aversion 
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method, while under the Borooah-based method the percentage increase in poverty 
estimates is greater for less unequal Attock. Unlike the other measures the Basu and 
Nolen measure is relatively unaffected by changes in the inequality parameter for the 
headcount index, and even more so for the distributionally more sensitive poverty gap 
and squared poverty gap. These comparisons across methods and different levels of 
poverty inequality aversion clearly show that accounting for the intertemporal 
distribution of poverty affects aggregate poverty measures, and that the choice of how 
to explicitly account for it matters. It also highlights the effect of relying on traditional 
static poverty measures with their implicit assumption that the distribution of poverty 
across households over time does not matter. 
 
Table 12 reports the Atkinson index for the inequality of poverty durations for the 
three Pα’s and for two values of ε. The Atkinson index in general measures how far a 
distribution is from perfect equality. In this context the index can be interpreted as the 
‘intertemporal poverty premium’ of the inequality of poverty durations. In other 
words, it shows the percentage increase in the Pα indices resulting from the actually 
existing unequal distribution of poverty spells. 
 
The increase in the intertemporal poverty measure due to the unequal distribution of 
poverty over time appears quite large regardless of our choice of ε. For all districts 
combined, even the relatively low value of 0.5 (at least low compared to estimates of ε 
based on consumer preferences) causes the ‘poverty distribution corrected’ headcount 
to increase by 22 percent. Put differently, redistributing time spent in poverty equally 
across the population, while keeping aggregate income unchanged, would reduce 
headcount poverty by 22 percent. Looking at it this way the 22 percent actually seem 
small. Ultimately, choosing the level of the intertemporal poverty premium is a 
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normative choice. The same, of course, is true for choosing δ for the discount method, 
or  β for Basu and Nolen’s measure. If one considers such a normative choice 
undesirable, one should keep that traditional poverty measure also make such a 
normative choice, albeit implicitly: by default the intertemporal distribution of poverty 
is assumed not to matter! 
 
Table 12 Intertemporal Poverty Premium due to the Unequal Intertemporal 
Distribution of Poverty 
 All Districts Faisalabad Attock 
  α=0 α=1 α=2 α=0 α=1 α=2 α=0 α=1 α=2 
ε=0.5 22% 32% 46% 24% 39% 54% 13% 91% 134% 
ε=2 68% 108% 164% 77% 125% 183% 45% 175% 276% 
 
 Badin Dir 
  α=0 α=1 α=2 α=0 α=1 α=2 
ε=0.5 16% 25% 31% 27% 19% 24% 
ε=2 61% 98% 130% 75% 77% 105% 
 
 
When disaggregated by district the intertemporal poverty premium varies 
considerably. The poorest district, Attock, is also most uniformly poor, as evidenced 
by the lowest intertemporal poverty premia for the headcount ratio (α=0). In contrast, 
poverty in the richest district, peri-urban Faisalabad, is least equitably distributed. 
 
5 Conclusions 
This paper has proposed new classes of poverty measures that extend standard static 
FGT indicators to account for two dynamic aspects that influence household and 
societal welfare: the variability over time of individual household incomes and the 
intertemporal distribution of poverty across households. 
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Economic theory, if not common sense, tells us that income variability is undesirable 
as it reduces overall intertemporal household welfare. Thus, measures of poverty that 
capture the effect of variability are conceptually superior to standard poverty measures 
for characterizing poverty over time. This paper has outlined two different ways how 
variability can be incorporated into household income measures and, by extension, 
into poverty indices. It has also presented some results for rural Pakistan comparing 
the two methods and their sensitivity towards the choice of parameters (δ, ρ). 
 
In practice, the choice of method and the selection of the variability aversion 
parameters will depend on the policy issue at hand. If the emphasis is on minimizing 
the number of households that have to endure poverty then household lifetime poverty 
should be measured using constant equivalent income. This would be appropriate in 
either of two circumstances. First, households can never (fully) recover from periods 
spent in poverty, for example in terms of physical irreversibilities or social stigma or 
second, if moving out of poverty again is disproportionately difficult or costly due to 
non-linearities and threshold effects in welfare dynamics. In contrast, if the main 
policy focus is on minimizing the social welfare loss due to income variability 
regardless of whether these income fluctuations cause households to move in and out 
of poverty over time, then using stability equivalent income would be the appropriate 
income indicator. 
 
It is also worth noting that the choice of method, and indeed the choice of parameters, 
not only depends on the particular policy focus, but also on the value judgment of the 
evaluator. Of course, economists tend not to be fond of value judgments, but if we are 
interested in social welfare some of these judgments are unavoidable. Indeed, without 
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them it would be difficult to assess the social welfare consequences of income 
variability. In practice, value judgments are often made implicitly in assessing social 
welfare, e.g., by choosing to use, say, the Gini coefficient over the Theil index in 
measuring inequality changes, or by selecting our preferred level of α for evaluating 
poverty trends. Thus, since some degree of value judgment is necessary in welfare 
economics, it is better to make it explicit. 
 
Empirically, the range of welfare losses for the two different methods are similar when 
looking at average variability adjusted incomes. Using the constant equivalent income 
method observed variability reduces Pakistani household welfare by as much as a 
third. Under the stability equivalent method this effect is between one-fifth and a 
quarter of average income, for ρ=2 and 3. At the Rawlsian extreme, which counts only 
households’ lowest incomes, the welfare loss due to variability is around half of 
average income. Furthermore, the comparison across districts showed that both 
methods of accounting for income variability can change poverty rankings. If 
resources are allocated according to these rankings, using welfare indicators that 
explicitly account for variability instead of the standard, static poverty measures can 
have important practical implications. 
 
Looking beyond income averages, the two methods differ systematically in how 
accounting for income variability affects different quantiles of the income distribution. 
Under the constant equivalent income approach, the shortfall from average incomes 
increases negligibly for the bottom 10% of the income distribution but by close to half 
for the richest ‘ever-poor’ households. The social welfare cost from income 
fluctuations is, thus, highest for households that are only temporarily poor, i.e., 
households that would never experience poverty if their incomes were more stable. 
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Clearly, the position of the poverty line is key in using the constant equivalent income 
approach.  
 
Indeed, the analytically most insightful positioning would not be at the official poverty 
line, but at a dynamic poverty threshold (if one exists). A dynamic poverty threshold 
in this context represents an unstable dynamic welfare equilibrium below which 
households would not be expected to climb out of poverty without assistance.40 
Placing the poverty line for the constant equivalent income welfare measure at such a 
threshold point would assign the greatest long-term social welfare cost from income 
variability to those households that fall below the threshold and into a poverty trap 
over time. In contrast, income fluctuations for households that were always poor are 
less ‘costly’ in terms of social welfare as, by not having crossed a threshold, the cost 
of getting them out of poverty has not increased as a result of income variability. Thus, 
in the presence of threshold effects below the poverty line the constant equivalent 
income measure can be a useful indicator for effective targeting of social safety nets 
and economic development programs.  
 
The stability equivalent income approach, in contrast, is most appropriate if we want 
to penalize income fluctuations equally across the entire income distribution. The 
calculated shortfalls from average incomes show only a slight rise across the income 
distribution, suggesting that richer households had larger fluctuations relative to their 
income level41, though these differences are small and decrease as the coefficient of 
relative variability aversion rises. 
 
                                                 
40 See Carter and Barrett (2006) for a detailed model of nonlinear welfare dynamics with dynamic 
threshold points. 
41 Perhaps some of this is due to greater measurement error for larger incomes. 
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The costs of income variability in terms of poverty can only be calculated for the 
stability equivalent income approach. For ρ=2 and 3 this results in an increase in the 
headcount index of 11 and 17 percentage points. The Rawlsian case would almost 
triple headcount income poverty, reflecting the large income fluctuations in the 
survey. 
 
This paper has also proposed two new methods for adjusting poverty indices to take 
account of the intertemporal distribution of poverty across households and derived 
another method from Borroah’s (2002) paper on unemployment. It compared these 
three methods and the Basu and Nolen’s (2006) measure by applying them to the same 
PRHS dataset. Each method requires choosing a parameter representing society’s 
preferences towards the intertemporal distribution of poverty which in turn influences 
the inequality-adjusted poverty rates. 
 
Looking at the poverty estimates for a broad range of parameters, the effect of the 
intertemporal distribution of poverty is similar in magnitude for the discounting 
method, the Basu and Nolen method and the poverty inequality aversion method, with 
percentage point increases in poverty of up to 15. The Borooah-based method appears 
to weight the intertemporal distribution of poverty more. At ε=2 the adjusted poverty 
rates are already higher than for the highest parameters for the other methods, and ε 
can be raised to infinity. As with the variability adjusted poverty measures earlier, the 
choice of method for accounting for the intertemporal distribution of poverty across 
households depends on the particular application of interest as well as preferences for 
evaluating social welfare. 
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Finally, while the paper has treated the two dynamic extensions to static poverty 
measures separately, they can conceivably be combined. Individual household poverty 
over time can be calculated taking account of intertemporal variation. The resulting 
household lifetime poverty or income measures can then be aggregated through one of 
the concave aggregation techniques that account for the intertemporal distribution of 
poverty across households. 
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Chapter 5: 
Microeconomic Determinants of Income Inequality in 
Rural Pakistan 
1 Introduction 
Poverty reduction policies after the Washington consensus have largely focused on 
fostering economic growth. However, since the late 1990s income distribution has 
been ‘brought back in from the cold’ (Atkinson 1997) and is making its way back onto 
the international policy agenda (Kanbur and Lustig 1999). This renewed interest in 
inequality is due to the emerging consensus that income inequality has an important 
influence on poverty reduction, both in theory and in practice (for an overview see 
Fields (2001)). This works through two main channels. First, the degree of inequality 
directly determines how a given amount of economic growth is shared among all 
members of society across the entire income distribution. Second, inequality can have 
an indirect impact on poverty reduction by reducing the amount of economic growth 
itself. 
 
Given that income inequality matters for reducing poverty it is surprising how little is 
known about the determinants of the level of income inequality and, even more so, 
about the determinants of changes in the distribution of income (Kanbur 2000). Such 
knowledge would be highly relevant for policy purposes as it would enable policy 
makers to decide whether and how to take action.42 For example, knowing what 
factors determine income inequality would highlight whether existing inequalities are 
                                                 
42 These decisions should ideally depend on whether inequalities are deemed to be instrumental, for 
example resulting from rewards to risk-taking, enterprise, education or savings, or dysfunctional, for 
instance due to political connections, discrimination or inheritance (Killick 2002). 
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due to intrinsic unchangeable characteristics, such as location or ethnicity, or due to 
variables whose distribution can be changed through policy, for instance, through 
broadening access to education. In sum, gaining better insights into the determinants 
of inequality would help to assess the distributional effects of existing and new 
poverty reduction and growth policies. This is relevant not only for policies 
specifically aimed at making the distribution of income more equitable, but also for 
assessing whether any proposed new policy is likely to affect the distribution of 
income via impacts on the distribution and returns of the determinants of income 
inequality. 
 
Pakistan provides an interesting case study for examining the determinants of income 
inequality. High poverty rates, particularly in rural areas, make poverty reduction 
imperative. However, the extent to which overall economic growth has reduced 
poverty depended greatly on concurrent changes in the distribution of income. During 
the second half of the1980s relatively fast growth in agricultural output substantially 
reduced poverty. In contrast, even higher rates of agricultural growth during the 1990s 
have bypassed many poor (World Bank 2002) because growth was accompanied by an 
increasingly unequal distribution of income. This suggests that to reduce poverty 
effectively in rural Pakistan it is important to look beyond the growth dimension and 
gain a better understanding of underlying structure of income inequality; in particular, 
to examine what factors determine the level of income inequality, what drives changes 
in the distribution of income, and whether these changes are due to changes in the 
distribution or due to changes in the returns to particular factors. As yet, there have 
been no attempts to disentangle these dynamic issues although this can provide 
important insights to make poverty reduction policies more effective. 
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Inequality decomposition studies on Pakistan to date have relied on traditional 
decomposition techniques and were, thus, unable to explore the. For the 1970s de 
Kruijk and van Leeuwen (1985) and de Kruijk (1987) conclude that inequality was 
rising due to non-labor income and ‘other sources of income’, mainly remittances. 
Labor income was the most important source of inequality. However, since labor 
income accounted for 80 per cent of income but only 60 per cent of the Theil index, 
increases in labor income were actually inequality reducing. Land and property 
income became less important as source for inequality, even in rural areas. Spatial 
factors and variations across occupation groups were only minor sources of inequality. 
 
Studies by Adams and co-authors (Adams and Alderman 1992; Adams 1994; Adams 
and He 1995) decompose income inequality in the late 1980s, identifying agricultural 
income as main source of inequality, accounting for between 27 to 46 per cent of total 
inequality. Further decomposing agricultural income they conclude that land 
ownership alone accounted for between a third and a half of total inequality, with 
labor and crop profits accounting for the other half of agricultural income inequality. 
Income from livestock and from non-farm activities was more important for the poor, 
and hence tended to reduce inequality. However, as is typical for these types of 
income source decompositions, Adams and co-authors find that non-farm income, 
transfers, and rentals either increased or reduced inequality, depending on the 
inequality index used. 
 
This paper goes beyond the existing static inequality decompositions and examines the 
drivers of inequality in a dynamic context and in terms of variables that are more 
relevant for policy. For this purpose it adapts a regression-based inequality 
decomposition technique which possesses a number of important advantages over 
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traditional inequality decompositions by income source (Shorrocks 1982) or by sub-
group(Shorrocks 1984). Most importantly, it allows patterns and changes in inequality 
to be analyzed not in terms of outcomes, but in terms of the drivers of these outcomes. 
Traditional inequality decompositions are primarily descriptive. They can tell us what 
types of incomes or sub-groups account for inequality, but since by design their 
analysis does not incorporate household endowments and characteristics, their 
conclusions tend to remain vague as to whether and how to address income inequality.  
 
This paper uses the same data as the studies by Adams and co-authors. Therefore, it 
can, in a familiar setting, examine the dynamics and the root causes of income 
inequality. For example, the dynamic analysis finds that higher education has made 
the distribution of income more equal over time. While an interesting finding in itself, 
the more relevant insight is that this took place because access to higher education has 
become more equal, despite the simultaneous inequality-raising effect of increases in 
returns to higher education. 
 
The next section provides a brief overview of existing approaches to analyzing income 
inequality. Section 3 lays out the decomposition methodology used in this study. The 
data are introduced in Section 4. The results from the econometric analysis in section 5 
describe the determinants of the level of, and changes in, income inequality, and 
describe to what extent changes in inequality over time are due to changes in the 
distribution of factors versus changes in factor returns. Section 6 concludes. 
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2 Existing approaches to explaining inequality 
To date poverty and inequality research has tended to focus on the link between 
growth and poverty reduction, the impact of growth on inequality, and the impact of 
inequality on growth. In contrast, there have been far fewer attempts to explain the 
factors that influence the distribution of income. One strand of the inequality literature 
has tried to explain theoretically why inequality exists and persists. These studies have 
tried to model the link between income inequality and asset inequality or credit market 
imperfections (Banerjee and Newman 1993; Galor and Zeira 1993). 
 
A second, applied strand of the literature uses one of two inequality decomposition 
techniques: decomposition by income source following Fei et al. (1978), Pyatt et al. 
(1980) and Shorrocks (1982); and decomposition by population sub-group in the 
tradition of Blinder (1973), Oaxaca (1973) and Shorrocks (1984). Most existing 
country studies on the determinants of inequality apply these techniques, including all 
existing studies on Pakistan (de Kruijk 1987; Adams and Alderman 1992; Adams 
1994; Adams and He 1995). The analysis in both of these types of decomposition 
studies is statistical in nature. By construction they have to exclude a range of 
variables, which are likely to matter and which policy can influence. For instance, the 
decomposition by income source can help to identify how much of income inequality 
is due to, say, agricultural income, non-agricultural income, rent, and transfers. 
However, it cannot assess how other important factors such as household composition, 
human capital or location influence income inequality. Similarly, decomposition by 
subgroup can display how income varies between certain subpopulations, but it does 
not indicate why it varies.  
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These two strands of the inequality literature have left a gap between the statistical 
analysis of inequality on the one hand and economic theories of its causes on the 
other. A small but growing number of studies has aimed to bridge that divide using a 
regression-based technique developed and refined by Fields (2003)43, Ravallion and 
Chen (1999) and Heltberg (2003). This technique combines income regression 
analysis with Shorrocks-type income source decomposition, where the ‘income 
sources’ in the second stage decomposition analysis are determined by the first stage 
income regression. This technique allows us to go beyond decomposing inequality 
changes simply in terms of income components and subgroups. Instead, we can 
explain inequality by any factor that can be included in an income or consumption 
regression, including variables that are relevant for policy. This enables us to explore 
two key areas where our understanding of inequality is weak (Kanbur 2000): the 
causes of inequality at country level; and inequality, and its causes, at different levels 
of aggregation between broadly defined groups, for example by household 
demographics, education, region, or ethnic group.  
 
3 Methodology 
The regression-based inequality decomposition proposed by Fields (2003) allows us to 
assess how much inequality at one point in time is explained by each determinant. In 
addition, changes in inequality over time can be decomposed into those resulting from 
changes in the distribution of individual determinants and those which come about due 
to changes in the returns to each determinant. 
 
                                                 
43 It first appeared in 1995 in a working paper by Gary Fields entitled “Accounting for Changing Wage 
Inequality”. 
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Determinants of the level of inequality 
The first step towards estimating the determinants of income inequality is to estimate 
the determinants of income using a standard income regression 
 
ln ε= + +y α Xβ  (1) 
 
where ln y is the N-vector of the logarithm household income per adult equivalent, α is 
the intercept, X is the NxK matrix of k household characteristics, and ε is the normally 
distributed error term 2(0, )N εε σ∼ . Following common practice with these types of 
income equations I use a linear model with a semi-log specification, and include as 
regressors variables which help to describe a household’s ability to earn income. 
These include variables on household demographics, assets, education and location.  
 
Some of these covariates of income may be considered endogenous, certainly over 
longer time periods. For example, household size is affected by migration decisions, 
and the level of household assets and education depends on the household’s own 
decisions. However, it is unclear what instruments I could use for these. Moreover, 
since the period of analysis spans only three years I treat all household characteristics 
as exogenous. 
 
The second step is to use the estimates from the regressions to construct factor 
inequality weights for each variable in the regression. This is done by exploiting the 
analogy to Shorrocks’ (1982) inequality decomposition by income source, which has 
shown that income inequality can be decomposed into its K factors such that: 
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where cov( , )ky y is the covariance between income from factor k and total income, 
and 2yσ  is the variance of total income. sk represents the proportion of income 
inequality due to source k, or the relative factor inequality weight of factor k. The sum 
of all sk’s adds up to one, and the sum of all K income sources equals total income. 
 
Following Fields (2003) we can replace the yk in equation 2 with household 
characteristic xk’s predicted contribution to total household income from equation 1, 
ˆ
k kxβ . Then, the relative factor inequality weight of xk is given by equation 3. 
 
2 2
ˆˆ ˆ ( , )cov( , ) cov( , )
kk x kk k k k
k
y y y
x yx y x y
s
β σ ρβ β
σ σ σ
= = =  (3) 
 
In practice, it is most convenient to use the middle expression of equation 3. Then, the 
sk’s can be computed by multiplying their respective ˆkβ  from equation 1 by the 
coefficient obtained by an OLS regression of the respective xk on log income 
(Ravallion and Chen 1999). The relative factor inequality weight has the following 
interpretation: inequality increases for any factor with a positive sk, it decreases for sk 
negative, and remains unchanged for factors with sk=0. The factor inequality weight 
corresponding to the error term of the regression, ε, identifies the proportion of 
inequality unexplained by the variables included in income regression 1. sε is 
calculated analogously to the other sk’s. Therefore, 
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Equation 4 shows that the explanatory power of the regression determines the 
proportion of inequality that can be explained. Put differently, any analysis of income 
inequality and its changes is only as meaningful as the underlying income regression. 
 
To gauge the proportion of explained inequality that is due to factor k we can calculate 
the percentage contribution  or ‘p weights’, pk, which are simply the factor inequality 
weight divided by the R squared of the regression (Fields 2003): 
2
k
k
s
p
R
= . 
 
Compared to other methods of inequality decomposition this regression based 
decomposition technique possesses a number of advantages (Fields 2003; Heltberg 
2003) that make it more versatile, and potentially insightful, for policy purposes. First, 
it is not limited to predetermined income sources. Instead, inequality can be 
decomposed into any factor explained by an income regression. Second, it makes it 
easy to combine the relative factor inequality weights of a subset of variables into a 
single group factor inequality weight, sg, as shown in equation 5. 
 
2
ˆcov( , )k kk g
g k
k g y
x y
s s
β
σ
∈
∈
= =
∑
∑  (5) 
 
This adding up of sk’s also works for non-continuous x variables, such as dummies 
and categorical variables, regardless of variable units. For example, if we are 
interested in the contribution of age of the household head on inequality, the sk’s of 
age and age squared can simply be added. 
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Third, we can combine subgroup and source inequality decomposition in one analysis. 
Subgroups can be added to equation 1 by including subgroup specific dummy 
variables resulting in equation 6. 
 
ln α β δ ε= + + +y X D  (6) 
 
The only restriction is that subgroups have to be exogenous (Heltberg 2003). Even if 
the primary interest lies in subgroup decomposition, using subgroup dummies in a 
regression-based inequality decomposition is still preferable to standard inequality 
subgroup decomposition for two reasons: it is possible to simultaneously control for 
other household and community specific variables through the X in equation 6, and it 
is more convenient for handling multiple subgroup categories.44 
 
Note also that the choice of which subgroup dummy to omit in equation 6 does not 
influence the inequality decomposition results as it does not affect the ˆkβ ’s or the 
explanatory power of the income regression. When a different subgroup is omitted 
only the regression constant α and the coefficients of the individual dummies, the 
βD‘s, and their respective individual factor inequality weights change; but the sum of 
factor inequality weights for the set of all subgroup dummies does not change. Total 
inequality can thus be expressed as the sum of inequality due to household 
characteristics X, inequality due to differences in returns to sub-groups D, and 
unexplained residual inequality. 
 
                                                 
44 In standard subgroup decomposition the number of subgroups is the product of the number of 
categories. For instance, if there are ten regions and we decompose by gender of the household head 
and by region this results in twenty subgroups. With available sample sizes this can quickly lead to 
imprecise within-group estimates (Morduch and Sicular 2002). 
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Fourth, as in Shorrocks’ (1982) ‘natural decomposition’45, we have
1
1
K
k
k
s sε
=
+ =∑ . This 
means that the regression constant α does not affect inequality. This can also be seen 
by inserting the covariance between the constant and error term, cov( , ) 0yε = , into 
equation 2. The resulting relative factor inequality weight is zero by definition. This 
makes sense as our inequality decomposition is designed to explain what accounts for 
differences across incomes in a population, that is, how and why they differ from α, 
the underlying level of income shared by everyone. This point is worth stressing as 
there are decomposition methods (see, e.g., Wan 2002) which treat the constant as a 
factor to be used to explain inequality. While it is clear that giving each household an 
additional rupee of income would reduce the level of income inequality, the constant 
does not help explain what determines the differences in income that we do see, which 
is, of course, exactly what our inequality decomposition sets out to do.46 
 
Fifth, the factor inequality weights are derived axiomatically and are independent of 
the inequality measure being used as shown formally in Fields (2003: 4-7). This is an 
elegant theoretical result, but also has the practical advantage that results don’t change 
with decision makers’ favorite inequality measures. 
 
Determinants of changes in inequality 
The factor inequality weights decomposition technique can also be used to examine to 
what extent changes in inequality over time are due to changes in returns to factors 
                                                 
45 The ‘natural decomposition’ of the variance assigns to the kth factor half the value of all the 
interaction terms involving k. 
46 In Wan’s (2002) application of his method to rural China the constant accounts for more than 75 per 
cent of mean income and its contribution to overall inequality, for instance for the Gini coefficient, is -
245.05%, whereas the contribution of all factors in the income regression is +323.67%. The 
interpretation of this is that the inequality ‘reducing’ effect of the constant almost cancels out any 
inequality that exists in the economy. In contrast, other inequality decomposition techniques, including 
the one in this paper, provide ways to explain what determines the actual inequality among incomes we 
observe (which is closely related to the difference between the percentages above: 323-245). 
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and due to changes in the distribution of factors. This requires at least two comparable 
surveys so that the same income regression equation can be estimated for each period. 
 
Let It denote the inequality index at time t and sk,t represent the relative factor 
inequality weight of factor k in period t. Then, following Jenkins (1995), changes in 
any commonly used inequality measure can be expressed as a function of the relative 
factor inequality weights and the inequality index in each period: 
 
( ) ( )2 1 ,2 2 ,1 1 ,2 2 ,1 1
1
K
k k
k
I I s I s I s I s Iε ε
=
 
− = − + − 
 
∑  (7) 
 
Therefore, the relative contribution of the kth factor to changes in inequality can be 
written as 
 
( ),2 2 ,1 1
2 1
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k k
k
s I s I
I
I I
−
Π =
−
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where, analogously to the relative factor inequality weights in equations 4 and 5, the 
Πk (I)’s and Πε (I) sum to one: 
1
( ) ( ) 1
K
k
k
I Iε
=
Π +Π =∑ . Note, however, that unlike in the 
decomposition of the level of inequality in the previous section, the decomposition of 
changes in inequality equations 8 and 9 depends on I. Hence, the factor inequality 
weights in the decomposition of changes in inequality, the Πk‘s, are no longer 
independent of our choice of inequality measure. 
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To calculate the Πk‘s in equation 8 we need the factor inequality weights for each 
factor in each period, that is, all the sk,t‘s. These are constructed as follows. First, 
estimate a panel data model of the form: 
 
ln t t t tα β γ= + + + +Y X TX U ε  (9) 
 
This extends equation 1 by adding a time dummy T and allowing for unobserved 
heterogeneity across households U=(u1 ,…, un). Then, use the coefficients from 
equation 9 to compute the sk,t‘s in a similar fashion to the single period sk’s in equation 
3: 
 
1 2
,1 1 ,2 2
,1 ,22 2
ˆ ˆcov( , ) cov(( ) , )
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k k k k k
k k
y y
x y x y
s s
β β γ
σ σ
+
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In principle, the relative factor inequality weights in equation 10 could also be 
calculated from cross sectional data, as for example, in Fields (2003). However, the 
key advantage in using panel data is that it makes it easy to decompose the 
determinants of changes in income inequality over time into changes in inequality due 
to changes in returns to factors of income and changes in the distribution of these 
factors. The estimate of γ shows directly whether changes in returns over time to 
household characteristics and sub-groups are statistically significant. For example, a 
positive (negative) γk indicates that returns to factor k have increased (decreased) over 
time and, hence, that changes in returns to factor k have increased (decreased) income 
inequality. Furthermore, the estimate of γk shows indirectly whether changes in the 
distribution of k have resulted in a change in inequality. For instance, if Πk is positive 
so that household characteristic (or subgroup) k increases income inequality over time 
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and γk is zero or negative, then the increase in income inequality due to k was due to 
an increasingly unequal distribution of k. In sum, with panel data it is possible to 
distinguish between changes in returns to factors and changes in the distribution of 
factors without having to rely on the additional strong statistical assumptions from 
earlier cross-sectional data studies (Fields and Yoo 2000; Bourguignon et al. 2001).  
 
4 Data and choice of variables 
The data in this study are taken from the Pakistan Rural Household Survey (PRHS) 
conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). Spanning 14 
rounds between July 1986 and October 1991 the survey collected data for around 900 
rural households in 46 villages located in four districts in three provinces: Badin in 
Sindh, Dir in the North Western Frontier Province, and Attock and Faisalabad in 
Punjab. As often with rural panel surveys, the selection of districts was not random: 
the first three were selected specifically because they are among the poorest in their 
province. The richer district of Faisalabad was included as a contrasting control 
district. The survey is therefore not representative for Pakistan as a whole. It should, 
however, reflect conditions in poor rural areas. Villages within districts and household 
within villages were selected by stratified random sampling. 
 
The survey contains detailed information on income, expenditures, education, labor 
and employment, migration, and land ownership and use, crop production, and 
livestock ownership. Men and women were included in the survey through separate 
questionnaires. Due to the irregular spacing of rounds across the five years the data 
display varying degrees of seasonality. To overcome this I follow previous studies that 
have used these data, for example Baulch and McCulloch (1998), and combine rounds 
by year yielding annual data. The composition of survey modules varies slightly 
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across rounds and years, so that not all information is available for all years. The years 
1986/87 and 1988/89 were chosen as they provide the most detail on education and 
asset variables; factors which a priori are assumed to be important contributors to 
inequality. Other years lack either full education or asset data, or both.47 
 
Consumption is often preferred over income as the measure of welfare. If households 
have a way to smooth consumption over time, through savings or through access to 
credit or insurance, then consumption is a better indicator of the underlying level of 
well-being. However, this paper follows previous studies which have used the PRHS 
dataset and use income as the welfare measure for three reasons. First, consumption 
data was not collected in all rounds and even when it is available it is not directly 
compatible across rounds due to different recall periods. Second, there is little 
evidence of consumption smoothing and risk sharing within villages (Alderman 1996), 
which implies that income and consumption are more closely correlated than in other 
settings. Third, household consumption and income are almost identically distributed, 
especially for the years used in this paper (Alderman and Garcia 1993), so that either 
measure can be used without significant changes in the results. The particular income 
measure used is the logarithm of household income per adult equivalent with 
household members weighted by the WHO caloric equivalence scale.48 
 
The selection of explanatory variables is informed by human capital theory and 
production theory supplemented by indicators for household composition and 
                                                 
47 Occupation is another potentially important factor for explaining income. However, since the dataset 
only provides occupational information for the first year occupation variables were dropped to make the 
static and dynamic income inequality decompositions comparable.  
48 Inequality measures give different results for the logarithm of income than for income. However, we 
can use the logarithmic transformation of incomes as the objective is to identify the percentage 
contributions of individual factors to income inequality, and these percentage contributions are not 
affected by choosing income or log income. 
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geography. They fall into four main categories: household demographics, education, 
physical assets and location. First, demographic characteristics are included to control 
for the effect of different household composition on the ability to earn income. The 
age of the household head and its square capture experience and life cycle effects. A 
dummy for female household heads was dropped as it was not significant in any 
model specification. A considerable number of Pakistanis work as migrant workers in 
the Gulf States. As their remittances can have a significant impact on household 
income, dummies are included if any family members are currently abroad or have 
been in the past. The number of working-age members and children per adult 
equivalent are included as regressors to control for the age composition of the 
household. Household size in adult equivalent units controls for economies of scale. 
Since the sample includes some very large households (with up to 28 members), 
which may be larger than the most efficient size, household size is also entered as a 
squared term. 
 
Second, human capital theory suggests that ability to earn income is dependent on the 
level of education. Human capital is captured by four variables: primary, middle and 
secondary school, and college education. Each of these is measured in per adult 
equivalent terms since the education levels of individual household members are likely 
to be of benefit for the household as a whole. 
 
Third, control over physical assets affects a household’s ability to generate income, 
particularly in rural areas where agriculture and animal husbandry represent important 
livelihood strategies. The income regressions below, therefore, include a number of 
physical capital variables. Access to and ownership of irrigated and non-irrigated land 
is an important productive asset in rural Pakistan. Other significant agricultural assets 
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included represent the degree of irrigation and mechanization in agriculture, namely 
the value of tube wells, tube sheds, dukans (workshops), and tractors. Livestock 
holdings are combined into a single livestock asset index measured in Tropical 
Livestock Units. The value of all real estate owned by the household is intended to 
capture general household wealth and collateral. All continuous asset variables are 
measured in per adult equivalent terms to reduce heteroscedasticity.  
 
Fourth, the capacity to earn income is likely to vary with location of the household. 
Distance to output and input markets affects the degree of economic interaction with 
outside the village and is modeled by the distance to tehsil and district capitals. 
Neighborhood effects and local culture, natural endowment and climatic effects are 
controlled for using village dummy variables. 
 
Table 13 provides a summary of descriptive statistics for the sample. The 1307 
observations are those used in the panel income regression reported in table 15. They 
include 688 different households. This reduction in the number of households 
compared to the full sample is partly due to random attrition as some panel household 
were not re-interviewed due to administrative and political reasons, and partly because 
not all variables are available for all household in both periods. 
 
Recall that while the choice of inequality index does not influence the determinants 
of the level of inequality, it does affect the determinants of changes income 
inequality. As a robustness check results from the decomposition of changes in 
inequality are reported for three inequality measures: the Gini coefficient and two 
indices from the class of generalized entropy (GE), namely the Theil index GE(1), 
and the Mean Log Deviation of incomes from their mean GE(0).Table 14 summarizes 
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Table 13 Descriptive Statistics 
# of Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Income per adult equivalent (in Rupees) 1307 3959 4034 1 62983
Demography
Age of household head 1307 45.7 14.8 16 92
Age of household head squared
Household member abroad in the past 1307 0.03 0.18 0 2
Household member abroad now 1307 0.07 0.37 0 5
Number of working age members per capita 1307 0.69 0.22 0.23 1.20
Number of kids per capita 1307 0.27 0.20 0.00 0.82
Household size (adult equivalents) 1307 7.75 3.60 2 28
Education
Primary education per capita 1307 0.038 0.064 0 0.405
Middle school education per capita 1307 0.017 0.042 0 0.381
Secondary education per capita 1307 0.021 0.051 0 0.401
College per capita 1307 0.009 0.035 0 0.398
Physical Assets
Land
Land owned per capita 1307 1.58 6.00 0 108
Irrigated land owned per capita 1307 0.60 1.49 0 13
Land operated per capita 1307 1.08 1.64 0 28
Irrigated land operated per capita 1307 0.70 1.14 0 10
Agric Assets
Tubewell value per capita 1307 67 1094 0 34258
Tubeshed value per capita 1307 7 116 0 2959
Dukan value per capita 1307 234 2001 0 54670
Tractor value per capita 1307 39808 260358 0 3189834
Livestock (TLU)
TLU per capita 1307 0.532 0.440 0 4
House value per capita 1307 7568 12894 0 127829
Location
Distance to Tehsil Capital 1307 13 9 0 40
Distance to District Capital 1307 37 26 0 99  
 
the aggregate levels and changes in income distribution for the sample used over the 
two periods. All three indices show an increase in income inequality varying between 
7.5 and 21 per cent. This represents a substantial increase in aggregate inequality over 
the two years. The inequality decomposition analysis below shows that this upward 
trend in overall inequality is the combined effect of inequality increasing and 
inequality reducing factors, with the former outweighing the latter. 
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Table 14 Inequality over time in the sample 
 Gini 
coefficient 
Theil index 
(GE(1)) 
 
Mean log 
deviation 
(GE(0)) 
Observations 
1986/1987 0.37 0.27 0.25 651 
1988/1989 0.40 0.33 0.29 656 
Change 7.5% 21.0% 17.1%  
 
5 Results 
Determinants of income 
The income regressions in table 15 explain log income per adult equivalent as a 
function of demographic, education, asset and location variables of the household. The 
semi-log functional form is appropriate not only because it facilitates the inequality 
decomposition, but also because the logarithmic transformation eliminates the 
skewness of the income variable. Columns 1 and 2 represent estimates of equation 1 
for 1986/87 and 1988/89. These OLS estimates take account of the stratification and 
primary sample unit structure of the data. The panel data equation 10 is estimated by 
random effects Generalized Least Squares with results provided in column 3. 
 
The overall explanatory power of the regressions is satisfactory for an income 
regression. R-squareds between 0.41 and 0.43 fall in the middle of the range for 
income regressions used for inequality decompositions in previous studies by Fields 
(2003) in the United States (0.38-0.41), Heltberg (2003) in Vietnam (0.55-0.71), and 
Ravallion and Chen (1999) in rural China (0.22-0.25).49 Nonetheless, one should keep 
                                                 
49 It also compares favourably with income regressions in studies that have used the same data for rural 
Pakistan, for example, McCulloch and Baulch (2000) or Kurosaki (2006). 
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in mind that these R-squared levels mean that more than half of income inequality 
cannot be explained by the variables collected in the household survey. 
 
The fit of the income regressions can be slightly improved by accounting for 
complementarities between physical assets, human capital and demographic and 
spatial characteristics by including the respective interaction terms. However, I have 
decided against using interaction terms for four reasons. First, it is not obvious how 
the inequality weight of the interaction term should be assigned between the two 
variables that make up the interaction term. Second, factor inequality weights would 
no longer sum to one, that is, ‘explain’ total inequality. Third, the inequality 
decomposition results would vary across different measures of inequality even in the 
‘levels’ decomposition. And fourth, including interaction terms improved the 
explanatory power of the regression by less than 2 per cent and, thus, would only have 
a marginal influence on factor inequality weights. 
 
The individual regressors in table 15 have all the expected signs. This holds for both 
single year regressions as well as in the random effects panel data regression. Log 
household income per adult equivalent increases with the age of the household head.50 
Income is higher if a household member has been or is abroad and if there are more 
household members of working age per adult equivalent, that is, if the household labor 
force is larger. Income is lower the more children there are per adult equivalent and 
the larger the household is in general. The latter is consistent with the findings of 
Baulch and McCulloch (1998) who use the same data set. 
 
                                                 
50 The negative coefficient for age of household head squared only reverses this relationship above the 
observed maximum age. 
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Table 15 Regression Results 
Dependent variable: log income per adult 
equivalent
β t β t β t γ t
Demography
Age of household head 0.01075 1.53 0.00589 0.61 0.01131 1.17 -0.00455 -0.36
Age of household head squared -0.00011 -1.47 -0.00005 -0.57 -0.00011 -1.11 0.00005 0.36
Household member abroad in the past 0.17973 1.94 0.17385 1.35 0.20668 1.32 -0.06665 -0.35
Household member abroad now 0.19648 3.28 0.14242 2.63 0.18526 2.43 -0.11732 -1.23
# of working age members per capita 0.42196 2.45 0.24898 1.23 0.43501 2.16 -0.17772 -0.63
# of kids per capita -0.28050 -1.55 -0.05649 -0.24 -0.27088 -1.31 0.24927 0.85
Household size (adult equivalents) -0.01524 -0.62 -0.01180 -0.55 -0.01835 -0.68 0.00846 0.26
Household size squared (adult 0.00045 0.42 0.00032 0.35 0.00060 0.46 -0.00037 -0.24
Education
Primary education per capita -0.13524 -0.42 0.21496 0.41 -0.16642 -0.48 0.74957 1.15
Middle school education per capita 0.21858 0.50 1.62984 2.41 0.25738 0.51 0.94946 0.95
Secondary education per capita 1.51347 3.29 1.50938 1.09 1.63359 3.89 -0.11083 -0.12
College per capita 2.07299 3.29 2.77065 4.14 1.69512 2.59 2.50288 2.14
Physical Assets
Land
Land owned per capita 0.01152 4.98 0.00871 1.64 0.01188 2.58 -0.00343 -0.42
Irrigated land owned per capita 0.08487 4.17 0.09716 4.03 0.08391 3.64 0.01389 0.45
Land operated per capita 0.01978 1.26 0.03206 1.49 0.01818 0.85 0.00750 0.21
Irrigated land operated per capita -0.00612 -0.13 -0.01008 -0.25 0.00035 0.01 0.00446 0.08
Agric Assets
Tubewell value per capita 0.00003 1.28 0.00003 1.87 0.00003 0.66 0.00000 0.02
Tubeshed value per capita 0.00050 1.07 0.00002 0.46 0.00039 0.90 -0.00033 -0.69
Dukan value per capita 0.00002 1.99 0.00002 7.52 0.00002 1.01 0.00001 0.29
Tractor value per capita 0.00000 1.34 0.00000 2.31 0.00000 2.02 0.00000 0.94
Other Assets
TLU per capita 0.24910 3.97 0.32264 3.24 0.24232 3.44 0.09128 0.99
House value per capita 0.00000 1.43 0.00001 2.09 0.00001 2.23 0.00000 0.82
Location
Distance to Tehsil Capital -0.00388 -3.53 -0.01315 -5.53 0.00467 0.24 -0.00451 -0.27
Distance to District Capital -0.01112 -17.88 -0.01802 -11.78 0.00261 0.08 -0.00203 -0.17
Village Dummies Yes Yes Yes
R-squared (total) 0.43 0.41 0.420
                 within 0.250
                 between 0.480
Number of observations 651 656 1307
Number of households 651 656 688
Wald chi squared (130) 796
p-value 0.000
Survey regression 
1986/87
Survey regression 
1988/89
Panel regression (random effects) 
1986/87 & 1988/89
(1) (2) (3)
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The education coefficients measure the additional income from different levels of 
education per adult equivalent. The size of the effect of education on income as well 
as its significance tends to increase with the level of education achieved. Primary and 
middle school education do not seem to affect income significantly. Higher levels of 
education, either secondary or college, have a noticeable positive impact on income. 
Again this is similar to the findings of other studies in rural Pakistan (Adams and He 
1995; McCulloch and Baulch 2000). 
 
Physical assets are also positively correlated with income, again mirroring the findings 
of  Adams and He (1995) and McCulloch and Baulch (2000). The regression results 
suggest that the ownership of land is more important than the amount of land operated. 
In addition, for owned land there is a large difference between irrigated and non-
irrigated land with the former contributing about eight times as much to income as the 
latter. 
 
Other agricultural assets in the form of irrigation equipment, sheds, and tractors tend 
to have a significant positive impact on income, even if the size of the coefficients is 
small. Livestock holdings and the value of all houses owned by the household are also 
positively correlated with income. Livestock is a directly productive asset, and the 
value of houses owned can serve as collateral to borrow for investment. 
 
Finally, the location of the household has a significant effect on its earning capacity. 
The further a household is from the tehsil51 and district capitals, the lower is its 
income. The coefficients in the two single year regressions show this directly. In the 
panel regression, the spatial effect is picked up by the village dummies instead. This 
                                                 
51 A tehsil is roughly equivalent to a county. 
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can be seen in table 16 where the total effects of location on income inequality for 
1986/1987, given by sk,1 in column 1, and for the random effect regression, denoted by 
sk,1RE in column 3, are both 12.2 per cent. The single year and the panel regression 
only differ in how much of the spatial effect they attribute to the distance to capitals 
rather than the village dummies. 
 
Determinants of the level of inequality 
Columns 1 to 3 in table 16 show the decomposition results of the level of income 
inequality. The bold rows summarize the relative factor inequality weights for broader 
factor categories. The most important of these broader categories determining the level 
of income inequality is physical assets with a relative factor inequality weight of 17.7 
per cent, followed by location with 12.2 per cent. In terms of these broad categories 
household demographics and education account for less of overall inequality.52  
 
The most important individual factors that determine the level of income inequality 
are the amount of irrigated land owned per adult equivalent (with a factor inequality 
weight, sk,1, of 5.4%), the distance from the district capital (4.3%), the size of 
livestock holdings per adult equivalent (3.6%), the number of working age members 
per adult equivalent (3.4%), and the amount of secondary education per adult 
equivalent (3.2%). Note that the residual from the income regressions accounts for the 
largest proportion of income inequality with an sk,1 of 57per cent. By construction the 
sk’s can only explain total inequality to the extent to which the regression explains of 
total income, that is, around 43per cent of it.  
                                                 
52 This general pattern holds for both individual years 1986/87 and 1988/89. The factor inequality 
weights for the two periods, sk,1 and sk,2 vary between the two years, probably due to the small sample 
size and because income data tends to be variable. Only the results for 1986/87 are reported for brevity. 
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The corresponding percentage contributions in column 2, pk,1, show the same pattern 
as they are proportional to sk,1.
53 They are useful as they indicate directly how much 
each of the individual factors contributes to the total level of income inequality that 
can be explained. 
 
Overall land ownership, as measured by irrigated and non-irrigated land together, 
accounts for 8.2 per cent of overall income inequality. This is similar in magnitude to 
the result in Adams and Alderman (1992). They attribute between one and two thirds 
of inequality in agricultural income to unequal land ownership. Since agricultural 
income on average represents between 25 and 30 per cent of total income this puts the 
effect of land on inequality at between 8 and 22 per cent. This serves as an interesting 
cross-check of the results of the regression based inequality decomposition compared 
to a standard income source decomposition which uses the same data. The discrepancy 
to the higher end of the Adams and Alderman estimate may arise as their inequality 
decomposition is limited to using fewer factors and, hence, is likely to attribute more 
inequality to each individual factor. For example, the inequality which is explained by 
non-land agricultural assets in this paper might be captured by the ‘land’ variable in 
Adams and Alderman. Indeed, if inequalities in land ownership also lead to 
inequalities in other agricultural asset and livestock holdings, as land owning 
household may be more likely to invest in these assets, then the relative factor 
inequality weights for agricultural assets (2.5%) and livestock (3.6%) could be added 
to give an upper bound of the broader effect of land and land-determined variables on 
income inequality. The resulting 15 per cent is close to the middle of the Adams and 
Alderman range. 
 
The importance of land in determining income inequality in Pakistan is not surprising 
given that land itself is unequally distributed. The decomposition results also suggest 
                                                 
53 Recall that the pk,1 are simply the sk,1 divided by the R-squared. 
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that it is land ownership, rather than access to land, which matters most for income 
inequality. The factor inequality weights for land and irrigated land owned are large 
(5.4% and 2.8%), whereas those for land and irrigated land operated are small. 
Unequal holdings of livestock are another important source of the level of income 
inequality with a factor inequality weight of 3.6 per cent. 
 
The influence of secondary and college education on income inequality is expected, 
given their unequal distribution and their impact on the ability to earn income. In 
contrast, lower levels of education do not seem to influence the level of inequality. 
This suggests that broadening access to higher education, rather than education in 
general, has the potential to reduce income inequality. 
 
There is considerable spatial inequality in income with more remote and less irrigated 
locations being worse off. The effect of remoteness is captured by distances to district 
and tehsil capitals. The effect of the village dummies is summarized as one factor 
inequality weight for brevity. The individual 45 village dummies pick up the effect of 
interregional differences in irrigation on inequality. Agriculture in Faisalabad and 
Badin is mostly irrigated, while irrigation is very rare in Attock and covers only about 
25per cent of tilled land in Dir.  
 
Household composition also contributes to the level of inequality. Households with a 
greater number of working age members per adult equivalent are better off than those 
with a smaller household labor force per adult equivalent. In addition, having a 
household member currently abroad increases that particular household’s income and, 
thus, contributes to income inequality between households. Having had a household 
member abroad in the past has little effect on income inequality. This suggests that 
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remittances received during a member’s stint abroad only affect concurrent income 
and don’t have a substantial effect on the subsequent earnings capacity of a household, 
for example through the investment of remittances. 
 
The decomposition results in this section underline the merit of examining income 
inequality by regression based-decomposition. To understand the determinants of 
inequality it is misleading to simply look at the determinants of income and at the 
distribution of these determinants. The coefficients for land from the income 
regression in table 15 give no indication whether land is important in explaining 
income inequality. Neither do we get that information from the distribution of the land 
variables themselves. For example, although the Theil indices for land variables in 
column 10 of table 16 are lower than those for other agricultural assets, for higher 
education, or for having a household member abroad, land is actually a more 
important source of income inequality.  
 
It is, hence, the particular combination of returns to variables and their distribution 
which determines their effect on income inequality. This combined effect is what the 
relative factor inequality weights capture. The key practical advantage of obtaining 
these weights by regression-based inequality decomposition rather than traditional 
source or subgroup decomposition methods is that it is possible to decompose by any 
variable that may be responsive to policy (and that is available in a survey). In 
contrast, decomposing by income source by definition only shows what types of 
income are responsible for how much of the overall level of income inequality. This 
may be of interest at times, but it does not directly tell us what particular household 
assets, characteristics or spatial factors drive the pattern of income inequality and, by 
implication, how it can be changed. 
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Determinants of changes in inequality 
Columns 4 to 9 in table 16 show how much of the change in income inequality is 
explained by each group of factors and by each factor. A positive Πk indicates that a 
factor has led to an increase in income inequality and vice versa for a negative Πk. As 
expected the three different inequality indices give slightly different results, but the 
pattern is similar. The discussion below refers to the results for s-weights of the Theil 
index in column 5. As in the levels decomposition before the p-weights in columns 7 
to 9 display how much each factor contributes to the explained proportion changes in 
inequality. 
 
After the residual the two most important sources of rising inequality are physical 
assets and location, accounting for 36 and 31 per cent of the change in total income 
inequality, respectively. Among physical assets livestock had a larger inequality 
increasing effect than other agricultural assets and land. This is not surprising as 
livestock holdings are more variable than land ownership. The increase in inequality 
over time due to spatial factors suggests that more remote areas are not only worse of 
in terms of income levels (as we have seen in the inequality levels decomposition), but 
are falling further behind other areas which are more centrally located and, thus, more 
integrated with overall economic activity.  
 
In contrast, changes in the demographic composition and the education of households 
reduced overall inequality. Almost all of the education effect is due to changes in 
secondary education, while the most important demographic factor that reduced 
inequality is the relative size of the labor force in the household.  
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Changes in returns versus changes in the distributions of 
determinants 
Changes in the distribution of income can arise from changes in factor returns or by 
changes in the distribution of factors. Which of the two dominates is an empirical 
question. The γ’s in the second to last column in table 15 indicate whether the factor 
returns have changed over time. In conjunction with the Π’s from table 16 this makes 
it possible to attribute changes in overall inequality due to a particular factor into 
changes due to returns and changes in the distribution of that factor. For example, if γk 
is not significant, but factor k has caused a change in the income distribution, as 
indicated by its Πk, then changes in the income distribution due to factor k must have 
been due to changes in the distribution of k. 
  
Only the γk for college education per adult equivalent is statistically significant. The 
coefficient is positive, indicating that the returns to college education have increased 
over the two years. Combining that with the corresponding Πk of between -3 and -11 
per cent54 suggests that college education per adult equivalent has become more 
equally distributed over time as its returns have increased but its contribution to 
overall inequality has decreased. 
 
Five other factors have a γ with t-statistics of at least close to 1, indicating that 
changes in their returns may have contributed to changes in income inequality. The 
returns to having a household member abroad now has fallen (γk = -0.117). This is 
consistent with the two following observations. First, having a household member 
                                                 
54 Depending on the inequality measure used. 
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abroad has become a slightly less important source of overall income inequality (see 
the Πk in table 16 of between -1% and -3%). Second, the Theil index for having a 
member abroad has fallen slightly over the two years (see last column of table 16).  
 
The four other factors, primary education per adult equivalent, house value per adult 
equivalent, middle school education per adult equivalent, and tractor value per adult 
equivalent, all show increases in factor returns indicated by positive γk’s in table 15, 
and all have led to an increase of overall income inequality over time represented by 
positive Πk’s in table 16. 
 
The γk’s for all other factors are even further from statistically significant. This 
suggests that the determinants of changes in inequality discussed in the previous 
section are not due to changes in the returns to these determinants, but due to changes 
in their distribution. However, the fact that only a few γk’s approach statistical 
significance can also be due to two other reasons: first, the two-year period analyzed is 
short for significant changes in returns to matter for income distribution and, second, 
the sample size of 688 is relatively small given the large number of explanatory 
variables. 
 
One other, potentially tautological, observation is worth stressing. Even a significant 
change in the distribution of a factor, as indicated by changes in its Theil index, does 
not mean that it leads to changes the distribution of income. This is obviously true if 
the factor only makes a small contribution to income, even if it is statistically 
significant, as is the case for agricultural assets for example. Moreover, a factor’s 
impact on changes in income inequality can be in the opposite direction to the changes 
in its own distribution, as shown by the case of college education above. An opposite 
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example is the value of tractors owned per adult equivalent. This has become more 
equally distributed over time; its Theil index fell by 11 per cent. At the same time 
returns to tractors, as shown by its γk, have increased enough so that the total effect of 
tractor ownership has been an increase in income inequality, as indicated by its 
positive Πk.  
 
6 Conclusions 
This paper has examined the microeconomic determinants of income inequality in 
rural Pakistan using regression-based inequality decomposition. Although this 
technique is methodologically superior to standard income source and subgroup 
inequality decompositions it has not yet been widely used. Indeed, this study 
represents the first application to Pakistan and is only the second to exploit panel data 
to explore the determinants of changes in the distribution of income over time. This 
paper has extended existing income inequality decomposition studies for Pakistan by 
explaining the root causes of inequality and its changes in terms of household 
demographics, education, physical assets, and location. 
 
Physical assets, particularly land, are the most important broader categories for 
explaining income inequality, followed by location, demographic characteristics, and 
education. Compared to previous studies the influence of land ownership on income 
inequality is slightly smaller. This is likely a result of the regression based 
decomposition being able to simultaneously control for non-income factors. While 
land ownership is the most important determinant of the level of income inequality it 
is unlikely to contribute to reducing inequality over time. Static redistribution of 
private land is infeasible in rural Pakistan, though there is some potential to 
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redistribute up to 2.7 million acres of state land (Planning Commission Pakistan 
2005). 
 
In theory the determinants of changes in income inequality depend on the inequality 
index chosen. However, the results for the Gini and Theil indices and the mean log 
deviation display a similar pattern. Physical assets account for the greatest proportion 
of increases in inequality, followed by location. In contrast, demographic 
characteristics of the household and higher levels of education have reduced income 
inequality over time. Thus, absent any changes in returns to factors, this suggests that 
overall inequality can be reduced by extending the coverage of secondary and higher 
education. This is relatively practical as the human capital of a household can be 
changed through dynamic redistribution: households can gain education without 
taking education away from others. 
 
Spatial inequalities are another important factor in explaining changes in income 
inequality. This suggests that the efficiency of market mechanisms in narrowing factor 
returns differs across locations. While income in some areas is rising, other regions 
may experience geographical poverty traps. Since location is a clearly an 
unchangeable characteristic policy can only aim to address locational disadvantages 
through improved market access.  
 
Further decomposing the determinants of changes in inequality into changes in factor 
returns versus changes in factor distributions we found that changes in inequality are a 
result of both changes in factor returns and changes in the factor distributions which 
for some factors re-enforce each other, for others partially off-set each other. Such a 
finding has methodological and policy implications. In terms of methodology it 
  176 
highlights the advantage of using this particular inequality decomposition technique, 
as unlike other inequality decomposition methods, it can differentiate between changes 
in returns and changes in distribution. In terms of policy the more nuanced 
decomposition of income inequality that is possible using this regression-based 
method thus yields more relevant insights. Simply identifying the factors that lead to 
changes in the distribution of income is insufficient. For example, we found that 
higher education reduced inequality over time. The more practical insight comes from 
the further decomposition which showed that this reduction in income inequality was 
because the distribution of higher education became more equitable, and despite an 
inequality increasing rise in the returns to education. 
 
The findings in this paper are based on data that from the late 1980s. However, they 
are still informative today for a number of reasons. First and foremost, the structure of 
these rural economies has not changed significantly. The distribution of the most 
important assets such as land is as skewed today as it was in the late 1980s. Further, 
the determinants of welfare are remarkably similar for the early 1990s and 2002 
(Dorosh and Malik 2006) which would lead to similar regression-based inequality 
decomposition results. Second, a dynamic analysis of income inequality works best 
with panel data and there are no other sources of data for rural Pakistan to rival the 
quality of the PRHS panel. Finally, inequality increased substantially in these rural 
areas (World Bank 2002; Dorosh and Malik 2006) making an analysis of its 
determinants all the more pertinent for future poverty reduction efforts. 
 
This paper has outlined how the regression-based inequality decomposition technique 
can be a useful tool for policy analysis. This type of analysis can identify through 
which factors one could effectively tackle income inequality. Based on this policy 
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makers can make a more informed decision whether to try to influence inequality, and 
if so, through which of these factors. Indeed, the value of this type of analysis extends 
further. Even if the policy focus is squarely on reducing poverty and has no 
distributional objectives per se, it would still be useful to test how any new policies are 
likely to affect the factors determining income inequality. At a minimum subjecting 
new policies to such an ‘inequality sensitivity analysis’ would help to prevent policies 
from inadvertently worsening the income distribution. This seems especially important 
in economies such as rural Pakistan where substantial agricultural growth in the 1990s 
has not brought about substantial reductions in rural poverty because of concurrent 
increases in inequality. 
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